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 Foreword 
 
 
Liberating the Nepalese society from feudal dominated culture, 
building the consensus on major national issues among the political 
forces, and adopting an economic policy which encompasses the 
broader interest and participation of the community at large, could 
probably form the major agendas for the new political order 
determined to make a new Nepal in true sense. We could disagree 
on many issues, but at the end, results of the disagreements should 
be eventually leading to agreements after thorough discussion and 
deliberations. 
 
The past one decade made us excessively occupied on conflict 
resolutions, inclusion of the so far less attended but very deserving 
sets of people in the main stream governance and politics, social 
security benefits, distribution of wealth and properties etc. The 
struggle the whole society was restlessly fighting for, is now 
heading towards a happier ending, particularly after the recently 
concluded Constitutional Assembly election. This has brought us 
to a point from where determined efforts can be made to come 
forward to build a new Nepal in true sense. 
 
The deliberations made at last year’s meeting happened to address 
most of the major issues bothering our minds at large and their 
views were concluded to be very significant for determining the 
path to build new Nepal. The Human and Natural Resources 
Studies Centre, in collaboration with the Swiss National Centre of 
Competence in Research, took a serious note of the proceedings 
and decided to bring out the ideas expressed there in the form of a 
collection; and this publication ‘Nepal: Transition to 
Transformation ’ is an ultimate outcome of that desire. The editors 
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 of this book, Professor Kailash Nath Pyakuryal, Dr. Bishnu Raj 
Upreti, and Dr. Sagar Raj Sharma deserve special appreciation for 
formulating the concept behind this work and painstakingly editing 
the chapters. This publication cannot be or should not be 
considered a complete set of document, but can be taken as a 
starting point to move in this direction, which was to a great extent 
left out agenda in the democratization themes of the political 
development process of Nepal. 
 
Similar subsequent deliberations would help in finalizing or fine 
tuning of the views of the experts that were made valuable inputs 
in the last year’s efforts. 
 
Suresh Raj Sharma 
Vice Chancellor 
Kathmandu University 
May 2008 
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CHAPTER 1 
Inclusion and Transformation 
An Introductory Remark 
 
 Kailash N. Pyakuryal 
 
Nepal is experiencing a rapid change in its political scenario. As 
this happens, the behavior of some ruling political parties has 
become unpredictable. For many this is a worrisome development 
in the present day Nepal. Several rounds of negotiations, 
understanding and agreements have culminated into the last 
concluded 23- point agreement reached between the Seven Party 
Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists that could mark a breakthrough in 
the long stalemated political situation of Nepal. This has led to a 
final agreement to declare Nepal a Federal Democratic Republic 
and its incorporation in the third amendment to the Interim 
Constitution (IC) 2007. The third time amended Interim 
Constitution now formally declares abolishment of the 240-year 
old monarchy in Nepal. The government also announced the CA 
(Constituent Assembly) polls for April 10, 2008. When 
materialized, it will set a unique example for Nepal in the annals of 
conflict transformation in the global arena.  
 
Jan Andolan I (People's Movement) (1990/91) reinstated 
democracy in Nepal by overthrowing the Panchayat system that 
was based on absolute monarchy, and replaced it with a 
constitutional monarchy. The ensuing period of 1990-2002 was 
characterized by infighting and split among the major political 
parties which made relentless efforts to serve their own party and 
individual interests.  The King continued to have an upper hand in 
manipulating the political parties in his favour. The conduct of the 
politicians and the political parties during this period (1990-2002) 
was far from reassuring in terms of their commitment to building 
enduring democratic practices and balancing their partisan and 
individual interests with the imperatives of good governance. The 
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monarchy had even less respect for the democratic norms and the 
King took in the end all executive and legislative power himself by 
dissolving the parliament in February 1, 2005. All political parties 
except those supporting the King's move were subjected to severe 
sanctions. This created an environment for organizing a united 
people's movement, including the CPN (Maoist), for the overthrow 
of the despotic monarch and restore democracy in Nepal by all the 
political parties. Jan Andolan II (April 2006) ended the King’s 
autocratic rule and restored the dissolved parliament. The unitary 
system of governance and exclusionary institutions and practices 
were being constantly challenged, and the success of the Jan 
Andolan II has paved the way for a true socioeconomic and 
political transformation of Nepal 
 
There have been numerous proposals and a prolonged debate over 
the nature of the supra structure of Nepal. Various systems of 
federalism… based either on ethnic/caste, or language, and/or 
regional divides have been proposed. Nepal is in transition and an 
inclusive transformation leading to national integration is the 
challenge for everyone today, including the statesmen and the 
ordinary people of Nepal.  
 
False consciousness is gradually getting transformed into felt 
consciousness and the marginalized groups, including the women, 
the Dalits and the various minority groups are demanding to have a 
greater and proportional participation in all spheres of the state’s 
polity and economy.   
 
According to the census 2001, Nepal’s indigenous people, also 
known as indigenous nationalities, constituted 37.2% (8.4 million) 
of Nepal’s total population. The largest indigenous groups are: The 
Magar (7.1%), The Tharu (6.7 %), The Tamang (5.6%), The 
Newar (5.5%), The Rai (2.8%), The Gurung (2.4%) and The 
Limbu (1.6%). The percentage of people from the plains, according 
to the census, was given as 28.5%.  This official figure may be 
underestimated, because the counting seems to leave out groups 
like the Muslims, the Tharus, the Marwaris and the others, who 
also live largely in the plains. 
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 It is these various groups who have the least control over the 
country’s economic resources. Most such resources and higher 
political positions are in the control of the high caste/class elites 
who occupy the higher echelons of power. The country’s 
Institutions, laws, rules and organizations have been made to suit 
the elites which serve their purpose more, so that the poor and the 
marginalized are always left behind. In substance, not much has 
changed in Nepal even after the Jan Andolan II. People however, 
believe that the ever awaited formation of the Constituent 
Assembly may have answers to redress their grievances and Nepal 
will surely move forward like its neighbors and prove to the world 
that it too can develop socially and economically and become a 
stable, prosperous and democratic nation in the years to come. 
 
This book on "Nepal: Transition to Transformation ”is the outcome 
of a national conference jointly organized by the Kathmandu 
University (KU) and the Swiss National Centre for Competence in 
Research (NCCR North-South) and held in Kathmandu on June 22, 
2007. All the papers included here were originally presented in that 
conference.    
 
I endeavor to present the articles from this conference in this 
introduction in the framework of two main issues: The first is the 
issue of inclusion/exclusion. Historically, certain groups of people 
have been more privileged than others in Nepal. The Dalits, the 
women and the adibasi janjatis have been among the most 
underprivileged groups of the Nepali people who were ever kept 
out the power structure, and who had little capital assets (natural, 
human, financial, physical and social) to sustain themselves. These 
were the people who were also the hardest hit by the 10-year armed 
conflict in Nepal. The second issue is about how conflict has 
helped such underprivileged groups of people in gradually 
realizing their power, and triggers transformation to bring about a 
new national integration. I will first set forth some specific 
implications for our understanding of inclusion /exclusion in my 
discussion. 
 
Though there is no agreement on a common definition of social 
exclusion, Silver and Miller, 2003 mention the following in this 
regard: Social exclusion is (1) multidimensional or socioeconomic, 
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and encompasses collective as well as individual resources, (2) is 
dynamic or processual, along a trajectory between full integration 
and multiple exclusion, (3) is relational in that exclusion entails 
social distance or isolation, rejection, humiliation, lack of social 
support networks, and denial of participation, (4) is active in that 
there is a clear cut agency doing the excluding, and (5) is relative 
to context. Disrespect, discrimination, and degradation are as much 
at work as monetary poverty and physical needs. In some versions, 
even the welfare state can exclude some citizens from protection or 
trap them in joblessness. 
 
The narrow definition of exclusion puts emphasis only on the need 
for inclusion of the excluded adapting to the current institutional 
environment. On the other hand, the positive concept of inclusion 
recognizes elimination of all the discriminatory institutional 
arrangements that need changing. 
 
The divisions of the Asian society are not only economic in nature, 
but also based on racial-ethnic, caste, gender, cultural, educational, 
religious and political. Because of discrepancies at various levels, 
the recent agenda for most of the States of the region has been the 
agenda of inclusive democracy that seeks to empower the poor and 
the disadvantaged people. 
 
In the past, development was equated with economic growth was 
considered to be a variable exclusion/inclusion mitigated by 
granting a right to citizenship and through elimination of absolute 
material deprivation. Poverty programs were gradually transformed 
into a fight against social exclusion to foster economic and social 
integration of the least privileged groups. Thus in the past, the 
economically weak were the excluded groups, whereas, presently 
,it also includes ,besides the poor, groups pertaining to a new 
poverty and the groups which are refused places and not  inserted 
in the society.  
 
Exclusion means relational isolation from the dominant group(s) 
plus absence of professional or cultural insertion and participation 
in a society. 
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Thinking about inclusion then would mean defining a framework 
for analysis in terms of how the incentives to relational isolation 
were or are being removed, and eventually politics of social 
insertion/inclusion installed. 
 
A broader social inclusion view encompasses a range of factors 
that prevent people from playing a full role in society. The goal of 
social inclusion is to facilitate changing the culture of work places 
and communities to make them more inclusive and become 
respectful of diversity. 
 
Here the envelope extends to the practices between the employers 
and the unions, the communities and the civil society. 
 
While impersonal institutions, dominant groups and powerful 
individuals can be agents of exclusion, the excluded must 
participate in the struggle for their own inclusion. Policies of 
inclusion must provide access, participation and voice to the 
excluded, rather than treat them as passive recipients of material 
assistance. Many programs to combat exclusion develop 
partnership with representatives of excluded groups.   
 
By merely, mainstreaming the excluded groups (assimilation) does 
not really help to empower the excluded as under such 
arrangements they are simply expected to follow the norms and 
values of the dominant group(s). Thus there is every reason to 
believe that the excluded may not want to come within the 
inclusion policy of the state, as they could end up losing their own 
identity. Similarly, some other authors such as Jackson (1999) 
argue that marginalization may not be always bad. Though 
marginalization is a constraint, it can also be turned into strength. 
Marginality may also be a good basis for demanding an equitable 
share.  
 
One group of articles in this book revolves around such issues as 
mentioned above. They either vividly describe the forms of 
inclusion/exclusion of indigenous nationalities, women, Dalits, the 
landless and the poor or they provide prescriptions for their 
improvement. 
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My second consideration to put forth would be concerning 
transformation and national integration. The People of Nepal, 
through the Jana Andolan II, have succeeded to but the monarchy 
in suspension, and realized to themselves a great degree of 
empowerment. Those (including the political parties) who 
supported the king in the past and did not participate actively in the 
Jana Andolan II have been discredited by the people, so that only 
the SPA and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) formed a 
partnership of a coalition government. In the post- revolution 
government which is supposed to be a powerful one, people at 
large and the various historically disadvantaged groups have 
clamored for greater and more judicious share of power and 
resources.  Such groups have got organized either with the help of 
their own social groups or through various political parties, and 
been putting pressure on the government for bringing about 
structural changes. Voices have been raised and demands made for 
a grant of full autonomy to them. The century old centralized 
system of governance controlled by the elites, the rich and the 
powerful has been challenged and vision of a new Nepal urged. 
 
The CPN (Maoist) party is waging a war against the old regime 
and the current establishment as an opposition. It has its own army 
and provincial governments. Capturing the interim parliament by 
force and seizing the powers of the government are some of the 
declared tactics of the Maoist party and its leadership. The ultimate 
goal is to come to power and rule the state in the way it thinks 
right. The SPA is a conglomerate of various political parties most 
of whom have faith in multi- party parliamentary democratic 
system. Thus within the government itself, there is an inherent 
conflict between the traditional and the reformist groups on the one 
hand, and a new group aiming at total structural changes, on the 
other. It is anticipated that the year- long awaited Constituent 
Assembly polls will address all these issues that have surfaced in 
Nepal that it will surely leap forward to a better and new Nepal. 
The second group of articles relates to the issues relating to 
pluralism, transition and national integration. 
 
There is a great debate going on in Nepal on federalism currently. 
One view considers federalism and autonomous states (with a 
power to self- determination) as detrimental to national integration 
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and hence such demands need to be turned down. The logic is that 
within a particular federal state there would be various minority 
groups and there is no guarantee of protection of the rights of such 
minority groups in such autonomous states. Language, religion, 
caste/ethnicity and the region do not and should not be the basis for 
such divisions. Such arrangements could divide rather than unite 
the peoples. Moreover, not all the proposed autonomous states 
would be endowed with equal resources, so that these new 
autonomous regions could also face similar problems of poor 
growth and underdevelopment. The proponents of a federal 
republic advocate that all the nationalities in Nepal were merged 
forcibly into the Gorkha state and ruled with suppression by the 
rulers and the ruling class. Since democracy has prevailed no one 
should feel subjugated by the other. If the state is decentralized and 
people are granted the freedom to federate themselves into the new 
republic of Nepal, this would mean evolving a real sense of 
belonging and inter- group and inter-state relationships. This would 
lead towards a better national integration, rather than causing the 
state’s disintegration. 
 
The book is organized into nine chapters. The introduction 
(chapter 1) explores the concepts of inclusion/exclusion and of 
national integration, as it summarizes the eight other chapters.   
 
The next three chapters (chapters 2- 4) deal with the problems of 
socioeconomic and political transformation and the issues of 
women's empowerment. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the problems of 
conflict induced displacement and exclusion of the poor people 
from land rights. The next two chapters (chapters 7-8) focus on the 
problems of landlessness, livelihood insecurity, and the question of 
national integration, and the last chapter is one of conclusion. 
Taken briefly, this is what the various chapters offer.   
 
Upreti (chapter 2) carries the view that resistance movements are 
often successful in bringing change in power relations and in 
effecting other social changes in countries with an autocratic past. 
Experiences from some of the globally recognized resistance 
movements such as the non-violent resistance movement for the 
independence of India, the Civil Rights movement in the USA, the 
non-violent struggle against the autocratic regimes of Augusto 
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Pinochet and Ferdinand Marcos by the peoples of Chile and the 
Philippines, the Rose Revolution of Georgia, the Orange 
Revolution of Ukraine, the ‘Tulip’ Revolution of Kyrgyzstan, the 
people’s movement of Lebanon, and Nepal’s popular April 
movement have amply demonstrated that despite retaining 
enormous state power and control of resources, ruling elites cannot 
sustain their regimes whereupon  they have  either to compromise 
or to surrender before the  people’s power. The case of Nepal is a 
testimony to the contributions of resistance movement in state 
transformation. The 'people’s war’ waged by the CPN (Maoist) and 
the people’s movement of April 2006 not only seriously questioned 
the relevance of nearly 400- year old royal regime but also paved 
the way for a  socio-political transformation. Feudalistic, 
centralized and exclusionary state structures are being openly 
challenged. The civic movement of April 6-24, 2006 proves that 
people’s power can defeat an autocratic, feudal regime by a 
peaceful means. However, adherence to strict discipline, sincere 
commitment, leadership quality and faith in people’s inner strength 
are needed to sustain the achievements of a successful resistance 
movement. 
 
Sharma mentions in chapter 3 that economists have so far made 
numerous attempts at finding the key to economic growth in the 
least developed countries (LDCs), but there is little evidence to 
suggest that they have actually found it. This paper reviews some 
of the keys that have not worked and offer pointers towards a more 
effective strategy. He does not claim to suggest that there is one 
single key to growth, but he does think there is evidence that some 
strategies work better than others. This paper attempts first to 
establish a relationship between official development assistance 
(ODA), and foreign direct investment (FDI) with policies in the 
developing countries and then proposes to adopt a few new 
strategies so that donors and governments do not have to repeat the 
old failures that keep resurfacing time and again. The paper 
examines the applicability of these strategies to countries in 
transition, focusing on the transformation of Nepal. 
 
Sharma carries the view that development in Nepal has ‘failed’ so 
far because of various factors, such as from centralisation of both 
the government and private structures in Kathmandu, an over- 
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dependence on foreign aid, widespread corruption and abuse of 
authority by bureaucrats and politicians, exclusion of large sections 
of the population from their  role of devising policy and programs, 
failure of donors to ensure proper use of their funds and effective 
coordination of their activities, to name a few. After highlighting 
some of the bitter experiences that Nepal has gone through in her 
attempt at development, the paper discusses the role that aid 
agencies can play in preventing further conflict in the country. It 
argues that foreign aid can indeed play the role of a catalyst in the 
development of poor countries, but it seems to work effectively in 
countries with 'good' environment.  However, in a country like 
Nepal where successive governments have utterly failed to make 
effective delivery of aid programmes, the donor communities also 
have the responsibility to transform themselves and exert 
appropriate pressure when required. If Nepal is to attain a genuine 
transformation, all the stakeholders, beginning from the political 
parties to the donor communities, need to reform themselves.  
Foreign aid in Nepal is part of the problem and also part of its 
potential solution. 
In her article on transformative politics and women in Nepal in 
chapter 4, Rajbhandari mentions that women in Nepal have always 
taken a lead role in the People's Movement, the People's War, and 
in all other political processes which to overcome the authoritarian 
regime. However, even after the success of the people's movements 
aimed at bringing a political transformationand socio-political 
transformation, women are kept continuously marginalized Issues 
such as violence against women in all aspects of their lives do not 
yet get proper attention. Due to a culture of impunity, which has 
continued even after the success of the historic people's movement-
II, the people responsible for the violence against women are 
exempt from punishment. Raping, abusing and torturing of women 
in society continues. This article focuses on why it is necessary to 
include women in all of the processes of transition, what 
challenges lie in accomplishing it, and how can this be 
consummated from the women's perspective 
Rajbhandari further mentions that women need to protest against 
the social inequalities and injustices from the social class structure, 
while also expressing their discontent with other forms of 
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inequalities resulting from gender, race, physical conditions, and 
sexual orientation. Women of Nepal need to enlarge the concept of 
human and women’s rights by placing social rights in the center of 
the discussion, and by also bringing up health, reproductive and 
sexual rights along with the right to live free from discrimination. 
To achieve this Rajbhandari suggests forging alliances by Women's 
Movements with other social movements, rather than keeping 
women's issues separate and isolated. 
 
In their article on ‘Conflict- induced displacement: an emerging 
phenomenon of internal migration in Nepal,’ Ghimire and Upreti 
(chapter 5) mention that the phenomenon of internal as well as 
external migration is not new to Nepal. Nepal has a long tradition 
of her people migrating from the mountainous region to the fertile 
land of the terai and going to different countries even beyond for 
various reasons, associated mostly with livelihood. Taking internal 
displacement as a part of the broader framework of migration, this 
article aims to focus on the different aspects of internal 
displacement caused by the conflict between the state and the CPN 
(Maoist).The ever-growing problem of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) is enormous and it cannot be mitigated with the available 
meager human and financial resources. It is one of the most 
compelling crises confronting the humanitarian assistance 
community. The state is facing a serious challenge to address the 
crisis as it is not yet able to develop the norms, institutions and 
mechanism for addressing its causes and consequences and in 
finding durable solutions to it, adequately. The country cannot 
hope to have an everlasting peace without addressing the issues of 
internal displacement soundly and effectively. 
 
This article discusses other related issues concerning the internal 
displacement, with a focus on the agents and trends of 
displacement, the debate on the definition of IDPs, allocation of 
responsibility, creation of livelihoods for the IDPs, national and 
international response to Nepalese IDPs and a review of the present 
National IDP Policy 2007. Further it brings some practical 
concerns of the IDP participation in the forth coming election and 
on the issue of their return and re-integration in their village. 
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In chapter 6 Basnet describes land reform in Nepal and narrates 
how the slogan "land to the tillers" has remained a high-pitched 
slogan only by most political parties of Nepal from the early 1960s 
but not seen in practice so far. In the streets they talk of much 
revolutionary rhetoric of land reform, but in the parliament, they 
still support landlordism. This has been the history of land reform 
in Nepal according to Basnet. His paper examines how the existing 
social and economic structures have contributed to alienating poor 
or powerless people from their land rights and keeping them 
excluded from the whole development process. This paper raises 
many questions relating to land and describes the historical process 
of land rights control, the present power structure in relation to , 
land issues and in the end, the road ahead. The paper also 
illustrates how the landlords' nexus works and how they are 
managing to sustain their classical structure and hold over power. 
Finally, the paper highlights some general options for land reform 
in Nepal. 
  
Nepali describes the Dalit issues in terms of their access to land 
resources and their livelihood insecurity (chapter 7). Land is an 
indicator of a broad socioeconomic status in an agrarian society 
like Nepal. It is a fundamental productive asset, a principal source 
of livelihood and, a means of power, pride, dignity, and prestige, 
and a symbol of prosperity for the people. Describing the situation 
of the Dalits, Nepali mentions that access to land resource by the 
Dalits (which accounts for about 13 % of the total population) is 
very nominal. Especially in the terai the term Dalit is synonymous 
to landless. Dalit remains at the very bottom of the Nepali caste 
hierarchy. Reasons behind landlessness of Dalit are of two types: i) 
The Dalits were confined or trapped into bonded service by their 
clients limiting them to their traditional caste based occupation, ii) 
The historical distribution of land vividly reveals how birta system 
had granted thousands of hectares of land to the military chiefs, 
royal family members, priests, and other influential persons of the 
state. The Dalits were deprived because they did not fall under 
such an elite category. 
 
The livelihood of the Dalits is in a miserable state due to their 
landlessness. Food self-sufficiency is much lower among the Dalits 
than among the Brahmans, Chhetris and the Newars.  
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Therefore, caste based traditional work such as those of 
blacksmiths; leather workers, tailors etc. hence are also important 
economic activities for the survival of the Dalits. Even today many 
Dalit groups in the rural areas of Nepal are obliged to maintain 
their traditional ‘Bali’ and ‘Khan’ system with their clients for their 
sheer survival. Skewed and inequitable distribution of land have 
resulted in the formation of various agrarian classes having 
different power and agrarian social relations, such as the patron-
client, the super/subordinate, or relations of antagonism, 
mutualism, domination, exploitation and discrimination. As Dalits 
fall in the lowest category in terms of caste and class, they have 
been facing all kinds of exploitation. Furthermore, loss of 
livelihood is a major cause for political violence anywhere. It 
might explain why most Dalit youths joined the Maoist insurgency. 
In brief, landlessness, marginal and small landholdings and a 
chronic food deficiency of more than six months in a year are some 
of the features of the Dalit economy, the so-called "untouchables" 
in Nepal. Within the Dalit community itself, this problem is more 
acute among the Terai Dalit.  
 
 Pyakuryal in his article on pluralism, diversity and national 
integration (chapter 8) deals with the concepts of pluralism, 
diversity and national integration. The concepts of ethnicity and 
inter-ethnic group relations and theories on inter group relations, 
such as assimilation, amalgamation and bi-cultural model also get 
treated here. Continued discrimination on the basis of caste, 
ethnicity, religion, language and ecological regions make Nepal a 
fertile ground for social conflict. It is argued that the key to 
attaining national integration is respecting and recognizing the 
rights of various groups and by empowering various groups of 
people on equal footings. This needs a thorough reform in the 
existing legislation.  
 
The book concludes with Upreti's paper on ‘Moving ahead: from 
transition to transformation described in chapter 9. It briefly 
discusses the important elements with regards to ‘management of 
transition’ and components of ‘transformation’ of the old state into 
a new nation. Smooth management of transition is crucial to 
achieving lasting peace and transformation.  
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Citing Baechler el. al., 2008 Upreti mentions that it is virtually 
impossible to transform a feudalistic, centralised, unitary, 
monarchist and exclusionary country into a modern, equity-
oriented, federal Nepal without transforming the perspective, 
thinking, action and behaviour of all people of Nepal. He details 
out how and in what way this transformation can be attained. He 
argues that some of the fundamental components have been 
ignored or are missing from the transition debate. The whole 
transition management process is non-transparent, elite-centric and, 
consequently, exclusionary in nature. The mindset of key political 
actors and their unwillingness to go for an inclusive state is a major 
challenge to successful management of transition and 
transformation of the unitary top-down exclusionary state into that 
of a federal inclusive and democratic nation.  
 
In sum, the papers in this volume provide valuable insights in the 
state- of- art of the contemporary Nepal and the roadmap that lies 
ahead for it. In particular, issues related to the post-conflict 
situation and ways to transform Nepal are well described. I 
strongly believe that the discourse contained in these papers as well 
as analysis of issues in relation to transition and transformation 
could be of interest to the policy makers, planners, politicians, 
researchers and scholars in Nepal and outside alike. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Resistance Movements in Conflict 
Transformation and Social Change 
 
Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
2.1 Resistance Movement in State Transformation and 
Social Change 
 
The people’s resistant movement of April 2006 in Nepal 
(hereinafter referred to as April movement) was a non-violent 
struggle by the people to end the autocratic rule of the King and 
restore peace by transforming the armed conflict into a viable 
democratic political system. A Non-violent peace initiative 
requires a fundamentally different approach to have than that 
requires the use of force and coercive measures (Ackermann and 
Duvall, 2005) in a dominant approach.  Non-violent action theory 
(BRCCCM, 2003) provides a strong analytical framework to 
understand the civic movement of Nepal. In the area of conflict 
transformation and peace building, the conceptual framework of 
non-violent action put forth by Sharp (1973), Ghandi (1938 and 
1950), King (1963) and other peace theorists and leaders provides 
a new dimension. Proponents of non-violent theories of conflict 
transformation highlight the importance played by the people’s 
convictions and ideologies, and their commitments to achieve their 
goals through a peaceful means. In the understanding of this 
theory, conflict is a non-violent struggle for bringing about social 
justice and change. The notion of non-violent actions for social 
change brings out tensions and contradictions that already exist in 
society, but which remain denied and covered up (McCarthy and 
Sharp, 1997). 
 
The non-violent action theory adopted by Mahatma Gandhi (1938 
and 1950) and Martin Luther King (1963) stresses the need for 
peaceful protests against the adversary and to a search for moral 
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defeat of the resisting force (Mitchell, 1981). A conflict 
transformation strategy embedded in non-violent action theory 
begins with a three-fold understanding of the mass movement to 
transform the conflict, i.e., (a) conflict as an element of society, (b) 
conflict as a catalyst for social change, and (c) conflict as a form of 
reflection of people’s power to establish social justice. Hence, a 
non-violent mass movement provides a basis to understand conflict 
as a means of social change, political reform and internalization of 
the fundamentals of democracy. The experiences made by  non-
violent people’s movement on the  different parts of the world have 
demonstrated that non-violent civil movement makes more 
powerful impact  than that made by  the violent approaches (Aditya 
et al.; 2006). The instances  of 1905’s Russian popular uprising, 
the popular non-violent struggle led by Mohandas Karam Chand 
Gandhi for the independence of India, Civil rights movement of 
USA led by Martin Luther King, the non-violent struggle of 
Chilean people against Augusto Pinochet in 1983; the overthrow of 
Ferdinand Marcos, the president of Philippines ,by people’s power 
in 1986; The Rose Revolution of Georgia (2003), the Orange 
Revolution of Ukraine (2004); Kyrgyzstan’s popular ‘Tulip’ 
Revolution1 (2005), People’s movement of Lebanon (2005), and 
the People’s movement of Nepal (April 2006) have all proved the 
importance of non-violent movements can have against the 
unpopular and despotic governments (Stephan and Mundy, 2006)2. 
However, the success of non-violent movement very much 
depends upon the strategy used to forge the unity of the people, 
follow non-violent methods, press for issues of importance, and 
display ability to organize people’s agency (Ackerman and 
Kruegler, 1994; Stephan and Mundy, 2006).       
 
The aims of Nepal’s April movement of 2006 were to topple-down 
the king’s rule, to resolve the ongoing armed conflict and achieve 
                                                 
1  The Tulip Revolution refers to the overthrow of President Askar Akayev and his 
government in the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. The 
revolution sought the end of rule by Akayev and by his family and associates, who 
in popular opinion had become increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. In the early 
stages, this revolution was referred as "Pink," "Lemon", "Silk", "Daffodil", or 
"Sandpaper" Revolution by the media. But the term "Tulip Revolution," was 
nomenclated by Akayev himself before ousting from the president in a speech 
warning that no such Color Revolution should happen in Kyrgyzstan. 
2  See The Economist.Com, Bloodless Regime Change (2006) for detail.  
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lasting peace in Nepal. It was realized that these aims would be 
possible only by changing the competitive and adversarial 
relationships between the seven party alliances (SPA) and the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)3 [herein after referred to as 
Maoists] into one of partnership approach. To achieve lasting 
peace requires restoring the fractured social relations amongst the 
conflicting sides through, reconciliation; apology from the 
perpetrator and forgiveness by the past victim, by building new 
relationship between adversaries, and a change in the adversarial or 
competitive relationship through dialogue and cooperation.   
 
Galtung (1996; 2000a and 2000b) argues that once they emerge, 
conflicts pass through a series of transformational processes, i.e., 
articulation or dis-articulation, conscientisation or de-
conscientisation, complexification or simplification, polarization or 
depolarization, escalation or de-escalation. Incompatibilities 
between conflicting parties can be overcome by transcending the 
contradiction, or through compromise, or by deepening or 
widening the conflict structure, and by associating or dissociating 
the actors (ibid). All these transformational processes were clearly 
observed in the 10 years of the armed insurgency in Nepal as 
explicitly reflected in the12-point understanding they reached. 
Galtung (1996), Krippendorf (1973), Shell (2003) and Curle (1971) 
emphasize the ever-growing global asymmetric relationships as the 
structural source of conflict around the world. Asymmetric 
relationships can be transformed through a shift from unbalanced 
to balanced relationships, and a process of conscientisation, 
confrontation, negotiation and development (BRCCCM, 2003). 
The post-1st February 2005 relationship between the SPA and the 
Maoists was transformed from asymmetric to one of cooperative 
relationship , which was reflected in the 12-point understanding. 
The improved relation between the SPA and the Maoists has been 
ultimately successful to end the rule of monarchy and to suspend 
the King’s power in a move to overthrowing the monarchical 
                                                 
3  The details of the Maoists insurgency is covered in books of the author entitled a) 
‘The Price of Neglect: From Resource Conflict to Maoists Insurgency in the 
Himalayan Kingdom. Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publications (Upreti, 2004) 
and b) Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: The Maoists Insurgency, Past 
Negotiation and Opportunities for Conflict Transformation. New Delhi: Adroit 
Publishers (Upreti, 2006).  
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system ultimately and replacing it with the Federal Republican 
system for Nepal.   
 
2.2 Features of the 2006 April Movement of Nepal  
 
The April movement of 2006 met several of the criteria necessary 
for a resistance movement some of which were as follows: 
 
• It often remained non-violent in nature;  
• The April movement first started as people were 
suppressed with violence by the repressive regime ; 
• The April movement was  relatively of a shorter duration 
lasting just 19 days , But, the results were radical and the 
output obvious; 
• There was a unique combination of frustration, alienation 
and a  hope for the  future;  
• The April movement put faith in mass action and mass 
movement motivating maximum people for participation in 
the resistance 
• Often such movements result in a regime change and  the 
same happened in this instance as well  ; 
• Convictions and ideologies, values and commitments of 
people were the basis of resistance; 
• It focused on the peaceful protest against adversary 
resulting in a moral defeat of the resisting force; 
• Often outcomes result into three forms. They are  
• Cosmetic change,  
• Minor reform and  
• Radical transformation  
• And this April movement has the symptoms of leading it 
toward a radical socio-political transformation; 
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• External support was secured commensurate with  the 
strength of the resistance movement in the lack of an 
alliance among the progressive forces; 
• There was support from the neutral mass as the April 
movement gained  in momentum; and  
• The repressive action and behavior of the rulers was, to a 
great extent, met the necessary conditions for fuelling the 
resistance movement.   
 
2.3 Nepalese Experiences in the April Movement  
 
Nepal is now at the crossroads of transformation from the centuries 
old feudal, top-down, autocratic and exclusionary monarchical 
regime triggered by the non-violent April movement of 2006. An 
‘understanding was reached between the SPA and the Maoists in 
the conditions that developed across the nation following the start 
of the Maoists ‘People’s War’. Intense power struggle between the 
political parties and the palace reached its peak when the King 
resumed all the executive power on 1st February 2005 by a coup; 
the parliament was dissolved, and the elected prime minister 
overthrown. This action of the king motivated the major political 
parties to come together and form an alliance (popularly known as 
the Seven Party Alliance4) to protest against the King’s action. 
They also decided to collaborate with the Maoists to revolt against 
the King, which the CPN (Maoists) had been proposing to do since 
last two years. That strategy brought together the two major forces 
of the country fighting against the king.  As a consequence, a 12-
point understanding was reached between them, which ultimately 
paved the path to launch the mass agitation of April. The non-
violent people’s resistance movement (popularly known in Nepal 
as Janaandolan) of 6- 24 April 2006 proved that people’s power 
can defeat autocratic, feudal regime the 10- year armed conflict 
was unable to do. This paper highlights the reasons for success of 
the non-violent movement. Women, marginalized groups, ethnic 
                                                 
4  The Alliance is composed of Nepal The Communist Party United Marxist-Leninist 
(CPN-UML), The Nepali Congress Party (NCP), The Nepali Congress Party 
(Democratic) (NCP-D), The Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), The Nepal 
Peasants and Workers Party, United leftist Front and Samyukta Janamorcha.  
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communities, disabled, youth, children, students, housewives, 
laborers, peasants, workers, street-vendors, business people, 
retailers, peace and human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, 
scholars and researchers, poets, writers, school teachers, university 
professors, doctors, nurses, shoe makers, tailors, government 
employees, technicians, artists, film actors and actresses, in short , 
people from every walk of life  participated in the non-violent 
movement. This paper also sheds light on similar nature of wider 
and inclusive participation by the people in this movement.  During 
the King’s period (15 months) of the direct rule, the state was very 
coercive. The high-handedness of the government during the April 
2006 was excessive and autocratic. This paper also analyzes the 
reasons for the regime’s coercive approach and its failure. This 
paper also sheds lights on the role of important stakeholders such 
as the SPA, the Maoists, media, civil society and NGOs, and 
international community in making the April movement successful. 
Effective transformation of conflict needs empowerment of people. 
This paper uses the conceptual frameworks of non-violent action 
and people’s power to examine the April movement of Nepal as a 
means of conflict transformation and peace- building. However, 
the paper does not cover the political dynamics following the 
successful completion of April movement of 2006.     
 
Once people organize for resistance movements, it is very hard for 
autocratic rulers to politically survive through suppression. In 
Nepal, despite the rigorous efforts and attempts by the king to 
justify his takeover, domestic protest mounted, but the international 
community, remained unconvinced by it. In his attempt to 
convince the Nepalese people and the international community, the 
monarch reiterated the ‘grand failure of the political parties’ to 
contain violence, to restore peace, control corruption and to 
improve the deteriorating economic situation of the country. In all 
his speeches, public comments, and media interviews, the king 
vehemently expressed his dismay with political parties as, “Nepal's 
bitter experiences over the past few years tend to show that 
democracy and progress contradict one another. Multiparty 
democracy was discredited by focusing solely on power politics. 
Parliament witnessed many aberrations in the name of retaining 
and ousting governments. Not a single House of Representative 
was allowed to complete its tenure. Continuous confusion and 
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disorder resulted in the obstruction of the democratic process.5 He 
further said  addressing the Nation at the time of the royal takeover 
on February one, ‘…today we have once again reached a juncture, 
where in keeping with popular aspirations, a historic decision must 
be taken to defend multiparty democracy by restoring peace for the 
nation and people. Even when bloodshed, violence and devastation 
have pushed the country on the brink of destruction, those engaged 
in politics in the name of country and people continue to shut their 
eyes to their welfare. Tussle for power, abuse of authority on 
gaining power and unhealthy competition in fulfilling personal and 
communal interests at the expense of the nation and citizenry 
contributed further to deterioration in the situation. …It is now 
time to bring to an end the ongoing act of terrorist violence and 
pledge, in earnest, to fulfill the people’s aspirations with the 
restoration of peace and security in the country…. As it is our 
responsibility to preserve our nationalism, national unity and 
sovereignty, as well as  to maintain peace and security in the 
country and ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate 
any further, we have, by virtue of the State Authority as exercised 
by us and in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Nepal 1990, taking into consideration Article 27 (3) of 
the constitution, dissolved effective from today, the current Council 
of Ministers to fulfill the people’s desire for the restoration of 
peace and security and to activate soon the democratic 
dispensation6’.  
Time and again, the king highlighted the role of the Shah Dynasty 
in the nation building of Nepal, referring to the unification process 
initiated by the King Prithvi Narayan Shah. Like his forefathers, he 
                                                 
5  The King’s address to the nation at the time of the Royal takeover on 1st February 
2005. It was the morning of 1st February (10:50 am), security officials under the 
command of army were deployed in all strategic places such as the media houses 
and party offices. Security forces were sent to arrest or detain political leaders and 
human rights activists. Telephone lines were cut and the king’s address to the nation 
lasted more than 34 minutes. Prime minister and ministers were detained in their 
own offices and residences (Upreti, 2006). There was a meeting of the king held 
with the security forces (The military, police and the armed police force in the 
evening of the 31 January. The king met the Prime Minister in the same day but the 
prime minister was not aware of the plan. Later, Mr Deuba acknowledged that when 
he met the king he felt that something could happen but he did not suspect the king 
to take such a big step.               
6 See The Kathmandu Post of 2 February 2005 for the full text of the speech by the 
King.  
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wanted to be at the centre stage of Nepal’s politics, which was 
opposed by the SPA and the CPN (Maoists).  The King had 
miscalculated the people’s desire for peace and his own ability to 
deliver it. Ordinary people were tired of continuing violence, but 
monarchy itself was the root cause of the structural conflict 
because of its feudalistic, exclusionary and regressive nature. The 
ordinary people’s expressed desire for peace was misunderstood by 
the king who was only keen to strengthen his direct rule in the 
name of ‘fighting against terrorism’. Hence, without declaring a 
ceasefire, he, invited the CPN (Maoists) for peace talks, ignoring 
the other political parties. He was over reliant on the security 
forces and in using coercive strategy than political negotiation. But 
his strategy and tactics to get support for his regime from the 
international community in the name of ‘war against terrorism’ and 
military-reliant coercive approach failed.  
 
The April movement of 2006 was basically the result of the king’s 
action and behaviour. Repression, gross violence of human rights, 
blatant abuses of state power and resources, abuse of authority, and 
tense relation with international community marked the king’s 
direct rule. If the king had not repressed the political parties, 
perhaps they would not have needed to align with Maoists to 
jointly fight against his regressive regime. The 12-point 
understanding between the SPA and Maoists was the outcome of 
the suppression by the king. The three of the 12-point 
understanding actually paved the path of the April movement:  
1. Today, democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and 
a free and sovereign Nepal is the main desire of all Nepalese. 
We completely agree that autocratic monarchy is the main 
hurdle in (realizing) this. It is our clear view that without 
establishing full democracy by ending autocratic monarchy, 
there is no possibility of peace, progress and prosperity in the 
country. Therefore, an understanding has been reached to 
establish full democracy by ending autocratic monarchy by 
exerting all forces against it, thereby creating a nationwide 
storm of democratic protests.  
2. The seven agitating parties are fully committed to the fact that 
only by establishing full democracy through the restoration of 
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the Parliament with the force of agitation, forming an all-party 
government with complete authority, holding elections to a 
constituent assembly through dialogue and understanding with 
the Maoists, can the existing conflict in the country be 
resolved and sovereignty and state power completely 
transferred to the people. It is the view and commitment of the 
CPN (Maoists) that the above mentioned goal can be achieved 
by holding a national political conference of the agitating 
democratic forces, and through its decision, forming an interim 
government to hold constituent assembly election. An 
understanding has been reached between the agitating seven 
parties and the CPN (Maoists) to continue dialogue on this 
procedural work-list and find a common understanding. It has 
been agreed that the power of people's movement is the only 
alternative to achieve this.  
3. Today, the country demands the establishment of permanent 
peace along with a positive solution to the armed conflict. 
Therefore, we are committed to ending autocratic monarchy 
and the existing armed conflict, and establishing permanent 
peace in the country through constituent assembly elections 
and forward-looking political outlet. The CPN (Maoists) 
expresses its commitment to move along the new peaceful 
political stream through this process. In this very context, an 
understanding has been reached to keep the armed CPN 
(Maoists) force and the royal army under the supervision of the 
United Nations or any other reliable international supervision 
during the holding of the constituent assembly elections. It is 
also agreed that the result of the free and fair elections would 
be accepted by both the parties (SPA and the CPN-Maoists). 
We expect reliable international mediation even during the 
dialogue process.   
 
The SPA had protested the king’s rule right from the beginning, 
but the Nepalese people had lost faith in these parties because of 
their poor performance in the past and therefore had not 
meaningfully participated in the earlier protest programs (Upreti, 
2006). Once the SPA reached the 12-point understanding with the 
Maoists and publicly acknowledged their past mistakes and 
promised not to commit the same mistakes again (points 6 and 7), 
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The Maoists similarly promised to work together to resolve 10 of 
years armed conflict, establish peace and to  work toward restoring 
full democracy in the country. Once this was done people in 
massive strength came on to the streets and challenged the royal 
régime Non-violent April movement of 2006 was precisely the 
outcome it. 
  
2.4 People’s Power Observed in Nineteen Days (6-24 April 
2006)  
 
The SPA called a nationwide general strike (Nepal bandh) for 4 
days (6-9 April). In response, hundreds of thousands of people 
came onto the streets across the country. On 5th April, CPN 
(Maoists) declared a ceasefire in support of the general strike. In 
spite of the SPA's promise of a peaceful the general strike, the 
royal government was claiming that the CPN (Maoists) will 
infiltrate the general strike to make it violent and the government 
would take necessary measures to protect the people’s life and 
property. The government asked the SPA to call-off the general 
strike and threatened to suppress it with the use of force. Despite 
the threat from the government and Nepal army (which led to the 
formation of a unified command of police, armed police, military 
and intelligence), the SPA decided to go ahead with their plans of 
agitation and protest.  
 
On the first day of the general strike on the 6th April, protesters 
organized mass rallies all over the country .In some areas 
protestors dismantled the statues of the Shah Kings. This protest 
was expanded in the following days. Even before the start of April 
movement, the royal government mobilized unified command to 
prevent people from coming on to the streets. Political leaders and 
activists were arrested from their residence or at the first encounter 
in the demonstration. People organized demonstrations in different 
parts of the town and district headquarters all over the country. The 
King’s government took all sorts of repressive measures and 
indulged in excessive baton charges and gun fires. On the 1st day of 
the general strike, CPN (Maoists) fiercely attacked the unified 
command in Sarlahi district and the defeat severely demoralized 
the security forces. Consequently, the security forces vented their 
anger against peaceful demonstrators in different parts of the 
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country. Mass demonstrations in the streets of Kathmandu and 
other parts of the country were expanding rapidly, irrespective of 
gunfire and other repressive measures employed by the autocratic 
government. On the evening of the 7th April, the government 
imposed a night time curfew extending it to  day-and - night  
curfew on 8th and 9th April with a ‘shoot on sight’ order. However, 
people defied the curfew and came on to the streets in mass. By 
April 9, almost 90 percent of the political leaders who had actively 
led in the protest, and more than 70 percent of local civil society 
members, human rights activists and journalists supporting the 
protest were arrested and jailed. 
 
The nationwide general strike (6-9 April)  called by the protesters 
get expanded for an indefinite period and people form all walks of 
life came on to the streets to protest the brutal regime of the King 
in greater numbers. Civil disobedience across the country 
paralyzed the nation. The King’s government and its home minister 
with a proven track record of anti-democratic convictions totally 
failed to keep law and order in the country even after full 
mobilization of the unified command and mobilization of all state 
resources and power. Government employees from law courts, 
ministries and departments, from corporations and companies all 
joined the civil disobedience and in the protest. Civil servants, 
banking sector and state-owned public sector employees joined in 
the protests. Even, tourists and foreign citizens joined in the 
protests held in Kathmandu and Pokhara. Solidarity for the 
democratic movement was evident on a massive scale. Even in 
remote rural districts more people gathered every day 7 and the 
number of people coming onto the streets of Kathmandu reached 2 
million in strength. The then ‘Royal Nepal Army8’ used helicopters 
for surveillance over peaceful demonstrations in different parts of 
the country and directed the ground troops to suppress them.  
Ground forces opened fire at the demonstrators in different parts of 
the Kathmandu with the orders of the army officers in the 
surveillance helicopters. The then Home Minister himself was 
working at the Army headquarters for coordinating with the Army 
                                                 
7  The Kathmandu Post April 24, 2006. 
8  After the successful April revolution, the name of the Royal Nepal Army was 
changed to Nepal Army by the revived Parliament.   
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Chief and the Valley Command Forces to suppress the movement. 
The government justified its suppression by saying that it found 
infiltration by CPN (Maoists) cadres in the demonstrations.  So, 
during the 19 days of peaceful protests, 25 people got killed, with 
more than 5500 people wounded that created a horror all over the 
country. The government massively mobilized ‘vigilantes’, 
criminals, and royalist youths to suppress the pro-democracy 
movement.  Home Minister is alleged to have spent millions of 
rupees weekly for this purpose9. But this measure did not work.  
 
When the April movement rapidly spread, the king invited SPA to 
talk with him. On his message to the nation on the occasion of the 
New Year’s Day on the 14th April, he said, ‘…Democracy demands 
restraint and consensus as all forms of extremisms are 
incompatible with democracy. While facing the challenges 
confronting the nation democracy also emphasizes acceptance of 
the pre-eminence of the collective wisdom in charting a future 
course’ 10 . However, the SPA ‘Movement Coordination 
Committee’ said that the king’s message was ‘meaningless’ and 
‘contains nothing’. It stated, ‘The king has used the trump card of 
dialogue at a time when he is completely isolated at the national 
and international level. The idea of the dialogue is a ploy by the 
royal regime to create confusion among the people and the 
international community’. The King failed to weaken the resolve of 
the people’s movement in the name of dialogue. Interesting 
contradiction is that during the 14 months of his direct rule, the 
king consistently denied requests from political parties, the civil 
society and the international community to open dialogues with the 
political parties and to reach a negotiated settlement with them. 
 
When the king failed to convince SPA to come up to talks, he 
attempted to use the international community, particularly India 
and the USA, countries who were in favour of the constitutional 
                                                 
9 The government appointed after the April movement formed a high level commission 
under the chairpersonship of ex-judge of the supreme court Mr. Krishna Jung 
Rayamajhi (Popularly known as the Rayamajhi Commission) to investigate the 
atrocities caused by the King’s government to suppress the 19 days of Janandolon. 
This commission came to the conclusion that the whole team of the king’s government 
was responsible for killing 25 people and wounding more than 45,500 people with the 
misuse of millions of rupees from the treasury.     
10  The Himalayan Times 14 April 2006.  
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monarchy, to help him out.  International community in general 
and these two countries in particular pressurized the SPA to accept 
the king’s offer. Dr. Karan Singh, 11  who is a relative of the 
Nepalese Royal family, came as a special envoy of the Indian 
Prime Minister, Dr. Manamohan Singh, to mediate with the SPA. 
On 19 April, Dr. Karan Singh met the SPA leaders and discussed 
the package he brought from the Indian government. His formula 
prescribed negotiation between the king and the SPA ensuring 
constitutional monarchy, and handing over of the executive power 
by the king to the SPA. The King accepted this package of 
negotiation. Accordingly, on the night of 21 April, he addressed 
the nation and said, “we, through this proclamation, affirm the 
executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal, which was in our 
safekeeping, from this day, shall, be returned to the people and be 
exercised in accordance with Article 35 of the 1990’s 
constitution12’.  However, people in the streets were in no mood to 
compromise unless the king accepted all the demands of the 
protesters (full acceptance of the 12-point understanding, and 
election to a constituent assembly).  
 
After this offer from the king, India expressed its hope that the 
king and political parties would reconcile and move ahead. At the 
same time, Envoys of USA, France, Sweden, UK, Germany and 
Finland went to the residence of SPA senior leader, Girija Prasad 
Koirala, on the 22 April to pressurize SPA leaders to accept the 
offer of the king. People opposed their action vehemently 13 . 
                                                 
11 Foreign Secretary Mr Shyam Sharan (who was Indian Ambassador to Nepal earlier) 
and Mr Pankaj Sharan (Joint Secretary of Indian External Affairs) also accompanied 
him and Mr Shayam Sharan had also talked with the Royal Nepal Army at that time.    
12 Article 35 of the 1990’s constitution states that the executive power shall, pursuant 
to this Constitution and other laws, be vested in His Majesty under this constitution 
shall be exercise upon the recommendation and advice, and with the consent of the 
council of ministers, except as otherwise expressly stated that it may be exercised 
exclusively by Him Majesty or at his discretion or on the recommendation of any 
institution or official. Such recommendation, advice and consent shall be submitted 
through the Prime Minister.     
13 See “Open questions to European Diplomats” from Bishnu Raj Upreti on 23 April 
2006 at web page http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article1975 for detail 
about the public opposition to their pressure to SPA leaders. The main questions asked 
were (1. How many times the king has used its commitment on multiparty- democracy 
and respect of human rights during his direct autocratic rule and did he ever translate 
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However, once the protesters knew that the foreign diplomats are 
exerting pressure on SPA leaders to compromise with the king, a 
huge mass of demonstrators reached the residence of Girija Prasad 
Koirala where foreign envoys and SPA leaders were having a 
meeting. They chanted slogans against the king’s offer and warned 
the SPA leaders not to surrender to the pressures by the foreigners 
and to keep the movement to go on. In the end, the SPA leaders 
rejected the King’s offer as well as the suggestions made by a 
group of foreign diplomats. The movement continued with strength 
and received wider support. By the 23rd of April more than half the 
of country’s population came out on to the streets protesting 
against the king’s rule and demanding the election for a constituent 
assembly. The street demand now shifted suddenly in favour of a 
republican state and punishment to the king.                                                  
 
Mass demonstrations turned into violent confrontations in different 
parts of the country. The royal regime brutally tried to suppress by 
mobilizing the army. It was not acceptable to the people and people 
opposed the repression by coming out onto the streets in millions.  
The Army failed to control the mass uprising and the SPA leaders 
got encouraged with the people’s support. They threatened to form 
a parallel government (which CPN (Maoists) leaders had been 
suggesting them from the time of signing up of the 12-point 
agreement), if the royal regime was not willing to surrender. Public 
pressure was mounting against the King tremendously.  
 
Finally, the army succumbed in front of people’s power, since they 
could not control millions of demonstrators rallying on the streets. 
The army feared the possibility that the teeming millions of 
                                                                                                    
these rhetoric into practice? Why Nepalese people should believe another rhetoric this 
time?; 2. Do you truly believe that the attitude, intention and behavior of the king are 
committed to democracy and establishing people’s sovereignty?; 3. Political history 
and culture of your country revels that there is respect of people supremacy and will. 
You should not respect this principle in the case of Nepal?; 4. Do you want political 
leaders not to respect the aspiration of people protesting in street?; 5. How you see 
possibility of resolving the deepening crisis by just accepting the prime minister 
offered by the king? This arrangement in the past but did not produce any result? And 
6. Are you in support of the king’s manipulation or with Nepalese people struggling to 
establish people’s true sovereignty?] 
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protesters could storm   the royal palace if the mass demonstrations 
continued further in the coming days. As the army was the sole 
base of king's 1st February coup and since the royal force was 
already demoralized, the king had no options but to submit to the 
wishes of the people. Then a tactical package of negotiations was 
offered from the Royal palace and from the international power 
centers to the SPA leaders. This package had two conditions to be 
fulfilled by the SPA leaders which they accepted just before the 
king’s address of 24 April. The first condition was to keep the 
constitutional monarchy and the second, not to interfere the army. 
A negotiation between the SPA and the Royal palace was reached 
on the mid night of 24 April 2006. In a televised speech the King 
said,’ Realizing the people’s movement and seven party alliance’s 
roadmap we have revived the House of Representatives which 
would help resolve the national problems, including violence…’14. 
The CPN (Maoists) and some critical analysts were not happy with 
the negotiated settlement accepted by the SPA. They argued that 
the people’s movement would have definitely overthrown the 
monarchy with the peaceful street protest continuing for 2 more 
days, if the SPA had not accepted the negotiation. It was also 
suspected that SPA leaders had assured the king about the 
continuity of the monarchy in the country upon which the king 
accepted the roadmap of the SPA. At the same time, the CPN 
(Maoists) too were unable to continue the movement alone without 
further support from the SPA.       
   
2.5 April Movement 2006 and Political Alliance of 
Compulsion   
 
The major political parties such as the Nepali Congress (splinters 
were reunited in November of 2007), the Communist Party of 
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) and to some extent other members 
of the SPA and the CPN (Maoists) had had deep adversarial 
relationship, attempting to politically finish each other. The SPA 
parties were in the government previously and using the state 
power to suppress the CPN (Maoists) rebels fighting against the 
state and also the ruling parties. Despite the vehement request by 
peace activists, civil society leaders and intellectuals to opt for a 
                                                 
14 The Kathmandu Post 25 April 2006.  
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non-violent approach to conflict transformation, for 8 years 
political parties were continuously ignoring this request and were 
using force to defeat the CPN (Maoists). Political parties never 
realized the need for state restructuring and transformation of a 
stratified vertical social structure and a skewed economic and 
political relation (Upreti, 2006). All major political parties showed 
a power-hungry attitude and behaviour of the status quoists. They 
were not only intensely engaged in their own internal power 
struggle, but also continuously bargaining with the King for power. 
Hence, they never made serious efforts to end the violent conflict 
with a negotiated settlement. Instead, they used the Maoists armed 
conflict as a pretext to retain their own power. Political parties 
realized their mistakes and erosion of public trust in them when the 
king arrested and jailed them, and imposed his autocratic rule on 
the 1st of February, 2005.  
 
On the other side, CPN (Maoists) leaders were concentrating to 
strengthen their army power and to weaken the political parties, 
instead of meaningfully engaging them to change the feudalistic 
political order. They let the palace and other regressive forces to 
erode the popularity of the political parties and vice-versa. 
However, their magic expansion and success in managing 
‘people’s war’ was able to bring 80 percent of the   country under 
their control, though they were not able to capture the state. 
Therefore, the armed conflict reached a situation of strategic 
stalemate. The CPN (Maoists) defeated the Nepal Army in many 
individual armed fights, but it was not able to defeat the state on 
their own. Hence, they were now seeking to defeat the king and his 
army in a concerted arrangement. For that, they not only changed 
their strategy but they also ideologically shifted their aims of a 
totalitarian government and a centrally controlled political system 
and opted for a more competitive multi-party political system.   
 
Therefore, the decision on both sides (CPN (Maoists) and the SPA) 
was based on the ‘necessity and compulsion’ of circumstances 
created by the king. It was the king and his autocratic government 
which were primarily responsible for bringing these two opposing 
forces together and for reaching the 12-point understanding which 
laid the foundations for the April movement. In the modern history 
of Nepal, significant political changes have taken place in the last 
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two years: the April 2006 popular uprising being the most 
important one. The April movement also brought the ten years of 
armed conflict to the final stage of negotiated settlement. 
 
2.6 CPN (Maoists) in the April Movement  
 
After serious discussions, CPN (Maoists) and the SPA leaders 
reached an agreement in New Delhi on 19 of March, 2006 and 
agreed to coordinate their plan for a nationwide general strike 
during 6-9 April 15 . CPN (Maoists) not only declared unilateral 
ceasefire on 3rd April 2006 and called halt to all offensive 
operations by it in the district headquarters and in the Kathmandu 
valley, but also lifted the indefinite transportation blockade they 
had imposed on Kathmandu in the previous weeks16. These steps 
were necessary for making the people’s movement successful.  
 
Once, the SPA and the CPN (Maoists) agreed to hold the 
constituent assembly elections, restructure the state, and to decide 
the fate of the monarchy by the constituent assembly meeting, 
public support suddenly for the movement increased and the mass 
came on to the streets. CPN (Maoists) leader Prachanda issued 
several statements against the royal takeover and expressed his 
commitment to support the political parties to restore democracy. 
Senior CPN (Maoists) leaders and SPA leaders visited New Delhi 
to discuss the modalities of collaboration to fight against the royal 
takeover. They discussed the issue with various Indian politicians. 
In October, SPA gave mandate to Madhav Nepal and Girija Prasad 
Koirala to hold talk with the CPN (Maoists). After a series of 
discussions and meetings 17 , they agreed to a 12-points 
understanding. The CPN (Maoists) declared a unilateral ceasefire 
for three months on September 3 2006, and promised that it was a 
step forward with the political parties in political collaboration. 
This ceasefire was a very strategic choice of the CPN (Maoists) 
because: 
                                                 
15 Kantipur Daily, 20 March 2006.  
16 Kantipur Daily 4 April 2006. 
17 see Nepal Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 15, 20 November, 2005 for detail on the talks between 
the Maoists and the political parties. 
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• They gave the message across the world that they want 
peace and end to political conflict,  
• They made the King’s position difficult in winning 
international support on the mere ground of controlling 
terrorism. The king had planned to attend the UN General 
Assembly where he could strongly put his case to justify 
the royal takeover as a step to combat terrorism. When the 
Maoists declared a ceasefire, the king faced an awkward 
situation. He had to justify his takeover in the UN as a 
move for peace in Nepal but if his government would not 
reciprocate the ceasefire how could his steps (royal 
takeover) be justifies? This raised serious questions on the 
intention of the king. Obviously, his intention was not to 
restore peace and he therefore did not reciprocate the 
ceasefire. All this led him to cancel his plan to address the 
UN General Assembly in September of 2005.  
• CPN (Maoists) also gathered more sympathy from the 
Nepalese people and the international community because 
of their unilateral ceasefire,  
• Pressure mounted on the king’s government both 
domestically and internationally for reciprocating the 
ceasefire,  
• In between, they could organize political programs, train 
their cadres and fighters, and accomplish organizational 
activities, such as meetings and conventions, training and 
orientations, expansion of public relations, etc.  
          
During the king’s direct rule, CPN (Maoists) made strategic moves 
demonstrating to the Nepalese people and the international 
community that their side was  genuinely committed to peace, 
willing to collaborate with political parties, and accepted multi-
party democracy, and respect for the rule of law and human rights. 
But they kept on pressurizing the army and the King. In 
collaboration with the SPA, they foiled all bids for local election, 
which the King intended to launch to show his commitment to 
democracy. The CPN (Maoists) had earlier declared a national 
strike in the 1st week of April, but later withdrew it to make the 5- 
day protest organized by the SPA successful. Further, the CPN 
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(Maoists) sent large number of people from rural areas to the cities 
and town center to hold mass rallies and protests; they publicly 
supported the general strike and mobilized their forces to make the 
protest successful. Thus the CPN (Maoists) contributed 
substantially and procedurally to make the April movement 
successful. Ten years of CPN (Maoists) armed conflict and the 12-
point understanding laid the foundation for the success of the April 
Revolution.           
 
2.7 Seven Party Alliance in the April Movement  
 
The SPA was the leading force of the April movement. As 
mentioned earlier, the credibility of the political parties had been 
eroded, and people were frustrated with them for their failure to 
bring about peace, and give them good governance. Soon after the 
royal takeover however, people realized the importance of the role 
of political parties. The king’s rule failed to address the 
expectations of the people in establishing peace, controlling 
corruption, and in stopping abuses of state power and resources by 
the government personnel. Instead, corruption increased manifold, 
insecurity reached a peak in the history of Nepal, resources and 
power of the state were blatantly abused by government official 
and ministers .The King's poor performance helped political parties 
gradually regain the confidence of the people.  
The role of SPA during the nineteen days of April movement was 
quite noteworthy in which primarily, the youth leaders of political 
parties played an important role in making a success of the 
movement. The SPA initiated the movement and later a 
spontaneous participation of the mass followed. SPA leaders 
publicly acknowledged this fact by saying that ‘The Movement 
from now on was in people’s hand18’. Local coordinator of the 
Mass Movement Coordination Committee in Kathmandu said, 
‘even if the seven parties accept the king’s offer, we are in no way 
going to compromise…the people will choose their leader’. Most 
SPA leaders were not that active in the people’s movement, but 
they showed their political maturity by not surrendering to the 
wishes of the King.        
   
                                                 
18 The Himalayan Times, 22 April 2006.  
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The Royal takeover was a serious blow to the political parties. The 
main leaders of the political parties were either detained arrested or 
jailed. The SPA leaders viewed these moves by the king as a 
strategy to weaken the resolve of the political parties. This 
motivated the political parties even more to unite to fight against 
the King’s takeover and reinstate democracy in the country. They 
signed a six-point program that called for the restoration of the 
House of Representatives as an entry point and the elections to the 
constituent assembly as an exit point for resolving the ongoing 
conflict. Some political parties even changed their position on the 
constitutional monarchy, opting for a republican political set up.  
 
The SPA had boycotted the municipal election arranged held by 
the royal government in the February of 2006. They tried to get 
more international support to their cause. Leaders of the main 
political parties 19  visited India and discussed Nepal’s political 
crisis with the Indian government, the Indian political leaders as 
well as CPN (Maoists) leaders.  On 16 November 2005, CPN-
UML leaders Madhav Kumar Nepal and Khadga Prasad Oli 
suddenly flew to New Delhi, only 5 days after their return from 
India. The Indian Ambassador met Madhav K. Nepal the same day 
before departing for New Delhi. Girija Prasad Koirala too was in 
New Delhi for a week. The Indian Ambassador also flew to New 
Delhi on the same day. CPN (Maoists) leaders were there in New 
Delhi already. The CPN (Maoists) and the SPA leaders held 
several rounds of talks and Indian politicians helped in 
coordinating these meetings. As a result the historic 12-points 
agreement comes to be born.  
 
The Delhi meeting and consultation of SPA prepared a roadmap20 
called ‘the declaration for a united effort to resolve the national 
crisis’, making the following provisions: 
1. Take up the democratic road and not the one leading to 
extremism, 
                                                 
19 For example, Girija Prasad Koirala (NCP), Bam Dev Gautam (CPN-UML), Gopal 
Man Shrestha (NCP-D) visited India to finalise 12 point understanding.  
20 A Joint Declaration for a United Effort to Resolve the national Crisis, signed by the 
leaders of 7 parties and issued on 8 May 2005 (25 Baishak, 2062).   
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2. Today’s need is to do away with the King’s autocratic 
rule, 
3. Reinstatement of the parliament for a people’s 
representative government, 
4. Some important points mentioned to resolve the national 
crisis were:  
a.  The government shall be responsible to the 
parliament, 
b. Conflict management and reinstatement of peace,  
c. Commitment toward the future progressive 
programmes,, 
d. Constitution shall adhere to the norms and values 
of   liberal multiparty democracy , 
e. Progressive political movements to be based on 
the constitution of 1990, 
f. Plans to hold national elections. 
 
This roadmap of the SPA laid the basis for reaching the 12-point 
understanding between the CPN (Maoists) and the SPA later.  
 
The SPA formed a Joint People’s Movement Central Coordination 
Committee to organize and coordinate the people’s movement and 
passed a resolution on the 13th of March to organize a ‘Let’s Go to 
Kathmandu’ campaign to effect the 6-9 April national strike 
successful 21 . Youths, students and trade union wings of SPA 
played a crucial role in making the non-violent people’s movement 
successful.  
 
2.8 Civil Society in the April Movement  
 
Immediately after the royal takeover, the civil society became 
active in organizing rallies, debates, discussions that provided a 
strong support to the SPA cause to fight against the cessation of 
democracy. Initiatives taken by the civil society to promote the 
people’s movement for democracy encouraged the political parties 
gain confidence and win back the lost trust with the people. The 
civil society for the first time defied the curfew with a march from 
                                                 
21 Kantipur Daily, 14 March 2006.  
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the Teaching Hospital, one of the coordination centers for the mass 
protest, and came out onto the street despite the ‘shoot-on-sight’ 
order.  
 
Human rights groups and professional organizations such as the 
associations of journalists, lawyers,  medical practitioners, actors, 
engineers; students unions, university teachers and laborers; writers 
and poets, guild, artists, and private sector media houses all got  
active in protest of the royal takeover . Specialized associations 
such as the Federation of Community Forestry Users in Nepal, 
Nepal Poultry Entrepreneurs Forum, Nepal Hotel Workers 
Association, Nepal Chartered Accountant Association, Airline 
Operators Association, Forest Technicians Association, National 
Dalit Rights Forum, Indigenous Peoples Peace Commission, the 
Sociological and Anthropological Society of Nepal, Maithili 
Federation, Loktantrik Newa Struggle Committee, and National 
Disabled Federation also backed the people’s movement. Civil 
society initiative was also supported by international organizations 
and networks, such as The UN High Commission on Human 
Rights, The Amnesty International, The International Commission 
of Jurists, The Human Rights Watch, The  International Federation 
of Journalists, Reporters without Borders, The World Association 
of Newspapers, The World Editors Forum22, etc. The Civil society 
mobilized hundreds of thousands of people not only in The 
Kathmandu Valley, but also in small cities, towns, urban areas and 
villages across the country. In terms of keeping anti-regression 
movement going in the face of a heavy handed suppression, human 
rights groups, lawyers and journalists all played a crucial role23.  
 
The contribution of the civil society to successfully accomplishing 
the people’s movement was acknowledged and appreciated by 
political leaders. This was reflected in the formation of a 5- 
member Peace Talks Observation Team (to which 5 prominent 
leaders of the civil society were selected) and a 31-member 
National Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee by the 
                                                 
22 All of them issued strong statements, wrote to the king to stop attack on people, and 
condemned gross violation of human rights and even some of them threatened.   
23 Human rights activists were the first to break the no go zone declared by the royal 
government, journalists and lawyers were in the street continuously to protest the 
king’s regime at the time when political parties were not able to come to the street.       
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negotiation team composed of CPN (Maoists) and the government 
on the 15th June 2006. On top of it, CPN (Maoists) proposed to 
allot 33 percent seats to the civil society in their nomination to the 
interim parliament 24. Sadly , however the prestige  accorded to 
many of the civil society leaders by nominating them to position of 
responsibility has been  eroded making them a  baseless and 
opportunistic group of people having no roots among the 
grassroots.          
 
2.9 Nepalese Citizens in the April Movement 
 
The expectation of the Nepalese people had got quite high because 
of the regime change from an autocratic system to one of a 
multiparty parliamentary democratic system in 1990, with 
commitments of political leaders to address the people's sufferings. 
But these assurances were systematically denied them not only by 
the previous regime, but also by the political parties who came 
riding the waves of political change. They completely ignored their 
commitment made to the Nepalese people during the time of the 
1990’s movement. Hence, people were frustrated by them and 
alienated by them. To some extent, attracted by CPN (Maoists) 
insurgency. The King used this frustration of the people to play 
against political parties, and staged his coup. He made a promise to 
fulfill major expectations of the Nepalese people, restore peace and 
security, control corruption, maintain law and order, achieve 
national unity and prevent the nation from further deterioration. 
However, his actions and behavior in the 15 months of the royal 
rule proved to be just the opposite of his public reiterations. .The 
king did not make any attempt to resolve the Maoists armed 
conflict. Rather, he used the opportunity as a means to hold on to 
power. Nepalese people soon came to realize that the king’s direct 
rule was even more harmful to people and the country. Therefore, 
they lent their full weight to the April movement. One uppermost 
concern of the April mass movement was restoration of peace in 
the country. Women, disabled persons, children, elderly, farmers, 
street vendors, and even rickshaw pullers actively took part in the 
                                                 
24 This was reflected in the suggestions given by the CPN (Maoists) to the Interim 
Constitution Drafting Committee.   
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peaceful mass protest. It was estimated that more than 16 million 
people came out on the streets across the country.  
 
2.10 King’s Government and the April Movement  
 
The king was in no mood to compromise with the SPA during the 
early days of the movement. He was neither interested to listen to 
the SPA and CPN (Maoists) nor ready to listen to the international 
community and the civil society. Rather, he made unsuccessful 
attempts repeatedly to convince the international community to 
help him fight terrorism in Nepal. This becomes clear from his 
address to the SAARC Summit at Dhaka on 12 of November, 
2005. He said, “It is ironical to note that the global war on 
terrorism is not matched by global action against it. The global 
war on terrorism has failed to reach every nook and corner of the 
world, especially in weak and vulnerable countries, as if they do 
not deserve justice and protection from terrorism. It is this double 
standard and selective approach that is assuming a dangerous 
character rather than terrorism itself. We cannot make a 
distinction between good and bad terrorism; terrorism is 
terrorism. In our region, the Declaration of the 11th SAARC 
Summit held in Kathmandu categorically stated that “terrorism, in 
all its forms and manifestations, is a challenge to all states and to 
all of humanity, and cannot be justified on ideological, political, 
religious or any other ground”. We agreed that “terrorism violates 
the fundamental values of the United Nations and the SAARC 
Charter and constitutes one of the most serious threats to 
international peace and security in the Twenty-first century”. 
Nepal has ratified the SAARC Convention on Suppression of 
Terrorism and its Additional Protocol with the belief that these 
instruments provide an effective tool to counter terrorism in the 
region. We call upon the SAARC member states to forge a strong 
partnership to eliminate terrorism from the region as well as 
spearhead a coordinated and earnest action against it”. His 
heavily worded statement was a clear message to the international 
community that he is fighting terrorists and the SAARC countries 
should not criticize for his war on ‘terrorism’. His statement in the 
SAARC Summit was in essence a response to the demand made by 
the international community to hand over power to political parties.    
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Interestingly, the King had nominated to his cabinet members who 
were notorious figures in the autocratic panchayat regime (this 
time also, all political parties remained banned) with a track record 
of crime, human rights violation, rape, corruption, hooliganism and 
default on bank loan behind them25. None of them had democratic 
credentials and a commitment to multi-party democracy. 
Therefore, all their efforts were concentrated on reviving all but the 
old autocratic panchayat regime. Hence, under the direct guidance 
of the king, the cabinet members made systematic efforts to 
dismantle all the democratic institutions one by one, evolved 
during the 12-13 years of multi-party political rule earlier. The 
king’s government had issued more than 6 dozens of ordinances to 
strengthen the King’s autocratic rule.     
 
The ministers in the autocratic government of the king made every 
effort to get the political parties surrender themselves before with 
the king. They treated progressive democratic forces as supporters 
of the CPN (Maoists). The actions and behavior of the ministers 
and of the king’s coterie thus widened the gap between the 
progressive political forces and the palace that contributed to 
materialize the April movement.       
 
As the king took very regressive path, he was unable to find 
enough capable people to accomplish the important state tasks such 
as those of ambassadors, ministers, planners, analysts and 
strategists, security and political advisors. He did not trust capable 
and honest people who had earlier served in the autocratic 
panchayat regime. He had to fully rely on the incapable persons 
with regressive attitudes. Their main role during the 15 months of 
autocratic rule was to widen the gap further between the palace and 
the political activists, suppress human rights activists, journalists 
and political parties, and to wipe out the CPN (Maoists) cadres. 
These acted as some contributing factors to unite people for April 
Revolution.  
 
                                                 
25 His vice-chairperson and other two of the powerful members of the cabinet were 
defaulters of the banks’ loan, one senior minister was charged as attempt rapist of 
hospital nurse, many of his cabinet ministers were declared as guilty of suppressing 
1990’s peoples movement by the Mallik Commission, two of the cabinet members 
were charged by the court as guilty of corruption.   
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The King similarly made unsuccessful attempts to use religion in 
strengthening his power. He had mobilized radical extremists and 
the orthodox Hindu clerics, and had hired people working under 
the banners of Hindu religion to oppose progressive political 
forces, which only back fired.       
 
The hard-line royalists moves helped to widen the gap between the 
king and the political parties and that contributed to the birth of the 
idea of republicanism. A former Chief of the army staff, who was 
said to be one of the close advisors to the King, had publicly asked 
the government to declare political parties as anti-nationalists 
force. The then Vice- Chairman of the Cabinet, Dr Tulsi Giri 
clearly said that monarchy and democracy in Nepal cannot go 
together and therefore Nepalese people should either monarchy or 
democracy (Upreti, 2006). In a television interview he further said 
that sovereignty cannot originate from two sources, it should only 
be with the king, not with the people judging from past 
experiences, it is unlikely that he could speak on such a 
fundamental issue without the consent of the king26. This meant 
that the King was not ready to give up power yet and was not 
interested to hold talks with the political parties. It is because of 
these factors that, Nepal’s politics is headed toward a republican 
system.  
 
The CPN (Maoists) demand for a republican system is gradually 
progressing. The CPN-UML has decided to go in for a republican 
political system. Similarly, the Nepali Congress, another big party 
and a past supporter of the idea of the constitutional monarchy has 
changed its stance by removing the provision of a constitutional 
monarchy from its party constitution. Other leftist political parties 
had been already in favor of a republican system. Youths, 
intellectuals, and the civil society members are increasingly 
aligned to the republican idea. In this way, influential forces in 
Nepal, which had defended the constitutional monarchy earlier, are 
now asking for a republican political set-up. Thus, the 1st February 
                                                 
26  For example, Dr Mohamad Mohasin, Communication Minister in the Deuba 
government said to be representative of the king, repeatedly indicated in late 2004 
and early 2005 about the forthcoming of 1st February event. Keshar Jung Rayamajhi 
had publicly asked the King to takeover. It happened after few weeks of these 
statements.   
 41 
move by the king proved counterproductive for the life of the 
monarchy in Nepal. 
 
2.11 Security Forces in the April Movement  
 
The security forces were also abused grossly in suppressing the 
April movement of 2006. The movement was suppressed by the 
Unified Command under the leadership of the then Chief of the 
then Royal Nepal Army, who was leading the fight against CPN 
(Maoists) insurgency. The army had created a special valley 
command to suppress the people’s movement in the Kathmandu 
Valley. Similarly, a core team composed of the Army Chief, the 
Home Minister and the palace representative was made responsible 
for the mobilization of this security forces and in foiling of the 
people’s movement. The army and the armed police used force 
excessively. The army used air patrolling by flying helicopters over 
rallies and demonstrations to create fear. Tanks and army vehicles 
were moving on the streets of Kathmandu Valley and in areas of 
mass rallies. When security forces unleashed brutal suppression 
against the people, national and international media vehemently 
criticized the security forces for its repression. Nepalese people 
came out even in greater number than ever to protest the use of 
force. 25 demonstrators got killed. Many of them were deliberately 
shot to death. Security forces shot at the demonstrators on the 
orders of their higher authorities (core team and valley command) 
.So they did not bother to take any precautionary measures. The 
use of excessive force thus became counterproductive in effect and 
millions of people came to the street to oppose the brutalization 
even more in number.          
 
Security forces on the ground were also facing other serious 
dilemma. On one side, their own family members ( ‘wives of 
security personnel’, ‘family members of the security forces’) not 
only came out in protest on the  streets and participated in mass 
demonstrations, but they also issued statements asking their 
husbands and sons to stop shooting at the rally. On the other side, 
their seniors in command were ordering them to shoot.  
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2.12 International Communities in the April Movement   
 
The role of the international community during the royal regime 
had been largely favorable and supportive to the people’s 
resistance movement since most of the international members were 
not happy with the takeover of 1st February 2005. However, their 
role in the eyes of Nepalese people looked suddenly suspicious as 
envoys of USA, France, Sweden, UK, Germany and Finland 
rushed to the residence of SPA senior leader Girija Prasad Koirala 
(where SPA leaders were having a special meeting) and wanted to 
exert pressure on the SPA to accept the king’s offer of the 21 April. 
However, this offer amounted to nothing less than legitimizing the 
king’s rule and accepting him as the custodian of the constitution 
and the protector of the national interests and institutionalizing 
monarchy in the future also. Hence, hundreds of thousands of 
protestors reached venue of the meeting and warned the SPA 
leaders not to make any compromises and keep the people’s 
movement going.  
 
On the other side, Finish Charge de Affairs Mr. Pauli Mustonen27 
(who was also the local chair of EU at that time), said, ‘Many EU 
countries have welcomed the king’s proclamation of 21 April and 
the EU is monitoring the situation’. Similarly, the then British 
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield said ‘it could be a basis to move 
ahead but parties do not accept it28’.The EU issued a statement 
saying that the royal proclamation is an opportunity for parties to 
move ahead. Similar supports to the king were coming from China, 
Canada, and the UN welcoming the Royal proclamation. But, the 
SPA leaders in the end took the side of the Nepalese people and 
did not listen to what the foreign diplomats has to say. India 
changed its position at once and its foreign secretary Shyam Sharan 
said the next day (22 April) that the king’s address of 21 April was 
not sufficient to solve the ongoing political problem.          
 
                                                 
27 Mr. Mustonen died in a helicopter crash in Taplejung on 23 September 2006 with 
other 23 persons including State Minister of Forest and Soil Conservation, Director 
Generals of Forest and Wildlife Departments, Ex -Minister Dr Harka Gurung, Head 
of WWF Nepal Dr Chandra Gurung, and others.    
28 The Himalayan Times, 23 April 2006.  
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Some of the international non-governmental organizations had also 
expressed their solidarity with the demonstrators. The Alliance of 
INGO even came on to the streets to express their solidarity and to 
protest the human rights violation during the April movement. 
Many senior Nepalese staff working in the INGOs and donor 
organizations got actively involved in the April movement in their 
individual capacity.   
 
There was thus a good synergy from concerted efforts of the local 
and global civil society organizations in making the people’s 
movement a success. The critical position of influential global 
organizations against the king and support for people’s struggle 
almost paralyzed the royal government. Few days before the 
surrender by the king, The Amnesty International, The Human 
Rights Watch and The International Commission of Jurists called 
for a travel ban on the king, the army officers and his senior 
advisors and aides for traveling in foreign countries which placed 
the king in an extremely difficult situation. In a meeting organized 
by the Swiss government in Geneva, these three international 
organizations also suggested freezing the assets kept in foreign 
countries of any person(s) associated with the royal regime29. The 
same meeting also discussed ‘targeted’ and ‘smart sanction’ 
against the king and his aides. When the king’s brutality against 
peaceful demonstrators was escalated from the 6th of April, 
bilateral countries and inter-governmental organizations became 
even more vocal to oppose the suppression.  
   
Since the morning of the 24 April, a series of meetings was held by 
the key international players (Ambassadors of USA, India, Norway 
and few other diplomats), representatives of the Palace and the 
leaders of CPN (UML) with the NC. The main agenda of these 
meetings were how to peacefully end the movement. The Palace 
through the diplomats offered to negotiate with the leaders and 
expressed its willingness to accept the roadmap laid down by the 
SPA.  Diplomats conveyed this missive of the King to the leaders 
of the political parties, and in response, a positive message was 
conveyed back by the political parties to the Principal Secretary of 
                                                 
29 Kantipur Daily, 19 April 2006. 
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the King, Mr Pashupati Bhakta Maharjan. Next the Principal 
Secretary of the Palace visited Girija Prasad Koirala and Madhav 
Nepal individually and informed the willingness of the king to 
accept the SPA roadmap. Restoration of the Parliament was the 
main demand of the Nepali Congress and therefore it at once 
agreed to the King’s offer. Likewise, UML leaders were also 
convinced by the King’s willingness to accept the SPA roadmap.  
Finally, a few selected leaders of NC, UML, and the Principal 
Secretary of the King (and some diplomats working behind the 
scene) drafted the text to be read by the king in the evening. The 
king’s speech was broadcasted on the Nepal Television. In this 
way, the 19 - day peaceful 30  movement was ended. If this 
movement had been extended for another one or two days, the king 
would have been overthrown. However, the priority of SPA 
seemed to be to force the king to accept SPA roadmap, instead of 
ending the monarchy. Therefore, the   negotiation that followed 
between the SPA leaders and Palace was a logical sequel despite 
the vehement opposition to it from the CPN (Maoists) who wanted 
to use the movement to end the monarchy immediately from this 
country. It is also widely speculated that an understanding between 
the political leaders of the NC and the representative of the king 
was reached to keep the constitutional monarchy in some form 
once the king agree to the SPA roadmap. This became obvious 
from to the fact that the restored Parliament reduced the role of the 
king but continued to recognize its existence .The government 
allocated a huge amount of the country’s budget to pay the 
allowance of the King and his immediate family member. Many 
analysts and people close to the Prime Minister indicate that the 
frequent expression of Prime Minister G.P Koirala about the need 
for a ‘ceremonial king’ or ‘baby king’ is a reflection of this hidden 
understanding between the SPA and the King. However, the King 
got suspicious of NC leader's promise when the Interim 
Constitution was promulgated in which the role of the king was 
completely suspended.         
 
                                                 
30 Though the repressive government killed 25 people and wounded more than 5500 
people, in 19 days the protesters were peaceful in this resistance.   
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2.13 People’s Resistance and Start of Downfall of the 
Royal Dynasty 
 
With the 10 years of republican campaign led by the CPN 
(Maoists) on the one side, and the behavior of the reigning king, 
his son and his close allies on the other had, has put the existence 
of royal dynasty on the verge of extinction. After the royal 
takeover of 1st February, major parties supporting constitutional 
monarchy such as the CPN (UML) have decided to opt for a 
republican political system, and the Nepali Congress the other big 
party of the SPA , too has deleted the clause of the constitutional 
monarchy from its party constitution. The Youth, ethnic 
communities, Dalit communities, intellectuals, scholars, 
journalists, and young politicians have all been overwhelmingly 
demanding for a republican political set up in the country. Even 
those who used to support the king and the active monarchy in the 
past have gradually been changing their positions at present. Many 
of them are agreed to a republican state in Nepal now. In the rural 
areas, the CPN (Maoists) have educated and oriented the people 
against the monarchy and oriented and in favour of a republican 
system. Hence, at present those who want to retain monarchy in 
this country are insignificant in number and not in a position to 
change the wave of republicanism in Nepal. USA, because of its 
strategic interests, by keeping the monarchy, hopes to stall radical 
communists from coming into power which might encourage other 
national and international radical communists to take up arms and 
come to power is indirectly supporting the palace but USA is also 
in a very difficult position, since by supporting the monarchy it is 
denying popular aspirations of the people. In its official statements, 
however, the USA has always maintained that it would respect the 
verdict of Nepalese people on the issue of monarchy. One can 
assume that the ever- awaited free and fair elections for the 
constituent assembly is most certainly going  to end the 400 year 
old of monarchy of Nepal31.    
 
                                                 
31 The Interim Constitution has made provision of deciding the fate of monarchy by 
simple majority decision of the first meeting of the constituent assembly.   
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2.14 Conclusions  
 
The April movement of 2006 has fundamentally questioned the 
feudalistic, centralized and exclusionary political system presided 
over by the monarchy in Nepal. It has also paved the way for a 
broader socio-political transformation and the ushering of a federal 
republic structure of the state.  
 
The April movement of 2006 has further strengthened the 
theoretical and methodological basis for adopting a non-violent 
approach for political change in 20th century .It has justified itself 
as an alternative method of conflict transformation in the 21st 
century. Nepal’s recent model of mobilizing people’s power 
against armed conflict challenges the American approach of use of 
force to resolve conflict. A Non-violent form of people’s resistance 
is probably a better way always for strengthening democracy for 
state-building and transforming a feudal, hierarchical, exclusionary 
state apparatus into an inclusive, modern democratic state.   
 
Based on the experiences of 19-day-long people’s peaceful 
resistance movement, I argue that conventional concept of civil 
society needs to be redefined based on the potential of civil 
movement in changing the political system and shaping the future 
of the nation-state. I conclude that non-violent resistance 
movement has great prospect of settling conflict and building 
peace.  
 
As explained in the theory of conflict transformation through non-
violence (Wehr et al, 1994; Clark 2000), the people’s resistance 
movement of Nepal has succeeded in transforming an autocratic 
and feudal regime of the king through a short run of transition to a 
promised democratic and peaceful country. Non-violent resistance 
movements can transform conflict by detaching it from the use of 
force and coercion through exercise of tolerance by harnessing 
conciliation, through promotion of co-operation and through use of 
other peaceful alternatives. The major actors of the April resistance 
movement demonstrated to possess these characteristics while 
fighting the army, state power and resources in a peaceful manner. 
Nepal's experience highlights that people’s resistance movement 
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takes origin from below. It not only is able to contribute to the 
downfall of dictators and autocrats, it also paves the path for social 
change in a society.  
 
Nepalese experience of the people’s resistance movement has 
confirmed that the success of resistance depends upon certain 
complementary elements. These are a unity of purpose; a broad-
based, non-violent and disciplined home-grown movement 
participated in by all concerned stakeholders, organizations, the 
media, support from national and international organization, and 
through use of a host of other tactics, such as strikes, 
demonstrations, boycotts, street speeches and street drama.  
Therefore, ‘people’s power is a form of consciousness’, and is 
‘about restoring the invisible institution of morality’ (Ackerman 
and Duvall, 2005:42) in the transformation of a state.   
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CHAPTER 3  
Role of Foreign Aid in Transformation 
 
Sagar Raj Sharma 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), one of the forms of 
foreign aid, is a transfer of concessional resources, usually from a 
foreign government or international institution, to a government or 
non-governmental organization in a recipient country. It may be 
provided for a variety of reasons, including diplomatic, commercial, 
cultural and developmental. It is typically used to fund 
expenditures that further development (or at least, it is usually 
justified in that way) in the recipient country, most of which has 
been used to finance infrastructural investment projects – building 
roads and schools, providing training and education, family 
planning and so on. Since the 1980s, a significant portion of ODA 
has also been in the form of services used as balance of payments 
and budget supports for governments agreeing to adopt economic 
or political reform programmes.  
 
But how effective has this ODA been in promoting overall 
development in the case of the least developed countries (LDCs), 
particularly countries like Nepal? Has it been effective and 
sustainable in achieving the goals of the projects and programmes 
it has funded? What role can ODA play in the rebuilding of the 
nations in transition? In case of Nepal, what role can ODA play in 
the peace-building process and national transformation? All of 
these questions require answering if one were to draw a picture of 
ODA effectiveness. 
 
In his article, ‘ODA as a Catalyst’, published in the September 
2001 issue of Development and Change, Jan Pronk argues that: 
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ODA is not the prime mover of development; it has sometimes 
even been an impediment, but this need not be the case. To use 
[ODA] as a reward for good development governance may indeed 
be justified under certain conditions, but often such conditions can 
only be met with outside help. [ODA] should, therefore, be used 
primarily as a catalyst, sometimes to help generate other resources 
or gain access to them, sometimes to help create domestic capacity 
or manage conflicts resulting from various forms of unsustainable 
development. At this juncture, what is required is a special focus in 
[ODA] policy on social harmony, political stability and peace, as 
preconditions for economic growth and development – not the 
other way around (Pronk, 2001:627-8). 
 
In the same article, Pronk contends that private capital cannot 
wholly replace publicly provided capital, whether the latter is 
offered in the form of grants or loans. He also claims that ODA can 
have a positive or negative impact on the desired goals, for 
example, by crowding in or crowding out private investment, but 
with appropriate policies it can generally be made positive. 
Furthermore, he is sceptical as to whether econometrics can shed 
much light on the effectiveness of ODA. This is partly because of 
the non-availability of the necessary information, the difficulties of 
being able to perform controlled experiments, and changing 
conditions and circumstances that cannot always be proxied by 
econometric variables.  Detailed historical case studies are more 
likely to be useful, but of course it is difficult to generalize from 
them. 
 
Economists have so far made numerous attempts at finding the key 
to growth in the LDCs, but there is little evidence to suggest that 
they have actually found it. This paper reviews some of the keys 
that have not worked and offers pointers towards a more effective 
strategy. I do not claim to suggest that there is one single key to 
growth, but I do think there is evidence that some strategies work 
better than others. This paper attempts first to establish a 
relationship between ODA, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
policies in the developing countries and then propose a few new 
strategies so that donors and governments do not repeat the old 
failures that keep resurfacing time and time again. It ends with the 
 51 
applicability of these strategies to the countries in transition, 
focusing on the transformation of Nepal. 
 
There have been two main phases in the search of the answer to 
growth in the developing world. The first stressed ODA-financed 
FDI to be the key to unlocking LDCs’ development potential. The 
second stressed ODA-induced policy reform as the key. Neither 
worked, at least in the case of Nepal and some other LDCs, 
because ODA neither increased FDI nor induced policy reform. 
The first key also failed because FDI did not have a tight link to 
growth in the short run, and not even much of a link in the long run 
in those economies. Policy, in contrast, has been seen to have a 
large effect on growth, but ODA did not systematically lead to 
policy reform. At the end of this paper, I shall attempt to show that 
the combination of good policy and ODA has been effective in 
promoting efficient FDI and growth. Thus, donors should target 
ODA to good policy environments if it is to be effective in 
promoting private investment in the LDCs.   
 
Before talking about ODA dependency and its effectiveness in the 
LDCs like Nepal, let me first discuss here the theoretical aspects of 
ODA and see how they affect growth in the recipient country, and 
what condition is best for receiving ODA, if there is any ‘best’ 
condition. Almost every nation now agrees that to achieve any real 
development, good policies and governance are irreplaceable, but 
this has yet to be proven by deeds. Although there is now an 
increasing coordination among the donor and the recipient 
countries regarding the poor performance of the conditional (tied) 
ODA, it has yet to be proven that untied ODA is the best solution 
for the effectiveness of ODA in the recipient country.  
 
The World Bank, in its 1998 report Assessing ODA, examined the 
relationship between ODA and growth in a large selection of 
developing economies and found no systematic association 
between the two. This finding might raise no eyebrows in many 
parts of the world where ODA is only a small proportion of the 
economic resources available to a country. But in LDCs like Nepal, 
where ODA is relatively large, this finding is indeed an eye-opener. 
The report found a strong positive association between ODA and 
growth in countries with good monetary, fiscal and trade policies, 
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indicating that ODA is indeed effective where economic policies 
are supportive of growth. The report also found that ODA was not 
very effective at bringing about an improvement in the policy 
environment.   
 
But the above findings do not tell all about the effectiveness story. 
What about the effectiveness of ODA-financed projects? If one 
accepts that such projects are likely to be ineffective and probably 
unsustainable in a very poor policy environment – for example a 
country like Nepal where successive governments have been so 
profoundly corrupt and incompetent that a highly unstable 
environment has been the result – one still does not know when 
they are likely to be effective and sustainable in more supportive 
environments. To answer that question, one must first ask whether 
ODA in fact funds the projects for which it is intended. This is not 
just a question of corruption, although that is definitely a major 
problem in some countries. But by and large, level, given the 
scrutiny of ODA by its various donors, it may not be that easy to 
have significant amounts of it shipped off to Swiss banks, as it is 
often alleged. It is more a question of fungibility. 
 
How fungible is ODA? Research on this question shows mixed 
results, but many analyses find a significant degree of fungibility 
(Dollar, 1998). A study of the fungibility of ODA in 16 African 
countries (Devarajan et al. 1998) found that almost 90 percent of 
ODA boosted government expenditures. Roughly half the ODA 
was used to finance external debt service payments, one-quarter 
was used to finance investments and the final quarter went into 
current account spending. According to the same study of the ODA 
that was used to fund investments in those countries, that used to 
finance projects in health, industry and agriculture, was found to be 
highly fungible, that is, expenditures in these sectors by recipient 
governments did not change despite the availability of ODA for 
projects in them. ODA to the energy, transport, and 
communications sectors was partially fungible, while that to 
education was least fungible. 
 
But these findings do not obviate the need and usefulness of 
evaluating ODA-financed projects in the host countries, and for 
two main reasons. First, the studies of fungibility show tendencies 
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or probabilities in the way ODA impacts on countries. They do not 
determine the actual impact of ODA in particular cases and, 
without a case-by-case examination, it is difficult to know exactly 
when ODA is or is not fungible. But the most important reason for 
evaluating individual ODA-financed projects is that even if 
governments would have funded the particular activity anyway, it 
would be likely that the way the project was designed and 
implemented would have been quite different because of donor 
involvement. This is usually the case in the LDCs of Asia and 
Africa, where donors have taken a particularly assertive role in 
identifying, designing, implementing and evaluating projects. It is 
important, therefore, to ascertain whether projects where ODA 
donors have been involved have been designed and implemented in 
an effective manner.  
 
A number of donor countries and agencies provide assessments of 
the effectiveness of their ODA by sector and region. But, usually 
the evaluation systems of the donors are seldom consistent with 
one another, although they may show common patterns of 
performance. In the case of Nepal, these assessments frequently 
show that ODA projects have suffered very badly, with high 
proportions of only partially successful or unsuccessful projects 
and with significant problems of unsustainability, once donor 
funding is terminated. Particular problems have been evident in 
agriculture and rural development projects, projects involving the 
creation and functioning of development finance organizations and 
projects in the industrial sector.   
 
If some types of project performed better than others in the same or 
similar policy and institutional environments, what are the factors 
that affect that performance? There seem to be three key elements 
that affect the performance of the donor-designed- and-
implemented projects typical of those in the LDCs. First is the 
frequent lack of proven technology for achieving project goals. The 
donors may know how to build roads or how to organize and help 
manage elections. But far less is known, for example, about 
generating a demand for family planning services, helping small 
farmers expand their production or improving the accountability of 
newly elected governments. Very little is known about how 
effectively to strengthen judiciaries, civil society organizations or 
 54 
the civil service. Yet much of what ODA tries to do at present is 
activities like these, involving institutional or behavioural change. 
 
Second, donors tend to know relatively little about the societies or 
institutions in which they are trying to bring about change. Most 
ODA officials spend a few years in any one country. Few speak 
local languages and many spend their time in their offices rather 
than in the field where their projects are implemented. To help 
bring about behavioural and institutional change in foreign 
environments, it is imperative that the agents of change be deeply 
knowledgeable about that environment. This is seldom the case 
with the expatriate officials or consultants who typically manage 
ODA interventions. 
 
The third problem involves the domestic and bureaucratic politics 
within ODA agencies themselves. All of them, even the 
multilateral ones, operate within a political environment that 
constrains and at times drives their allocative and policy decisions. 
Those decisions are thus frequently taken with less reference to 
what works in a recipient country than to what is required by their 
own public, their legislature or their bureaucracy. Ethnic and 
ideological factors, personal relationships, domestic political 
concerns, bureaucratic processes and the ever-present imperative to 
spend available funds within given time periods all influence 
decisions on who gets the ODA, how much they get and how it is 
used, making the flexible, locally informed interventions needed 
for the type of ODA-funded activities today ,extremely difficult.   
 
3.2 Dependency on ODA and its Implications 
 
Let us here take a look at some of the propositions regarding 
dependency on ODA and its effect on development that are to be 
found in current discourse on ODA. While these propositions are 
distinct, this school of thought has in common a negative view of 
ODA, a view that has been termed by some economists as the 
‘ODA dependency school’ (Collier, 1999). 
 
The first proposition is that some poor countries and regions have 
grown more slowly than others in part because they have received 
much more ODA relative to GDP than other developing regions. 
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Bauer (1982) has very strongly argued that ODA reduced the 
incentive to adopt good policies. The same proposition has been 
more recently expanded by another group of economists (Kanbur 
et al. 1999), whose proposition is based on a different argument, 
namely that large gross flows of ODA project overwhelm the 
management capacity of poor governments. The second 
proposition is that the analysis of ‘welfare dependency’ in poor 
households carries over to ODA-receiving countries. To elaborate, 
recent analysis of poor households in advanced countries has 
established reasonable evidence for a dependence syndrome 
whereby welfare payments create very high implicit marginal tax 
rates and so discourage work, trapping recipients into continued 
need for welfare. ODA dependency infers that poor countries are 
subject to the same trap. This is also embedded in the commonly 
used metaphor that recipient governments should be ‘weaned off’ 
ODA. 
 
The third proposition is that the enormous increase in private 
capital flows to developing countries during the 1990s, which has 
transformed them from a small fraction to a large multiple of ODA, 
has made it unnecessary and indeed a distraction; governments 
should focus on attracting private capital rather than ODA. The 
fourth is that ODA flows, determined by donor fads, are so fickle 
that they are a source of instability rather than a basis for sustained 
growth. This view has also been shared as the conventional 
wisdom in the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1998). The final 
proposition is that ODA in any case is doomed: the forces which 
have recently led to reductions in ODA budgets will continue, so 
that ODA will rapidly decline in real terms. Managing the 
transition from ODA dependency has been a subject of recent 
research among some development economists (Kanbur et al. 
1999). 
 
In summary, ODA is historically detrimental: the disincentive 
effect provides a theoretical underpinning for this experience; 
private, not public capital is important; ODA has been fickle so 
that it cannot be relied upon as a component of a budget; and in 
any case ODA budgets are rapidly falling so that governments 
must learn to live without it. These five propositions have in 
common the inference that governments should focus upon 
 56 
adjusting to less ODA, either because large ODA flows for various 
reasons are detrimental, or because they will inevitably decline.    
 
Let me add here a few of my own comments on the above 
arguments of the ‘aid-dependency school’ of thought, while 
examining the relationship between ODA and FDI.  First, 
regarding the question of whether ODA has been detrimental, 
looking at regions like Africa or South Asia that have been 
receiving huge amounts of ODA for a long time but whose growth 
is still far from satisfactory by international standards, one can 
safely say that in most cases ODA has been ineffective because of 
a massive but readily rectifiable mistake in its allocation.  ODA is, 
and has been, effective in raising growth in ‘good’ environments 
and ineffective in ‘poor’ environments. This result holds whether 
‘environment’ is defined narrowly in terms of macroeconomic 
policy or more broadly in terms of a wide range of policies and 
institutions.  What one could say in general is that ODA has been 
ineffective because too much of it has been concentrated in ‘poor’ 
environments. The government becomes so overwhelmed by ODA 
projects that the business of government becomes dominated by 
the need to satisfy donors, replacing the need to satisfy citizens. 
Regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, may have suffered 
from ‘big ODA’ even if smaller amounts of ODA would have been 
advantageous.  
 
As regards the second proposition that compares ODA dependency 
to welfare dependency; it calls into question the theoretical 
analysis of the ‘aid dependency school.’ If ODA really had the sort 
of disincentive effects on poor countries that welfare payments 
have on poor households, ODA should reduce growth irrespective 
of the policy environment. Indeed, we might expect that the better 
the policy environment and so the higher the potential growth rate 
in the absence of ODA, the more damage ODA would do. 
However, this analogy with welfare dependency is not only 
empirically questionable, but also fundamentally mistaken. 
 
First, the scale of ODA relative to income is tiny by comparison 
with welfare payments. The ‘poverty trap’ of welfare recipient 
households commonly involves households for whom welfare 
payments constitute a large majority of total income and who 
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thereby face implicit marginal tax rates of 80 percent or more. By 
contrast, gross ODA flows to highly ODA dependent regions like 
Africa, for example, peaked at around 12 percent and implicit 
marginal tax rates were correspondingly radically lower. Alesina 
and Dollar (1998) analyse the patterns of donor ODA allocation. 
The donors who most sharply reduce ODA in response to rising 
incomes are the Nordic group. Usually, their ODA flows start to 
decline once per capita incomes rise above $600 and are largely 
eliminated once incomes rise above $1,600. However, since the 
loss of ODA involved in this policy is only around $3 per capita, 
the marginal tax rate implied by Nordic policy is well under one 
percent. Similarly, the American aid agency USAID tapers out its 
much larger ODA budget, but does so much more gradually. The 
implicit tax rate imposed by USAID is less than 0.5 percent 
(Collier, 1999). Other donors are less responsive to changes in 
income. Hence, the aggregate marginal tax rate implied by donor 
reductions in ODA as income rises is usually in single digits. Any 
disincentive effect at the aggregate level is therefore trivial.   
 
One exception to the absence of an incentive effect of ODA is with 
respect to the behaviour of governments. Directly, ODA accrues to 
the government and thus it faces an incentive problem vis-à-vis 
taxation. In the absence of ODA, a government has to balance the 
political unpopularity of taxation against the political popularity of 
public expenditure. A dollar of tax revenue has, at the margin, as 
many political costs as a dollar of expenditure has political benefits. 
The receipt of ODA by the government does not change this 
fundamental balancing requirement of political economy, but it 
necessarily changes the levels of taxation and expenditure at which 
balance is achieved. Collier (1999) has articulately explained such 
fiscal effects of ODA using a simple graph. 
 
 Figure 1 depicts the rising political costs of taxation by the T T 
curve and the diminishing political benefits of public expenditure 
along the E E curve.  The point of intersection of the two curves at 
E0 is the equilibrium without ODA. The with-ODA equilibrium, Ea, 
involves both higher expenditure and lower taxation than without 
ODA.  
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Figure. 3.1. Fiscal Effects of ODA  
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This response is optimal if the political process broadly 
encapsulated the economic costs and benefits of taxation and 
expenditure. It infers that ODA would indeed induce governments 
to have lower taxation than without ODA. The population is 
choosing, in effect, the benefits of ODA that would accrue to 
households most efficiently either by means of reducing taxation or 
through increased public expenditure. One finds it difficult to see 
this as an incentive problem since it is the solution to a household 
welfare-maximising problem that is identical to that which faces 
the donors. Presumptively, donors have no particular reason to 
prefer ODA to accrue directly or indirectly to households. The 
reduction in taxation, however, has favourable incentive effects at 
the household level. The developing countries usually have quite 
high marginal costs of taxation because there are few efficient tax 
handles. Hence, reduced tax effort can free households and firms 
from powerful disincentive effects of taxation. Thus, contrary to 
the welfare-dependency analogy, ODA improves the incentive 
environment at the level of the individual agent. A simple 
extension of this argument is the more familiar debt problem. Debt, 
which is simply future negative ODA, discourages investment 
because it constitutes a future tax liability. Hence, it is increased 
debt rather than increased ODA which gives rise to an incentive 
problem: the counterparts to welfare households trapped into 
idleness are firms trapped into disinvestments. 
 
E T
E0Ea Ea
T E
ODA Tax revenue
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3.3 Relationship between ODA and FDI 
 
Now let us turn to the proposition regarding ODA and FDI. In a 
globalised economy, it is usually private rather than public 
transfers which will eventually be decisive in sustaining growth. 
China has made this transition, receiving around $30 per capita in 
FDI. India is also on the verge of making it. But, by contrast, in the 
case of Africa, for example, private capital flows are less than $3 
per capita, and so remain dwarfed by ODA flows. The same also 
holds true in case of Nepal. In these countries, an important task is 
indeed to increase private capital inflows. However, ODA can be 
used with a central role as a facilitator to this transformation.  The 
World Bank (Burnside and Dollar 1997) finds that ODA is 
effective in attracting FDI as long as the policy environment is 
satisfactory. Indeed, evidence from some developing countries 
around the globe suggests that far from having become less 
important, ODA has become more valuable than ever. The reason 
for this is that several of these regions and countries have 
implemented sufficient reforms that their macroeconomic policy 
environments are ‘satisfactory’ in the Burnside-Dollar sense, i.e. 
that ODA is indeed effective in attracting FDI if there is a 
favourable policy environment. However, there also remain some 
countries where despite, or some might say because of, huge 
amounts of ODA, the environment is not conducive to investment. 
There are too many risks involved in undertaking any serious 
investment.  Nepal, for example, falls in this category.   
 
Risk, however, is not the only factor deterring FDI in countries like 
Nepal. These countries face the severe problem of poor 
infrastructure. For example, regarding power generation, only 293 
MW out of Nepal’s estimated 43,000 MW economically viable 
hydropower potential has been developed to date.  As a result, 
costs of operation are much higher than they need to be and FDI 
gets diverted into the purchase of generators. Hence, even before 
allowing for the disincentive impact on FDI, the effective FDI rate 
could be much higher if firms were free to spend their FDI budgets 
on other necessary equipment. Similarly, transport costs are usually 
a major problem, particularly for exporters. Two main reasons as to 
why transport costs are so high are that the road network is so 
inadequate and that there are no sea ports in the country.   
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FDI thus becomes extremely difficult in the LDCs for the simple 
reason that they lack basic infrastructure. Although they feel the 
need to improve their basic infrastructure for attracting any 
significant investment to their economies, they cannot do anything 
on their own, as they are too poor to provide it. Hence they become 
extremely vulnerable to ODA, as that becomes essential for the 
purpose of luring in FDI, which would otherwise not oblige.   
 
This need for FDI has resulted in many poor nations rushing to 
accelerate the process of FDI liberalization by extending more 
open policies and permitting forms of FDI entry previously 
considered less desirable, such as the establishment of fully owned 
subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and participation in 
privatization programs. This has, in turn, provided multinational 
companies (MNCs) with an ever-increasing choice of locations and 
they have become more selective and demanding as regards other 
host country determinants. 
 
The outcome of all this is that while the liberalization of FDI 
frameworks has contributed to an acceleration of FDI flows, a 
process of diminishing returns has set in and liberal FDI policy is 
increasingly losing its effectiveness as a locational determinant of 
FDI. Competing intensively with one another for FDI and finding 
that liberal policies are no longer enough; host countries have 
increasingly come to realize the importance of adopting proactive 
measures and popular policies to facilitate business transactions by 
foreign inventors and improving the economic determinants of 
FDI. 
 
Of equal importance is what is missing from this agenda after 
evaluating the balance of costs and benefits of various popular 
policies toward FDI in relation to the economic and 
political/national security goals that those policies are intended to 
advance. The use of domestic-content requirements, for instance, 
to promote backward linkages, industrial deepening, or mere job 
creation is questionable, and is perhaps best discarded. 
 
FDI projects with high domestic-content mandates seem to exhibit 
many negative characteristics: high costs, lack in both technology 
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and management practices, and slim hope of maturing from infant 
status to internationally competitive operations. They often 
incorporate a political-economic logic of self-protection that 
frequently extends retarding host efforts at liberalizing trade and 
investment more generally. 
 
Another approach not very helpful to the development of the host 
country is perhaps the use of joint-venture requirements to enhance 
development objectives such as technology transfer, international 
market penetration, or development of a robust supplier base. FDI 
projects launched with joint venture requirements show a high 
degree of conflict among the partners, suffer from a high degree of 
instability, and often exhibit older technology, slower rates of 
technology transfer to the venture, and fewer prospects for exports.   
 
Host countries must initiate many of the most important actions to 
attract and utilize FDI in their development programs on their own 
– in particular improving the micro- and macro-economic 
functioning of their economies and strengthening commercial and 
judicial institutions that provide stability and dependability to all 
domestic as well as foreign investors. At the same time policy 
improvements such as abandoning the use of domestic content and 
joint venture could also be adopted unilaterally, to the benefit of 
host authorities in the developing world and economies in 
transition. 
 
Although public investment is potentially complementary to 
private investment, it is questionable how effectively it would 
enhance growth if it were financed through increased taxation.  An 
improvement in roads in Nepal, for instance, financed by higher 
petroleum prices would initially increase transport costs, since the 
accumulation of an asset is being financed out of recurrent income, 
with most of the benefits accruing in the distant future. Hence, a 
substantial part of the needed increase in public investment usually 
comes initially from ODA. 
 
Thus, in the circumstances of newly reformed developing 
countries, ODA needs to taper in ahead of FDI.  Burnside and 
Dollar (1997) established that in good policy environments an 
extra dollar of ODA increases FDI. As to how this might come 
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about, ODA improves infrastructure and lowers high taxation, both 
of which are constraints. The Burnside-Dollar results on ODA 
effectiveness directly provide a static case for allocating more 
ODA to those countries that already have satisfactory policy 
environments. Let me suggest here a more dynamic case for a 
temporary increase in ODA. There could be three phases in a post-
reform environment, the first of which could be called the bounce-
back phase, where high growth is achieved by policy reform 
despite low public and private investment. The second phase is the 
ODA-dependent growth, where high growth is maintained by high 
public investment, despite low FDI. And the third phase is 
sustainable growth, where high growth is maintained by high 
private investment, with public investment increasingly financed 
through taxation of the rapidly growing taxable base.   
 
ODA thus needs to taper in before it tapers out in the reformed 
environments. This produces a completely different pattern of 
ODA from that envisaged in the old policy-conditionality 
framework. There, ODA was to be used to induce policy reform, so 
that most ODA would need to be deployed in those environments 
with the worst policies. As policies improved, the scope for 
inducing further ODA reform would gradually diminish so that 
ODA would taper out.   
 
3.4 ODA and its Future Prospects 
 
The next question is about whether ODA is a source of fiscal 
instability. With regard to this proposition of the ODA dependency 
school, even the IMF treats ODA receipts as an exceptional 
financing item to meet a budget deficit, rather than as a core 
component of non-tax receipts (IMF, 1998). A likely reason for 
this is that ODA flows are seen as so unreliable as to be a source of 
instability. Thus, a safety-first strategy requires that ODA be 
treated as windfall exceptional financing, rather than as a flow of 
receipts on which a government can reliably maintain expenditures 
in excess of revenues.   
 
There are two main reasons why ODA receipts might be unreliable. 
One is that donors may use ODA to advance a political agenda 
driven by the political concerns of their domestic electorates.  
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Although the donors these days provide ODA primarily for 
development purposes as opposed to the political gains during the 
cold war era, there are still some cases of donors providing ODA 
for non-development-related goals like maintaining spheres of 
influence, promoting commercial interests or garnering votes for 
favoured issues in the United Nations. Secondly, donor procedures 
for disbursement may be so cumbersome that, even when funds are 
committed, there may be long and unpredictable lags before 
governments are able to utilise them.  There are good grounds for 
both of these concerns. For example, the ODA cut-off to Pakistan 
when it matched India’s testing of nuclear weapons constituted a 
major fiscal shock that could not reasonably have been anticipated 
in budgetary planning. Hence, ODA could very well be a source of 
fiscal instability sometimes, especially in a highly ODA-dependent 
poor country.  
 
The final question is about whether ODA receipts will continue to 
decline. ODA levels have clearly fallen in recent years and this has 
produced an environment of ODA pessimism.  Historically, both 
the US and Western Europe have been through a phase of fiscal 
retrenchment at the same time: the US, because the budget deficit 
became a high profile political issue and Europe, because of the 
need to meet the ‘convergence criteria’ for monetary union. Not 
surprisingly, ODA budgets were reduced during this phase. And 
although the American budget is now balanced and Europe has 
successfully met most of the convergence criteria, the global 
economy on the whole is still unstable; especially since the 2001 
September 11 attacks. The G8 summit in Canada held in June 2002 
rejected, for example, Africa’s plea for more ODA. The group of 
eight merely gave a vague promise to increase funding by $6 
billion a year by 2006.  This is not even new money, but only half 
the $12 billion increase of total world ODA promised at the UN 
meeting in Mexico earlier this year. Even a firm commitment to 
use half of the world total for Africa was opposed by the US and 
Japan, the two largest donors in the world. The US was far more 
concerned with payments to Russia than Africa, and it even got 
Europe and Japan to agree to add a further $10 billion to double the 
amount the US is paying to Russia over the next 10 years in the 
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“global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of 
mass destruction.” Japan, on the other hand, has made cuts in its 
ODA spending stressing that it is not a good time for making more 
ODA commitments, given its own need for fiscal tightening.  
 
Looking at the long span of ODA history, another powerful cause 
of declining ODA budgets has been the end of the cold war. 
During the cold war much ODA was used to secure political 
allegiance, and although there are signs of a similar allegiance at 
the wake of September 11, 2001, especially with American ODA, 
much of that now is over, and so the incentive for ODA has 
correspondingly fallen. This may well account for the fact that in 
the past bilateral ODA was so unrelated to the policy environment: 
developmental effects of ODA were secondary considerations to 
political alignment. 
 
Also the perception that ODA has been ineffective has hampered 
any substantial increase of ODA money. Paradoxically, this view 
has become prevalent at just the time at which research has 
identified the circumstances where ODA is unambiguously 
effective, namely, a reasonable macroeconomic policy 
environment. In the past, partly because ODA was allocated 
according to political agenda, it failed to reflect this policy 
environment. If donors were to persist with such ODA allocations, 
the gradual accumulation of evidence in the ineffectiveness of 
ODA would continue to undermine the basis for ODA budgets: 
ODA would decline simply because it was a waste of money. If, 
however, ODA becomes increasingly concentrated upon 
satisfactory policy environments, then, not only would its 
effectiveness demonstrably increase, but also the concentration 
would itself increase the flow of ODA to the post-stabilisation 
countries.  Conditional upon donors channelling ODA to those 
areas in which the policy environment is already satisfactory, 
instead of the attempt to use ODA to induce reform where policy is 
poor, there are reasonable prospects for rising ODA flows into 
satisfactory policy environments.   
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3.5 ODA and Nepal’s Development 
 
This section deals with different issues relating to the ODA 
provided to Nepal by different bilateral and multilateral sources, 
and looks into what role this has played in the country’s economic 
development as well as at what implications this has had for the 
lives of the average Nepalese.  
 
From its beginning in the 1950s, ODA increased in the following 
decades to a level where disbursements constituted around 80 
percent of the development budget in the late 1980s. Such a high 
degree of ODA dependency was not without domestic political 
implications, and in the last decade of the one-party Panchayat 
period (1960-1990), there was a tendency to see in the domestic 
political debate a relationship between the dominant powers in the 
country and ODA. At the same time, government projects were by 
and large unable to reduce poverty. 'Development' through ODA 
essentially became a metaphor for the maintenance and 
strengthening of the traditional native power structure. Certain 
social classes played a decisive role in determining both the 
content and the channel of the aid inflow. The upper social classes 
derived the major benefits from foreign aided development. As a 
result, ODA enhanced the position of the upper social classes, who 
benefited from the maintenance of the existing system of political 
and economic power. The need to legitimise such a power gave 
foreign aided development the halo of a ‘people-oriented 
development’ while at the same time increasing the dependence of 
the lower classes.  
 
The political picture has changed since then, some claim, as a 
result of the above-mentioned contradiction, while others assert 
that it was helped by donors’ support to democratic development. 
In spite of the political changes, however, ODA continues to 
constitute a very large share of the development budget. But 
despite this significant inflow of ODA, it is the general feeling in 
Nepal that ODA channelled through government line ministries has 
not resulted in effective poverty reduction. Even the large ODA for 
agriculture has not resulted in acceptable growth in agricultural 
production.  
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To get a true picture of ODA and its relationship to development in 
Nepal, one has to go beyond mere trends and financial dimensions 
and look at other aspects of this relationship. Because Nepal has 
been depending on ODA for so long and so heavily, it has affected 
the entire thought processes of important societal agents 
concerning development. It has deeply affected not only the values 
assumed by the society but also the functioning of the democratic 
polity and the development of a responsible civil society (Panday, 
1999). 
 
During the Panchayat period, ODA played a big role in the 
disillusionment of the people with the political economy. The 
rulers locked themselves in an aid mentality in such a manner that 
they not only craved more ODA but also emphasised this aspect in 
official propaganda. Getting more ODA from friendly countries 
and international institutions abroad, including international non-
government organisations became an end in itself. Those who did 
not benefit from ODA felt cheated, reinforcing their suspicion that 
the money was being diverted to enrich a few in powerful positions. 
Dependence on ODA continued, so much so that in the end—
according to some critics—it even contributed to the collapse of 
the regime. 
 
What is more disheartening is that even after the advent of 
‘democracy’ in 1990 and with a multiparty system under their belts, 
the main agenda and doctrine of successive government leaders 
retained ODA, and even their daily activities were seen to be 
overwhelmed by it. A prime minister’s main achievement was 
recorded in terms of the number of ODA agreements signed and 
the amount of aid received. Even the largest political parties, with a 
long history of commitment to democratic socialism, were often 
seen wielding ODA as a weapon, both when in or out of power. 
When in power, they sought legitimacy in an increased flow of 
ODA into the country, not in the support of the people. When out 
of power, they tried to use ODA as a measure of their opponents’ 
failures, in the hope that donors would shun their rivals. Concern 
for the general public rarely figured in this picture.  
 
This excessive dependency on ODA becomes clearer if one looks 
at some of the latest ODA figures. Loans and grants together have 
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consistently financed almost 60 percent of development 
expenditure in recent years, with the share of grants larger than that 
of loans. The increase in foreign loans as a source of financing 
government expenditure began in the 1980s with the introduction 
of structural adjustment lending by multilateral institutions, 
accelerating the process of dependency. Among the five largest 
countries of South Asia, Nepal is the only one where ODA as a 
percentage of GNP has been consistently high since 1980. Per 
capita ODA to Nepal was US$19 in 2003, second highest in the 
region, while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was the lowest in 
the region (Table 1). 
           
Table 3.1: Per Capita ODA and Total FDI in South Asia (2003) 
 
Country Per-capita ODA 
(US$) 
FDI (Million US$) 
Bangladesh 10 102 
India 1 4,269 
Nepal 19 15 
Pakistan 7 534 
Sri Lanka 35 229 
Source: World Development Report (2006). The World Bank 
 
As for the development of the private sector, although governments 
after the 1990 movement gradually promoted the private sector, 
their policies were not clearly or consistently reinforced by 
subsequent governments. Little was done to address fundamental 
issues, like loss-making public enterprises and a highly 
bureaucratic administration. The lack of clear signals to the private 
sector about the extent and nature of policy reforms, as well as the 
inconsistency of these policies, resulted in an uncertain financial 
environment. In the meantime, practices like a high level of non-
performing loans, excessive government involvement in the 
banking sector, weak corporate governance and organisational 
culture and unwanted political interventions, to name a few, 
continue even today. There is an urgent need to undertake 
important measures to strengthen and deepen the financial system. 
After all, a competitive, efficient and healthy financial system is 
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vital for enhancing growth, efficiency and maintaining the stability 
of the economy.  
 
There are several other apparent ‘failures’ of successive 
governments after 1990 that led, one could argue, to the successful 
launch of the Maoists revolution. The following points stand out as 
mistakes that need to be avoided at any cost if we are serious about 
bringing about a real revolution in the coming days: centralisation 
in Kathmandu of both government and private structures; rampant 
corruption and abuse of authority by bureaucrats and politicians; 
exclusion of large sections of the population from having a voice in 
policy and programme development; failure of donors to scrutinise 
the use of their funds and ensure effective coordination of their 
activities; and a lack of ethics among the business communities.  
 
3.6 Impact of Insurgency on the Economy 
 
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) launched its 
armed insurgency in 1996, after the then government turned down 
its 40-point demand. In a booklet published in 1998, the party 
outlined its objectives, stating that its goal was to usher in self-
reliant, independent, balanced and planned economic development 
through a radical, land-reform programme and national 
industrialisation. Since then and until the November 2006 signing 
of the peace accord between the Maoists and the government, it is 
estimated that more than 15,000 Nepalese lost their lives, and 
another 200,000 were internally displaced. The insurgency had a 
heavy impact on the country’s economy and business sector. 
Although a serious study on its real impact is yet to be done, one 
estimate suggested that the economy had lost about $800 million in 
GDP already by 2002 (Dhakal and Subedi, 2006).  
 
Now that the euphoria of the peace deal is almost forgotten and 
that the country is heading for its first ever elected constituent 
assembly, which will carry the responsibility of rebuilding a ‘New 
Nepal,’ the foremost task of society is to identify and support the 
actors who will take the leadership role in this reconstruction 
process. They have to decide on what to do first when everything is 
a priority! It is indeed a daunting task for any party to shoulder this 
responsibility, but we cannot afford to do otherwise.  
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It is of utmost importance that Nepal needs a new policy agenda in 
post-conflict reconstruction. The reconstruction will require growth, 
which in turn will require private-sector investment. But it is an 
effective state that can provide the environment for investment, and 
to attain this environment, it is paramount that individuals and 
agencies take active participation in their respective societies. We 
need to thus consider different dimensions of reconstruction.  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction does not mean that we should be 
rebuilding the past. As discussed earlier in the paper, past policies, 
institutions, and investments were often not the best prescriptions 
for development or political stability, but instead generated 
grievances among those left out of the 'social pie.' It is a lot easier 
to rebuild shattered infrastructure than it is to change institutions 
and to make them effective and accountable to the majority of the 
population—but it is the latter challenge that must be met for a 
durable peace.  
 
Reconstruction cannot work without economic policy reform: 
policies that thwart investment by communities and the private 
sector must be reviewed and changed. Creating better public 
expenditure management so that public money and aid can be 
channelled into the highest return public investments should get a 
high priority. Privatization is important for reducing the fiscal 
burden of inefficient state enterprises, freeing up public money for 
redeployment in the social sectors such as education and health, 
and for improving the delivery of essential services to support and 
encourage community and private-sector investment. Equally 
important is securing the access of poor communities to land and 
other natural resource capital (forests, fisheries etc.) upon which 
their livelihoods depend, and managing the allocation of natural 
capital to large (and often politically powerful) investors in a 
transparent manner that protects the rights of the poor as well as 
the public interest.  
 
3.7 ODA and Transformation in Nepal 
 
In short, the general perception among the Nepalese is that foreign 
aid has made life more pleasant and rewarding for a limited few 
and that it has done little to promote the production of wealth, or to 
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breed political responsibility, or to encourage people to help 
themselves. By doing so it has allowed successive governments to 
avoid correcting their mistakes.  
 
Judith Tendler’s 1975 observation remains true even today, at least 
in the case of Nepal: 
A donor organization’s sense of mission, then, relates not 
necessarily to economic development but to the commitment of 
resources, the moving of money…..the estimates of total capital 
needs for development assistance in relation to supply seem to 
have been the implicit standard by which donor organizations have 
guided their behavior and judged their performance…the 
quantitative measure has gained its supremacy by default. 
 
In order to transform this nation into a ‘New Nepal,’ all the 
stakeholders need to reform themselves, starting from the political 
parties to the donor community. The stubborn and un-reforming 
attitude of the political parties is being assisted by the ‘business as 
usual’ attitude of the other stakeholders. AID cannot be blamed for 
all the mistakes made in the projects it bankrolls. However, by 
providing a seemingly endless credit line to governments 
regardless of their policies, AID effectively discourages 
governments from learning from and correcting their mistakes.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
 
The role of ODA and its relationship with FDI and economic 
growth in developing countries has long been a hotly debated 
subject among economists and critics alike.  We have seen in this 
paper that despite long and numerous attempts to find the key to 
growth in the poor economies, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the key has actually been found. This paper reviewed some of 
the keys that have not worked and offered some new propositions 
regarding the ‘aid-dependency syndrome’ seen in many of the least 
developed and ODA-dependent economies around the globe.   
With regard to the ‘aid-dependency school’ and its belief that ODA 
should rapidly wither to an inglorious past, I have offered my own 
arguments on each of its propositions.  One argument, concerning 
high ODA having been the cause of slow growth in the LDCs, led 
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to the conclusion that that is the case applicable only in those 
economies where there is excess of ODA despite unsuitable 
environments for ODA effectiveness, and Nepal fell in this 
category. However, this need not be the case everywhere; indeed, 
in most of the developing countries, subject to a satisfactory policy 
environment, ODA may actually raise the rate of economic growth 
before remarkably high levels of ODA are reached. Also the 
argument that ODA has a disincentive effect analogous to welfare 
dependency was found wanting since there might indeed be 
positive incentive effects arising from reduced distortionary effects 
of the system.  
  
Regarding the claim that ODA detracts from private investment, I 
have argued that in economies with recently reformed policies and 
sound environments, ODA has a vital role to play, both in 
sustaining economic growth until private investment increases and 
in leading-in private investment. It is true that in the case of 
countries like Nepal, this argument may not hold, but it has 
generally been the case in most developing and newly developed 
countries. I have also shown, however, that the liberalization 
process of investment policies is increasingly losing its 
effectiveness as a locational determinant of FDI.  It is of extreme 
importance to the LDCs to evaluate the balance of costs and 
benefits of various popular policies toward FDI in relation to the 
economic and national security goals that those policies are 
intended to advance. This leads to the next proposition of the ‘aid-
dependency school’ that ODA flows are so fickle and unreliable 
that they are too risky to include as a core component of the 
budget. We saw that this indeed has been the case in highly 
unstable and ODA-dependent countries or where the interest of the 
donors has lain more on political than purely economic reasons. As 
for the final claim of the school that ODA is doomed to decline 
because of continued contraction in donor budgets, I have argued 
that provided that donors channel their aid money to economies in 
which policy environments are already satisfactory, there are 
reasonable prospects for rising ODA flows in those environments. 
As for Nepal, the discussions in this study may not have been 
enough to get a complete picture of its economy, but one thing that 
has been clear is that there remains a lot to be done to bring about 
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the necessary changes to uplift this fragile economy. In other 
words, Nepal’s development world seems to be in desperate times. 
Overwhelming needs, impending crises and unachieved goals have 
been dominating the agenda for quite a few years. One has only to 
look at some vital sector statistics of the country’s social and 
economic structure, and the picture becomes clear. 
 
The analyses concerning ODA do not offer us any satisfactory 
results either. What they show us instead is that there exists a huge 
gap between the theoretical concerns and the reality of the impact 
of ODA on the country concerned. That could be the reason why 
there are some academic critics of development projects that point 
to methodological or theoretical weaknesses being deflected with 
the counter charge of a lack of realism by the development 
practitioners.   
 
This is where the question of the donors’ role comes in. Although 
there have been some occasional grumbling recently from some of 
the donors regarding the handling of ODA (France in 2002 
temporarily removed Nepal from its priority list of ODA-receiving 
countries), there does not seem to have been much discussion 
going on among the donor countries themselves regarding this 
issue. It looks like the donors are struggling with their trial and 
error approach and in doing so their manifest role is becoming less 
clear or agreeable. They suffer from two major problems. First, 
there is a profound lack of coordination among them as a result of 
which they are not satisfied with one another.  Even the World 
Bank has mentioned this in its report (CAS 1999-2000) stating that 
“lack of donor coordination” is a major risk in the process of 
development. Second, there is an increasing inability to establish a 
framework of cooperative coordination with governments in the 
recipient countries. As a result, they are less satisfied with what 
they do and achieve while working with these governments. So 
they blame the state for its continual ineptness and lack of 
performance. In return, the state blames the society and its politics 
that the donors fail to appreciate; and the society blames both, the 
government and the donors. It seems that the ruling class and the 
donors need each other to defend their action and inaction, but they 
cannot work together to produce a lasting impact on development! 
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As for FDI, which has been identified as one of the potential 
factors believed to have a conceptual capacity for reducing poverty 
through the better utilization of available resources, for building up 
the much needed infrastructure and for availing employment 
opportunities to the locals, ultimately assisting overall 
improvement of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, one feels 
that there is still a long way to go to achieving these goals. 
Although Nepal has come up with some attractive incentives such 
as tax holidays, including tax-free export and duty-free import of 
raw materials, plus cheap labour, the above discussions show that 
there exists a serious fallacy either in policy matters or 
implementation stage or both. There may be some positive 
correlation between FDI and employment, but that alone is 
certainly not enough to keep the investors interested. What one 
really needs is a healthy and conducive environment to attract any 
serious long-term FDI.  
 
Efforts to promote FDI may go amiss if its structural weaknesses 
are not taken care of at the proper time. It has been felt for a long 
time that for boosting FDI, the country needs to identify 
manufacturing and service sectors with potential other than tourism 
and hydropower. These have to be supported by updated and 
transparent legal and regulatory frameworks. Sorting out the 
administrative hurdles and providing political stability must boost 
the credibility of government policies. This is the least the 
government could do, if it is serious about increasing FDI in the 
country.   
 
One should ask whether the arguments presented in this paper 
conform with or contradict accepted wisdom. In other words, how 
do they square with the two polar views in this field discussed in at 
the beginning of this paper? One view being that promulgated by 
Pronk (2001) who claims that aid-financed investment and aid-
induced policy reforms are the keys to unlocking the recipient 
country’s development potential and that ODA acts as a catalyst 
for development. The other view being that of analysts like Bauer 
and Kanbur et. al., who strongly argued that foreign aid reduces the 
incentives for the recipient nations to adopt good policies and 
overwhelms the management capacity of the governments of poor 
countries. In Nepal’s case, I have argued that the results so far 
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corroborate the view expressed by analysts like Bauer and his 
school of thought, i.e., Nepal has sadly fallen in the trap of the 
‘aid-dependency syndrome’. 
 
Let me end with some comments about a remark made by the 
World Bank in 1979, in which it stated that "the country is caught 
in a vicious circle of poverty, and difficult as it is to break this 
circle, the next five to ten years may represent Nepal’s last chance 
to do so without having to become completely dependent upon the 
goodwill of aid donors." By suggesting more than two decades ago 
that Nepal had no more than five to ten years to change course in 
the positive direction before it approached a status of a country 
‘completely dependent upon the goodwill of aid donors’, the 
experts at the Bank perhaps thought that its warning would be 
sufficient to get the results it wanted. But almost three decades 
later, as far as the ruling classes are concerned, the country is 
moving along in its substantively business as usual mode. As for 
the concerned experts in the Bank, it will be interesting to know 
whether they now see Nepal as being at the mercy of the donors as 
it predicted, or as a case of a country, which has pulled itself 
through by virtue of the ‘miracles’ of the market place. There may 
be some who wish to argue the latter case, but I, for one, see no 
such miracle happening, as I have argued in this paper. The 
character of the country’s dependence may not have changed much 
in material terms, but the psychological effect and the political 
price to be paid by the government and the people may soon 
become unmanageable. The 1979 prognosis cannot yet be 
considered a thing of the past. In 2007, the situation looks to have 
become worse, and one wonders if foreign aid can play any 
positive role in the transformation of this country.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Transformative Politics and Women in 
Nepal 
 
Renu Rajbhandari 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
After the success of people's movement 2005/2006, Nepal has 
entered a Transitional phase in its politics. Nepali people have 
finally been recognized as free citizens of Nepal, rather than as 
"Raiti (subjects) of the Nepali King". This transition was made 
possible by the continuous struggle of the Nepali people. The 
desire for peace and their desire to live the lives of free citizens by 
the people with all their inalienable human rights were central to 
the success of this movement. It should not be forgotten that the 
Twelve years of violent political conflict, which took the lives of 
more than 13,000 Nepali people, has accelerated the process.  With 
aspirations to be free citizens, hundreds of thousands of people 
from almost every district of Nepal came to the streets to 
overthrow the autocratic regime, regarded as the main cause of 
conflict and social injustice. Although people of Nepal were 
frustrated and tired with the undemocratic working style of the so 
called mainstream political parties, they still appealed the 7 major 
political parties to forge an alliance with the CPN(Maoists) and 
lead the movement to fight against the King’s autocratic regime. 
After the success of the people's movement, 7 political parties and 
Maoist were mandated by the people to form a coalition interim 
Government. The mandate given to 7 parties and the Maoists to 
rule the country was conditional. The conditions imposed on them 
were to fulfill the following non-negotiable agendas: 
 
◊  Declaration of Nepal as a democratic Republic. 
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◊  To hold an election for the Constituent Assembly, by 
ensuring people's rights to write their constitution 
themselves. 
◊  To give all marginalized groups their proportional 
representation in accordance with their population) in all 
structures of power by restructuring the state machinery. 
 
These issues were underlined as basic needs for peace with social 
justice in the country by all stakeholders. With these mandates, the 
parliament dissolved earlier by the King was reinstated. A new 
Government was formed with the country now ruled by peoples’ 
representatives. Nepal entered its transformative political stage. At 
this moment, it was most important for all political parties that they 
do not forget the mandate given to them by the people to prepare 
the country for the Constituent Assembly elections. However, 
parties for long failed to meet the people's aspirations. People's 
demand to form an inclusive Government, whereby every citizen in 
the country can feel included, has been largely ignored. Women 
who constitute more than fifty percent of the total population have 
been left out. Similar situation can be seen to prevail among 
Adibasis, Madhesis, Dalits, and the others. Government has given 
ample evidence to prove that even after the movement; there is no 
change in leadership, working style and in the institutions and the 
power structures within which the government operates. This has 
created a difficulty to order a smooth transformation in the country 
as desired and demanded by the popular movement of 2005. This 
situation requires an urgent analysis and a plan of action to correct 
by all political parties themselves. Only an immediate action by 
them can demonstrate that political parties are really serious and 
committed to transformation and bring peace with social justice in 
the country. 
 
4.2 Background of Conflict and Beginning of Peace 
Process 
 
The country was ruled by an autocratic monarchy during the last 
238 years. Giving voice to the aspirations of the people for a 
democratic rule in Nepal, political parties have launched resistant 
movements in the people-supported movements since 1950’s. 
However all movements ended with compromise between political 
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parties and the King32. The role played by foreign countries has led 
the movement to end in a compromise always. This compromise 
has saved the Shah Kings to continue the rule of their dynasty.  
1990 People's Movement can be taken as a recent example of this. 
The 1990 people's movement can be seen to be curtailing some of 
the powers of the King and establishing democratic norms and 
values in the country. It should not be denied that 1990 movement 
opened a space to the different marginalized groups demanding 
their political rights and justice for the first time. The people’s 
movement of 1990 should also be seen to be an example of how 
Governments cannot become truly democratic when movements 
end in compromise. In 1990 people from all castes, classes and 
gender came out to the streets asking for democracy. It was led by 
the Nepali congress and the Samyukta BamMorcha alliance. 
Although the movement succeeded, it ended in a compromise 
between the three players: Monarcy, the democratic forces, and 
outside powers. So, in the end, it ignored the peoples’ desires and 
aspirations. Nevertheless, it did lay some foundations for 
democracy. The King was forced to delegate some of his power (in 
a small way) to the democratic parties. The democratic political 
parties then divided up their power amongst themselves according 
to their size (according to the number of votes they received in the 
general elections). These parties largely ignored the women, the 
madhesis, the dalits, the disabled people, the homosexuals, people 
from remote areas, the poorest of the poor, the Janjatis, and the 
others in power-sharing. Largely, power rested with people of the 
same class, caste, gender and the groups who were used to ruling 
the state without the participation of others. Denial of  right to the 
people to participate equally in all state structures by mainstream 
political parties (which is primarily dominated by urban men from 
the higher and middle class Brahmin and Kshatriya castes), 
ultimately made the political parties  weak. Rampant corruption, 
practice of Nepotism and an authoritarian style of work by political 
leaders in the Government formed under them further weakend the 
political parties. It led to more conflict that turned in the end into a 
violent political conflict of 2005. 
 
                                                 
32 Arjun KARKI AND David Seddoned .The people's war in a historical context.  
Adroit publishers, Delhi, 2003. 
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King Gyanendra seized power when the so-called democratic rule 
was just 12 years old by assuming all powers of the state to 
himself. The king and his nominees in the government violated all 
human rights of the citizens. People got tired of The King’s move 
to curtail the citizens’ rights to speak and assemble freely. Every 
citizen of Nepal became eager to get rid of King Gyanendra’s 
autocratic regime. 
 
Responding to this situation, the seven political parties forged an 
alliance with the Maoist Party, who until that time were an 
underground party engaged in conducting a people's war.  The 
Civil society 100 played a crucial role in bringing these political 
actors together. An agreement was reached between seven parties 
and the Maoist party in the form of a 12- point agenda in New 
Delhi in November of 2005. 
 
This agreement provided both an opportunity and a platform for 
the oncoming popular movement-2. The movement set itself to 
achieve its set goals outlined in the 12-point agreement  
 
Agendas were set for launching the movement with the 
participation of hundreds of thousands of people. The signing of 
the 12-point agreement marked the beginning of a peace process in 
Nepal. All marginalized groups and women associated with the 
various political parties and groups were sure that in the new 
political set up all marginalised groups would be represented in a 
proportional way; but, this has not happened. Although people did 
succeed in bringing down the authoritarian regime of King 
Gyanendra, (his power is now suspended), the authoritarian 
behavior of the political parties has not changed, so that, peoples' 
wishes for power sharing remain not addressed.  The denial of 
proportional power to the women hurts them more, because they 
have suffered from multiple forms of marginalization.  The 
incidences of violence against women at all level fail to get proper 
attention. Due to a growing culture of impunity, which has 
continued even after the success of the historic people's movement-
2, the offenders of violence continue to be exempted from 
punishment. Women's get raped, abused and tortured. Women 
seem to be getting even more marginalized and abused these days. 
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A high level Commission was formed to investigate into the 
atrocities committed against the people during the 19 –day 
people’s movement, but it failed to order investigation of atrocities 
committed against women pointedly. The commission, in fact, was 
given very limited mandates.  Parliament gave mandate to the 
commission to look into the case of atrocities committed only 
within the 19 day period. This left out the cases of rape and other 
forms of sexual violence committed within and outside the police 
custody before and after the 19-day popular movement. The 
composition of members, in the commission was dominated by 
men, and women victims didn't feel comfortable to talk with them. 
So, abuses and atrocities committed against the women couldn’t be 
brought to light. The interim parliament had relatively a higher 
number of women parliamentarians. But, surprisingly the 
parliament didn't even think of establishing a high level 
commission to look at the violence committed against women. As 
a result, even after democracy, victims of violence keep 
continuously suffering; more cases of violence against women are 
being reported. The State has failed to create support mechanism 
for women. It will never let sustainable peace and social justice; 
which all the political parties are reciting as a mantra at this 
moment, to be established. A peaceful and socially just Nepal is 
one of its dreams. A year has passed without much progress in the 
peace process, and government activities are getting more and 
more questionable. Although a substantial period of the peace 
process has already passed, it is not yet too late to correct the 
situation and take the right path, provided that the political parties 
are serious about their commitments. Ensuring women's 
proportional participation in all stages of the state’s restructuring 
process is among the various corrective activities which the 
Government needs to take at this moment. This article largely 
focuses on why it is necessary to include women in all of the 
processes of transition, what the challenges are for accomplishing 
this, and how this can be consummated from the women's 
perspective. This article has several limitations; however, I feel 
that it will help to push forward the contemporary developmental 
and political debates on this issue. 
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Women and their Role in Transformation 
 
Women have played key roles in making the people's movement 
successful. History has evidenced that women in Nepal have taken 
a lead role in all the political processes in the past. In spite of the 
women lending support to movements geared towards political and 
socio-political transformation, women have been continuously 
marginalized even after the success of these movements33. Women 
are acting only as tools of their own political parties. The 
stereotypical roles of the women are getting reinforced even within 
the movement. Strong patriarchal values enshrined in all political 
parties never provide any space for women to take on leadership 
role.  As a rule, conflict can not be transformed into a sustainable 
peace in the absence of an active and egalitarian society, minus 
inclusive and democratic structures, and without an open and 
accountable government. These can not be established without a 
proper representation from the marginalized groups and from 
women in all these marginalized groups at stage of peace building.  
Women are affected by gender specific violence, which is an 
outcome of a feudo-patriarchal nature of governance. Women 
alone have the ability to understand the structures of violence 
directed against them, since they have the necessary experience 
borne of relationships for their subordination and abuse. From 
experiences women know which institutions and structures of 
power need to be changed immediately. Similarly they also know 
how a particular power relationship can be changed. This only 
contributes to conflict transformation and reconciliation 
considerably, which ultimately would lead the state to turn conflict 
into peace. In this situation it is necessary for the Government of 
Nepal to involve women in all stages of peace building and to 
make their voices in the peace process heard. 
  
3.3 Transformation from the Women's Perspective: 
 
Feminist activists around the world have defined transformation 
from different perspectives. Their perspective largely depends on 
the political reality of the place where they live. For example, 
                                                 
33 Hisila Yami- Janayuddha and Mahila Mukti( women's liberation and people's war)- 
Janadhwani Publishers, 2063(edition) 
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feminists from the countries with functional democracy mainly 
focus on gender equality and the transformation of gender 
relations. Their vision of transformation highlights the change in 
the roles of the male and elimination of all gender based violence34. 
On the contrary, those feminists who recently struggled to establish 
democracy have analyzed transitioning from a broader perspective. 
For them, the notion of equality applies to all class, caste and race 
relations, and not just to gender relations. For them all gender 
based violence needs to be eliminated; however, according to this 
analysis elimination of gender based violence presumes 
transformation of all institutions, values and processes required for 
that transformation first. These feminists examine gender based 
violence by analyzing macro politics. It has been categorically 
established by these groups that North-South relationship impacts 
on power relationship, structures of power, and influence even 
gender relationship. Hence, all this also needs to be considered. For 
women in these countries, elimination of gender based violence 
would mean an end to other forms of violence, such as war, 
militarization, and economic exploitation, among others. In the 
Nepalese context it is very necessary to look into gender equality 
from a broader point of view. It is necessary to look at gender 
relationship and its intersection with class, caste, region and its 
urban-rural context. For the Nepalese feminists, elimination of 
gender-based violence is a key issue at this moment; however, we 
have understood by it that gender-based violence can not be 
eliminated without transforming all institutions, structures of 
power, and values first. For the feminists of Nepal, transformation 
involves not only bringing women into politics, or giving them 
positions at decision making levels; but it also means ensuring 
women's right to means of production, and their involvement in  
education, health, food security and in other such areas. It should 
be made the dominant agenda of all political parties as well as the 
Government. It is not just getting political positions within the 
same structures which have been dominant for centuries and been 
responsible for all forms of discrimination to women. Rather, it is a 
conscious effort to transform them. 
 
                                                 
34 Jaccqueline, Pitangroy,  ‘Governence, Citizenship and political participation, NGO 
Forum’, Huairou, China,September 3,1995 
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Why Political Participation of Women is the Key to Attaining 
Sustainable Peace? 
 
Jacqueline Pitanguay has said:  
"We women want to use power to transform in the sense 
that certain issues and values, such as education, peace, 
social justice, equality, health, became dominant topics of 
the political agenda-we are... [achieving] power not only 
by supporting women to take leadership in the existing 
power instruments, but also, and mainly, trying to 
transform them. Yes, we want to make women's voices 
heard but, most of all, we want to break the ghetto and 
bring the gender perspective to all social, political and 
economic issues to all voices." 
(Jacqueline Pitanguay, Plenary Session on Governance, Citizenship 
and Political Participation, NGO Forum, Huairou, China, 
September 3, 1995) 
 
Women's role during political transition has always been a crucial 
one. Political parties and the Government formed by them ignore 
this fact. Violation of human rights on the basis of class, caste, 
gender, physical ability, ethnicity, geographical location, and a 
person’s position in society are some of the root causes of conflict 
in any country. A country such as Nepal, which is going through a 
peace process after a period of conflict, needs to seriously address 
issues related to any kind of discrimination. Throughout the 
process, it is necessary to address and transform the structures, 
which have been identified to be discriminatory. Principles of 
democratic participation, human rights and gender equality which 
is built on social justice and equality for all need to be practiced 
strictly in order to attain a long lasting peace. This requires 
transformation of systems relating to access and distribution of 
resources, together with transformation of social and political 
institutions, situations and relationships.35  Since women constitute 
50 percent in all in the above mentioned groups, it becomes 
imperative to ensure proper gender perspectives in all activities 
                                                 
35 Women's role in transforming Approaches to Conflict, Resolution at the National 
and Regional level, Women Politicians: A Global force for peace- Ms. Eugenia Piza-
Lopez, Head , Policy and Advocacy Department- International Alert 
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which have an objective of peace building. In a country like Nepal, 
with one of the lowest HDIs, and where rampant discrimination is 
a root cause of poverty, peace will not be sustainable without first 
addressing pervasive discrimination that are institutionalized in our 
social practices, and existed for centuries as a result of the feudal-
patriarchal authoritarian regime. It has shaped the mindset of all 
people working under the existing structures in Nepal and all 
policies evolved there of. Peace building process has given space 
to Nepal government and society to analyze deeply and identify 
structures which need to be changed. The feudo-patriarchal and 
autocratic regime of Nepal in the past has been instrumental in the 
genesis of all forms of poverty, use of discrimination, and violation 
of human rights of the Nepali people. Identification of problematic 
institutions during the conflict period in Nepal and aspirations of 
the Nepali people for peace by transforming these institutions into 
more egalitarian, democratic and accountable structures should be 
taken as a positive outcome of the armed conflict in Nepal. Now, it 
is up to the SPA and the NCP (M) led Government to   decide how 
they intend to do it. 
 
In the peace process, it is very necessary that people who had been 
marginalized from centuries gain power. This is especially 
necessary during the transitional period. According to this line of 
reasoning, women should have power because they have been 
marginalized since long and due to this fact, they have proper 
understanding of structures responsible for their marginalization 
and discrimination. When they get power they will use that power 
to transform those structures and institutions which is a 
prerequisite for the establishment of peace with social justice. 
Without the meaningful participation of women in these social 
structures, liberation and equality alone do not carry much 
meaning.   
 
Women who believe in the transformative dimension of equality 
argue that equality can not be achieved without the proper 
transformation of dominant political values, processes and 
institutions. For example, the transformation of values would mean 
a shift from power as domination to power as liberation; from war 
and conflict to peace; from efficiency considerations to equality 
and equity; from growth to sustainability; and from "winner take it 
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all" norms to sharing and caring. The transformation processes of 
governance imply, for example, a change from hierarchies to 
participation; from corrupt to cleaner practices, to transparency; 
and from burdensome imposition to empowering. Similarly, the 
transformation of institutions is visualized as coming from the top 
down with bureaucracy becoming more egalitarian, responsive and 
accountable36in functioning. 
The feminist vision of transformative politics highlights gender 
equality as well as the transformation of existing values, processes 
and institutions (See Box 1). 37 
 
Box  4.1: The Feminist Vision of Transformative Politics 
1. Equality 
a. gender parity  
b. gender balance  
c. shared power and 
responsibility 
 
2. Transformed values 
a. equality and equity 
b. peace  
c. sustainability  
d. service  
e. sharing  
f. caring 
3. Transformed processes 
a. participatory  
b. empowering  
c. transparent  
d. non-corrupt 
 
4. Transformed Institutions  
a. egalitarian  
b. responsive  
c. accountable 38 
 
It has been widely recognized that the Institutions, Structures of 
power and Values established by the systems of Governance of 
Nepal in the past were corrupt, discriminatory, unsustainable and 
authoritarian in nature. This has been identified as the root cause of 
all conflict in the country. Hence it becomes imperative that these 
systems of governance be transformed. To transform these 
institutions, participation of women at decision making positions 
                                                 
36 Chirstine Pintat ,A Global Analysis: What has worked for women in 
politics and what has not? Paper presented at the Second Congress of the 
Global Network of women in politics held in Manila, The Philippines, 28-
30 august 1998 
37 Rounaq Johan ,The practice of Transformative politics- - Columbia University. 
38 ibid 
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within all political parties and Government becomes essential. It 
should be noted that women's participation in decision making 
positions needs to be carefully thought out and balanced. It is 
necessary that women get positions of power as their counter parts 
on an equal basis. Together with this, it is also necessary to include 
women who believe in transformative dimension of equality and 
have clear understanding of how power gained by women need to 
be utilized without being manipulated by people in  the old 
structure of power and institutions. For us women, it is very 
necessary to be clear on how we use such a power. Power should 
not be used as an instrument of dominance and exclusion ever, as it 
has been done in the past. It should rather be used as an instrument 
to achieve new liberation and Equality. 
 
4.4 Challenges Relating to Transformation from the 
Women's Perspectives in Nepal 
 
There are various challenges facing women who want to play key 
roles in the transformation of Nepal. To realize these 
transformations, the following challenges can be taken to be the 
key challenges: 
* The challenge with regard to redefining politics39 
* The challenge posed by globalization and global 
governance 
* The challenge of genderizing the civil society 
* The challenge of sisterhood 
 
Redefining Politics 
 
Nepal has been ruled by an authoritarian regime that was 
responsible for shaping the Nepali socio-political and economic 
structures, as well as its political parties and its civil society. 
Similar situations can be seen to happen within the academia and 
the other sectors of the civil society. Dominated by the feudal-
patriarchal structure and by the Hindu religion, Nepal's politics has 
                                                 
39  Jurgette Honculada , Agenda for the Dawn of a New Millennium: Gender and 
Transformative politics ( Paper presented during the Second Congress of the Global 
Network of women in politics- from Rhetoric to Reality: held during 28th-30th  of 
August 1998 in Manila , cosponsored by CAPWIP and the United Nation's 
Development fund for women( UNIFEM) 
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largely ignored women's voices. Women's voices have been 
continually suppressed under the feudal-patriarchal framework of 
the society. This is ample evidenced by analyzing the movements 
for political rights in Nepal. These movements that were initiated 
to overthrow the authoritarian regimes have drawn in massive 
numbers of women both for peaceful resistance as well as for the 
armed struggle. The participation of women in the Maoist 
movement as part of the People's Liberation Army can be taken as 
an example of this. 
 
Inclusion and mobilization of women during the 1991 people's 
movement was quite substantial; but with the success of the 
movement, they ignored gender issues completely, and restricted 
full participation of women. The decision making process serves as 
a good example to understand the attitude of political parties 
towards women. Similar trends are being observed following the 
success of the 2005/006 people's movement. The ratio of 
participation by women in government structures, interim 
constitution drafting committee, and in the newly formed 
constitutional and legal committees, makes the Government’s and 
the political party’s attitude towards women quite clear. Women's 
participation determined the success of the popular Movement-2, 
and during the People's War, also women's participation in the 
armed struggle proved to be decisive. Yet Government actions to 
date, including even the Maoist party’s policies, continue to make 
gender concerns a low priority.  Women who have suffered a great 
deal of violence continue to do so even now. There are no support 
mechanisms which have been established or commissions which 
have been formed to investigate and provide support to these 
women.  Participation of women in the peace building process has 
been largely ignored. Policies, programs and structures established 
after the democratic movement fail to give adequate representation 
to women. It has become a practice, save when pressure from 
outside organizations is created; the Government does not even 
consider women's issues as issues. This phenomenon clearly 
demonstrates the unfavorable attitudes of political parties towards 
women. Additionally, a 15-year long practice of liberal democracy 
by the government before the People's Movement-2 still denies the 
women from playing their viable roles. It is because, the same 
political parties, and the same people within those political parties, 
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are in power and their mind sets continues to be the same. This 
created a real challenge for transforming the values, politics and 
institutions necessary for ensuring equality. Similar attitudes can 
be seen to dominate the social and human rights movements of 
Nepal. This constitutes a prime challenge in the transformation of 
politics which is a necessary precondition to have for a sustainable 
peace in Nepal. Without changing the century long established 
“transformation processes” of social justice, transformative politics 
can not be successful. This process can be established only when 
the institutions responsible for this are ready to be transformed in 
their values, their commitment to actions, in their intent to attain 
equality. At this moment, this has been lacking in the Nepalese 
context. The political parties who are mainly exercised in 
establishing peace through transformative politics are only 
repeating their rhetoric rather than turning these into a reality. In 
order to establish peace, present definition of politics needs to be 
redefined. This needs to be redefined from the people's perspective. 
Because of the dominance of the leaders who were groomed under 
the authoritarian regime and were socialized in feudo-patriarchal 
values, it seems quite a big challenge to have at this moment. 
 
The Challenge of Globalization and Global Governance 
 
In today's globalised world not a single country can stay alone. The 
world has been converted into a global village. Influencing Politics 
of developing countries by powerful countries and global power 
structures has become a common practice today. This is true in 
countries like Nepal, whose economy is quite weak and the 
national budget is largely dependent on foreign aid. Geopolitical 
situation of Nepal also demands to have a good relationship with 
its neighboring countries. 
The Politics of Nepal tends to get affected and influenced by the 
Indian politics. Nepal's security and foreign policies are being 
increasingly determined by American and Indian state policies. 
Nepal has undergone four major political changes so far.  
 
1. The movement against the autocratic Rana regime, that 
was in power from 1846 to 1950. The struggle of 1950 can 
be called a nationalist struggle during which time people of 
 90 
Nepal worked together with the late King Tribhuvan to 
overthrow the Rana regime. 
2. A decade of democratic experiments under the so-called 
multiparty system from 1950 to 1959. 
3. Nepali people fought for three decade against the partyless 
Panchayt system, imposed by King Mahendra, from 1960 
to1990. 
4. A decade and a half long struggle to establish inclusive 
democracy and remove the Monarchy of Nepal. This 
struggle was against fighting inadequacies of the 
multiparty democracy with the identification of these 
inadequacies and a demand for the removal of these 
inadequacies responsible for it. Thus this struggle was for 
achieving a socio-economic and political transformation of 
the country (1991- 2005). 
 
All the three political movements above, except that of 
2005/2006,had  largely ended in a compromise between the King, 
the  political parties at struggle, and Indian political forces. So, 
even after the success of these movements, old Institutions and 
structures of power remained the same. Power remained 
concentrated in people of one class (those owning land), caste and 
gender state, power was centralized People's voices and their needs 
for power-sharing ignored. This led to the continuation of political 
conflict in the country. This needs to be understood and realized by 
all the major political parties. A decade long struggle of Maoist 
insurgency claimed lives of more that 13,000 Nepali people were 
focused on ending this problem. This struggle, however, ended in a 
compromise between the three opposing political parties again.  
 
1. Seven major political parties agreed to bringing total 
transformation in politics and in the structures of power.  
2. NCP (M) - demanded for total transformation in the 
politics and the institutions as well as in the structures of 
power for which they had fought f. 
3. Civil Society: who supported the demand of Total 
transformation of socio-political and economical 
transformation of the country, denounced violence and 
appealed all political parties including Maoist to work for 
peace. 
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It can't be denied that this struggle was also equally influenced by 
global forces and the political forces from India. However, as this 
in essence, was a struggle of every Nepali citizen, its outcome was 
different in character. Unlike in the past, this struggle excluded the 
king and his allies, completely. In a way it can be said that the 
struggle has excluded all the fundamentalists, all the right wing and 
accommodated elements from, left of the center, the radical left, 
the liberals and all the nationalists. Coalition between parties of 
different ideologies along with the civil society agreed on the peace 
process by reinstating the parliament which the king had dissolved. 
The objective of restoring the old parliament was to make it an 
interim parliament and to write by it an interim constitution. 
Problems started emerging. The reinstated parliament and political 
parties ignored the terms of the agreement, and continued to 
behave much as before. They failed to address the demands of the 
marginalized people for inclusion in the mainstream politics, to 
punish those responsible for suppression, and drive the king and 
the king's army out of the Royal palace. They failed, however, to 
transform the ruling institutions and structures of power. As a 
result, another round of conflict has started in the country. The 
southern part of the country (Terai) is still undergoing the pains of 
political unrest and violence. All marginalized groups, along with 
the people from the southern part of the country, are struggling for 
inclusion and for their rights. A sustainable peace can come only 
when this situation is changed. This can only happen when major 
political parties responsible for leading the country, listen to the 
people, respect their rights, and enter into dialogue with them, 
rather than letting themselves be influenced by outside political 
forces.  The present transitional phase of politics needs to be 
managed properly. Influences from external forces are quite visible 
in the country at the moment. This needs to be fought off with a 
political will. In order to make the political transformation 
sustainable, it is imperative to have economical transformation at 
the same time. As Nepal's economy is largely based on agriculture, 
agrarian reform is very necessary to attain. Land reform is a must. 
Labor relations practiced so far need to be analyzed from a class 
and caste perspective. This requires adopting clear economical 
policies by the state, keeping people’s rights and needs at the 
center. In the present era of Globalization, with Nepal allowing 
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privatization of state institutions and even basic services in the 
past, it is very difficult to overcome the problem. It becomes even 
more difficult when policy makers sanctioning such practices and 
values are in the decision making positions. Nepal's economy is in 
ruins and its economic policies have all but failed. Economic 
growth rate is almost negligible. National budget is largely 
dependent on external aid. Nepal has been a market place for the 
economically stable neighbors and for some other countries.  Nepal 
has adopted a policy of economic liberalization, bu endorsing 
privatization and the structural adjustment program lay down by 
the World Bank. Mainstream political parties which led the 
Government after the political change of 1990 have internalized 
this reality. Now, even after the success of the 2005/2006 people's 
movement the government is trying to perpetuate the same 
principles and practices already identified as discriminatory 
policies unacceptable to the Nepali people. Thus resisting influence 
from the Political and economic global powers and to work from 
the people's perspective today constitutes a real challenge for the 
parties and the Government of this hour. It is, no doubt, difficult to 
do but not impossible, which political forces of Nepal at this time 
need to understand. 
  
The Challenge of Incorporating Gender Issues in the Civil 
Society 
 
Civil society has played an important role to make 2005/ 2006 
people's movement a success. As mentioned earlier, civil society 
was an important stakeholder of the movement. Responsible 
members of the civil society played a role to bridge the gap 
between CPN (M) and other political parties. They were quite 
influential and supportive of the popular movement during the 
drafting of 12-point agenda. From the very beginning the civil 
society made known their demands and concerns clear. These 
consisted of an inclusive democracy, a democratic republic for 
Nepal, elections for a Constituent Assembly for ensuring the rights 
of the citizens of Nepal and expulsion of the King and his army 
from the Royal Palace. These are definitely a very positive role. 
This role is being continuously played by the civil society of Nepal 
even today. 
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Although the Civil Society’s role in the political transformation has 
been a laudable one , it  needs to analyze and ponder several issues 
concerning institutional transformations. 
 
One very important issue which needs to be made clear is that there 
is a tendency to make the NGO's and the Civil Society 
synonymous. It should be made clear to everyone that the NGO's 
are only a part of the civil society. The NGOs of Nepal are largely 
dependent on foreign funding. Depending upon the type and source 
of funding, it has been seen in the past and as well as now, that 
some NGO's get influenced in their actions by that. This, at times, 
does not serve the interest of the people. The larger civil society 
movement never gets (in principle they should not) influenced by 
any one except by the demands and needs of the people. In Nepal 
there is some collusion on interest here. Sometimes, when 
personalities in the NGO movement are strong and politically 
clear, they do not get influenced by outside forces; nevertheless, 
there are times when this fusion jeopardizes the whole movement. 
This needs to be continuously watched and corrected. 
 
The other factor is that civil society members and organizations 
linked to them need to be sensitive about their leadership 
composition, language and their activities. It is important for all 
leaders, directly or indirectly involved in the peaceful 
transformation of the country, to analyze themselves. Civil society 
is a reflection of the larger society of the country as are the 
political parties. The elements of undemocratic authoritarian 
character, dominance of one class, caste and gender in almost all 
the movements and institutions, is obvious. The predominance of 
feudo-patriarchal values can distract movements geared to peace 
and attaining justice. This could contradict the avowed policies 
being advocated by the civil society. The civil society can 
pressurize the government to be responsive and accountable to the 
people in accelerating transformation. To practice what you preach 
becomes the responsibility of all institutions. Thus, in this context 
it is the civil society too need to improve and change in the spirit of 
transformation. It has been observed that majority of organization 
in the civil society are led by men from the upper class and caste 
people.  These established personalities (who largely got 
established by dint of tradition) consider political issues as prime 
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issues to deal with, while other issues related with marginalization, 
discrimination and exclusion of weaker groups are the real cause 
leading to political instability and conflict. So their focus should be 
on this. In spite of the continuous argument from the side of the 
women involved, their male counterparts do not take women's 
issues as important issues. This has remained a lip service largely. 
Deeply ingrained patriarchal values coupled with the practice of 
domination by one class, caste and gender in power structure 
within the civil society movements, has created a real challenge for 
genderizing the civil society of Nepal. 
 
The Challenge of Sisterhood 
 
For us, women of Nepal, it is necessary to learn from the various 
prolonged nationalist movements against the colonial regime that 
took place in the neighboring countries of south Asia. In these 
countries, hundreds of thousands of women were drawn in massive 
proportions to these movements. They played key roles in the 
freedom movements; however, after independence, the post 
colonial states did little to push the cause for gender equality in 
public life. What is more disturbing is that the nationalist ideology 
in many states in the recent years (especially in India and Iran) has 
turned more extremist and reactionary, following which  it has 
defined women's place in the society in a more restrictive way. 
Thus, while the nationalist movements have created a space for 
women in public life, after the movements have achieved their 
goals, women's legitimate rights are again restricted40. This lesson 
indicates that Nepali women can also be pushed to the background 
by the mainstream political parties. Looking at the activities of the 
State machinery and the political parties, the situation becomes 
clearer. It is almost clear to us (Nepali women) that the dominant 
patriarchal values enshrined in all the feudal /semi-feudal/and the 
capitalist Institutions of governance and all structures of power will 
neither give enough space to women nor address gender issues, nor 
push for giving equality to women in public life. To make all that 
happen, old structures need to be changed. This can not be done 
without the equal participation of women in all these structures. In 
this situation it is necessary for women from different classes, 
                                                 
40 ibid 
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castes, the third gender, and the disabled to come together and 
claim their rights to equality. Unfortunately, it has been very 
difficult for women belonging to different groups to rally together. 
Feeling of sisterhood and support to each other has been a real 
challenge to women. It has various reasons; however, the most 
important reasons can be identified to be as follows: 
 
Due to the feudal and patriarchal values of the State as reflected in 
the community and individual households, women have been 
systematically abused, marginalized and discriminated against. 
Women have no control over resources or a right to decisions over 
their own bodies. Men exercise complete power over women 
which lead to several forms of violence committed against women. 
Whether it is at household level or at state level, violence against 
women prevails; in some areas it has become pervasive. Rape, 
sexual abuse, trafficking, bride burning, acid burning and different 
other forms of domestic violence (physical, mental, sexual) have 
become a reality of the Nepalese women. Marginalization of 
women's issues, and impunity for offence committed against the 
women are still perpetrated by the State. Whether it is at the 
community level or at a custodial level, women's bodies have been 
used as battle fields to win over each other. The custodial rape of 
the Maoist women’s cadres by the Nepal army during the People's 
War, the incidences of Gaur after the restoration of democracy, the 
gang rapes of Dalit girls in Siraha, Saptari Rautahat, and hundreds 
of other cases of rape and exploitation committed at community 
levels serve as  examples of this. Astonishingly, even after the 
Maoist joined the government, they have not made their voice, 
asking to form a commission for investigating the forms of 
violence perpetrated against their women cadres while in custody 
during the People's War. Similarly, despite the sizable number of 
women parliamentarians in the interim parliament, not enough 
voices are heard demanding the formation of protection 
mechanisms for women at the community level, and the formation 
of a high level commission to examine cases of violence against 
women in the past year. This gives a clear message of how the 
mindset of the political parties' and their cadres is shaped by 
patriarchal values. This underlines the need for the women’s 
groups to be more vigilant, and to continually ask themselves 
whether women's representation at the policy-making level is the 
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only answer to it. I want to argue that to transform the State from 
an authoritarian into an egalitarian state; it is first necessary to have 
the numerical representation of women increased. It should be 
followed next by the representations of appropriate political visions 
with a clear understanding of feminist values of transformative 
politics and issues relating to women. This poses a real challenge 
for the women of Nepal; balancing women's representation, with 
infusion of clear political and feminist points of view at all 
structural levels. 
 
The relatively weak Women's Movement, a weak projectization of 
women's issues, and the donor's strategies of dividing the Women's 
Movement according to their interest, constitutes another challenge 
for achieving transformation and transformative politics from the 
women's perspectives.41 
 
What needs to be done to Change the Situation? 
 
One of the early articulations of women's visions concerning 
political transformation can be found in the 1985 pre-Nairobi 
writings of a Southern Women's Network: 
"We want a world where inequality based on class, gender, 
and race is absent from every country, and from the 
relationships among countries. We want a world where 
basic needs become basic rights and where poverty and all 
forms of violence are eliminated. Each person will have 
the opportunity to develop her or his full potential and 
creativity, and women's values of nurturance and solidarity 
will characterize human relationships. In such a world 
women's reproductive role will be redefined: child care 
will be shared by men, women, and society as a whole. We 
want a world where the massive resources now used in the 
production of the means of destruction will be diverted to 
areas where they will help to relieve oppression both inside 
and outside the home…We want a world where all 
institutions are open to participatory democratic processes, 
where women share in determining priorities and 
                                                 
41 Kanwaljit Soin, Why women, what politics? Association of Women for Action and 
research, Singapore, (publication year) 
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decisions...Only by sharpening the links between equality, 
development, and peace, can we show that the 'basic rights' 
of the poor and the transformation of the institutions that 
subordinate women are inextricably linked. They can be 
achieved together through the self-empowerment of 
women."  
Gita Sen and Caren Grown, Development, Crisis and 
Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives, 
New York 1987, pp.80-82 
 
The Women's Movement has been consistently demanding equality 
in terms of numbers, power and responsibility along side men. 
Women want power, but they want to use power differently. This 
is because women understand the real causes of discrimination 
better. They have shown how those who hold the mainstream 
power misuse power and marginalize women and other groups in 
the process. Women cannot hold power without changing the 
agenda, values, processes and institutions thereof. The agenda can 
not be changed without transforming politics, and politics need to 
be transformed in such a way that it becomes dedicated to the 
people. It can be said that the Women's Movement believes that 
true social transformation can only be brought about when all 
power relations are transformed; and power relations can only be 
transformed through the restructuring of the State. As Nepal is in a 
stage of transformation and the political parties are being 
compelled by the people to restructure the prevailing institutions, 
the Women's Movement is expected to use this situation to their 
advantage. 
 
Brazil is often cited by feminists as a good example where women, 
through their participation in the democratic movements of the 
1970’s and 1980’s, were able to transform the political agenda of 
the resistance against the rule of military dictatorship. Now, Nepal 
can furnish another good example of this. The People's Movement 
in Nepal has demonstrated how dictators can be defied with the 
people's power. Nepali women have taken a decisive role in 
making this movement successful. Now that democracy has been 
established, it needs to be sustainable. To do this, women have to 
play a very decisive role again. In this process women need to 
influence the political sphere by changing the political agenda and 
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alteration in power relationships. It is necessary for women's 
groups to give issues a visibility, heretofore considered 
unimportant or even ridiculous by the establishment. It is necessary 
to force the establishment to take up these issues into their agenda 
and to put them in the plan of their action. 
 
As part of the larger democratic movement vis-a-vis dictatorship, 
women are quite vocal in denouncing state violence, but they must 
also bring all forms of sexual and domestic violence perpetuated by 
the    different non-state actors into their political agenda, enlarging 
their field of action and their concept of peace. Women need to 
protest against the continuing social inequalities and injustices 
derived from the old class structure, while also expressing their 
discontent with other forms of inequalities to be seen in gender, 
race, physical conditions, and sexual orientation. We, the women 
of Nepal, need to enlarge the concept of human and women’s 
rights by placing social rights at the center of discussion, and also 
by bringing up health, reproductive and sexual rights along with 
the rights to live free from any kind of discrimination. 
 
To achieve this, it is necessary that the Women's Movement of 
Nepal forge alliances with the other social movements rather than 
keeping women's issues separate and isolated. While doing this, it 
is also necessary that women's cause does not get diluted by a 
patriarchal analysis of transformative politics. To keep this up it is 
also necessary for women's groups to forge alliances among the 
different women’s groups, keeping in mind their political 
understandings and class backgrounds. In a country like Nepal, it is 
necessary to make everyone understand the real meaning of 
restructuring and social inclusion; otherwise, this can easily be 
converted into a donor driven agenda which will become a major 
obstacle in social transformation. The Women's Movement has 
both the vision and capacity to do it. That is why it is necessary for 
women's groups to come forward unitedly and take the lead. 
 
Women Human Rights Defenders (“WHRDs”) active in different 
parts of the country have started to come together and developed 
their own vision of political transformation. With that vision, they 
will take an active part in the democratic movement. There is 
ample evidence to prove women's decisive role in the People's 
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Movement-2. After the establishment of democracy for the second 
time in Nepal, WHRDs coming from different parts of the country 
in a gathering discussed their priorities and areas of concern in the 
form of a Women's Charter. This was later endorsed by different 
women’s group' active throughout the country, and was then 
handed over to the different political parties. There is yet another 
challenge facing them to make the political parties sensitive and 
alive to the Women's Charter, and charge them with the 
responsibility of implementing the Charter. 
 
It is necessary for women of all groups to own the above discussed 
issues and to build a movement for their implement action.  
Women who belong to various political parties need to take the 
lead in their implementation, and women from the civil society 
need to lend support to them in this. Nepal's politics at this moment 
is largely dominated by socialist.  
 
In theory, socialism stands for equality between men and women. 
Socialist movements and socialist states demand greater public 
roles for women. Socialist states create greater opportunities for 
women in education and employment and require expanded 
women's roles in public spheres. But, while socialist states greatly 
expand women's economic roles, they (with the exception of the 
democratic socialist states of the Nordic countries) do not 
emphasize the transformation of gender relations. This 
phenomenon can be in the socialist parties of Nepal. On one hand, 
almost all of the political parties are advocating for the rights of 
women; yet, on the other hand, there is not a single party which has 
as many women in leadership positions as their men do. 
Additionally, none of the parties have clear-cut policies as to how 
they will address gender relations within their own groups. This 
phenomenon has been keeping women in a delusion. Women who 
are affiliated with these political parties are somehow being lured 
into the parties with the hope that once their party wins, women's 
issues will be taken care of. They have been tied to party 
disciplines which force them to be silent and accept the dictates 
imposed by their fellow party members. This situation must lead 
women to make their own vision in politics clear. This has already 
been practiced in different parts of the world. In this context it is 
necessary that women affiliated with different parties (the 
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Communist Parties of Nepal, the Nepali Congress, or other Center- 
left parties) to come out of the party domain to forge an alliance on 
the issue of Women's participation, violence against them, and for 
their socio-economic rights, acknowledging the fact that whatever 
their parties might say on the issues of women, their practices do 
not seem ready for transforming gender relation. 
 
In the end, as the parliamentarians of the world represented in the 
IPU in September 1997, on the Universal Declaration on 
Democracy have said: "The achievement of Democracy 
presupposes a genuine partnership between men and women in the 
conduct of the affairs of society in which they work in Equality and 
complimentarily, drawing mutual enrichment from their 
difference". This needs to be taken very seriously by all the 
democratic parties and Government of Nepal, and create, a 
favorable environment to institutionalize Democracy on a 
sustainable basis. This is the only way forward and to achieve 
lasting peace in the country. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conflict Induced Displacement:  
An Emerging Phenomenon of Internal 
Migration in Nepal 
 
Anita Bhattarai-Ghimire 
Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Nepal, the ten years of armed conflict between the state and the 
C P N (Maoists) has uprooted thousands of people from their 
homes and communities. They are facing tremendous difficulties. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the status, trend and 
dilemmas faced by the IDPs, and to initiate a debate on the urgency 
of addressing the IDP issues. This paper is divided into five 
sections. The first section introduces the context. The second 
discusses the displacement caused by the armed conflict in Nepal. 
The third section brings ‘responsibility debate’, focusing on if and 
when international interventions are needed. The fourth section 
briefly discusses the response made by the state to address the IDP 
issues in Nepal. Finally, the fifth chapter presents a conclusion and 
some ways forward.    
 
The phenomenon of human migration is too diverse and 
multifaceted and therefore beyond the scope of explanation by any 
single theory. Hence, scholars from various disciplines such as 
economics, sociology, geography, and political science have 
striven to give models, analytical frameworks, conceptual 
approaches or simple notions of migration. Migration has often 
been explained according to the changing realities viewed by time 
(Arango, 2000). Ravenstein has said that “bad or oppressive laws, 
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heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social 
surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), 
all have produced and are still producing currents of migration but 
none of these currents can compare in volume with that which 
arises from the desire inherent in most men to “better” themselves 
in material respects” (Ravenstein, 1888:286). Similarly, in Arthur 
Lewis’ model of “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply 
of Labour” (Lewis, 1954), migration was defined as a crucial 
mechanism wherein modern sector (connected with outside world) 
expands by drawing labour from traditional sector (where there is 
surplus labour) from which however both sending and receiving 
sectors benefit.   
  
During 1960-70s when international migration of labour became a 
prominent global feature, migration was explained as a 
phenomenon prompted by individual decisions of  rational actors 
seeking to improve their wellbeing by moving to new places where 
the reward of their labour would be higher  than the one they were 
getting at home (Todaro, 1969, 1976). Toward the third quarter of 
the twentieth century, dependency theory said that migration was 
one of the mechanisms through which inequalities between 
countries (core industrialized countries and peripheral agrarian 
countries) were perpetuated and reinforced, especially through 
brain drain. However, Arango (2000) argues that no single theory 
is enough to define or explain migration on its own though they are 
important by themselves.  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we have defined migration as a 
phenomenon of displacement of a person who leaves his/her place 
of birth or of residence to go to another place. Hence, it is a 
movement of people from one location to another for seeking a 
better life. Migration is both internal as well as external in 
happening. In the internal migration, migrants remain within their 
country whereas in external migration, migrants leave the country 
in which they were born and settle in another country.  
 
The term migrant is defined as ‘any person who lives temporarily 
or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has 
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acquired some significant social ties to this country’42. The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Migrants defines a migrant worker as 
a "person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in 
a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a 
national." This is a broader definition of migrants. "The term 
'migrant' in article 1.1 (a) should be understood as covering all 
cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the 
individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and 
without intervention of an external compelling factor43."  
 
Migration involves the movement of refugees, displaced persons, 
uprooted people, as well as economic migrants. Internal migration 
refers to a move from one area (a province, district or a 
municipality) to another area within one country. International 
migration is a territorial relocation of people between countries. 
Two types of relocation are not part of migration. They are: 1) a 
territorial movement which does not lead to any change in ties of 
social membership and therefore remains largely inconsequential 
both for the individual and for the society at the points of origin 
and  destination, such as tourism; and 2) a relocation in which the 
individuals or the groups concerned are purely passive objects 
rather than active agents of the movement, such as organized 
transfer of refugees from states of origins to a  safe haven 
(http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php).   
 
Migration and displacement are often interchangeably used in 
general literature that leads to confusion and vagueness. Both refer 
to movements- change of place of residence. Migration, however, 
is often found to connote a voluntary movement whereas in case of 
displacement, the perception scale is more inclined towards 
involuntary movement. For general people, migration is often 
understood to be  a long distance movement either across country 
or from one region to another (hills to terai for example) where as 
                                                 
42  See http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=3020&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  
43  Report of the working group of intergovernmental experts on the human rights of 
migrants submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1997/15. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Fifty-fourth session, 
Intergovernmental working group of experts on the human rights of migrants. 
 104 
displacement is understood to be relatively short distanced and also 
with possibility of or desire to return back for the migrating person. 
 
This paper uses the definition of displacement as given in the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID, 1998). It 
defines displacement as an  ‘involuntary movement of a person 
from one’s place of habitual residence caused by or as a result of 
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or owing to natural or human-made 
disasters, but keeping within an internationally recognized border 
of the same country. There are also people who are migrating for 
economic purposes but within the borders of one’s own country. 
They are strictly not regarded as IDPs by the GPID. But if we 
observe the situation from a very practical level and especially 
when conflicts tends to get prolonged, then the line between the 
economic migrants and the displaced people as termed in GPID 
becomes very blurred indeed.  
 
5.2 Armed Conflict in Nepal 
 
The armed conflict between the state and the CPN (Maoists) which 
started from February 13, 1996 in Nepal has severely affected its 
politics, economy and society. By the end of 21 November, 2006 
till the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, the conflict 
had taken the life of an estimated 13,200 (UNIFEM, 2006) persons 
and rendered up to 60000044 (Aditya et al., 2006) people to be 
homeless, and uprooted from their homes.  
 
The causes of conflict which are complex, multitude, and 
interwoven lie embedded in the social, cultural, political, 
geographic and economic structure of the society (Upreti, 2006; 
2007b). The CPN (Maoists), who were an important element of the 
1990 movement for the establishment of constitutional democracy 
soon turned away from the democratic government of 1990 and, 
launched their "People's War" against the constitutional monarchy 
                                                 
44 However, there is no nationally accepted figure of IDPs. The government records is 
quite low (less than seventy thousands), reports of international agencies such as 
Norwegian Refugee Council is moderate (around two hundred thousands) and various 
report of Nepalese scholars and civil society are high (goes up to six hundred 
thousands).   
 105 
and to establish a “Maoists People’s Democracy” (Upreti, 2004). 
But there are other factors than mere “People’s War” that led to the 
participation of the common mass in this conflict. If we look at the 
popular support which this conflict received in terms of 
participation of poor and the disadvantaged people and the 
dynamics of the conflict, we can clearly see that there was a high 
level of frustration among the people which was just waiting for an 
outlet to explode.  The declaration of the “Peoples War” had just 
provided such an outlet.  
 
Box 5.1. Summary of Potential Sources of Social Tension and 
Violent Conflict  
1. Structural sources 2.International 
sources 
3. Triggers and 
catalysts 
4. Political sources 
5. Socio-economic 
(caste, class, 
religion based 
discriminations 
and inequalities; 
poverty and 
unemployment; 
social exclusion, 
etc.) sources,  
6. Geographical 
isolation 
7. Constitution and 
legal sources 
8. Ideological 
sources 
5. Change in 
international 
context; 
6. Interests 
(political, 
economic: 
natural 
resources-
gas, oil, water 
and forest; 
historical 
legacy; 
religious; 
strategic and 
military) of 
powerful 
nations. 
7. Vested interests  
8. Suddenly 
emerging 
situation (e.g., 
The Royal 
massacre of 1st 
June 2001in 
Nepal) 
9. Failure of 
political 
leadership, 
10. Psychological 
factors- revenge 
and retaliations. 
11. Irresponsibility 
factor and a 
culture of denial 
Source: Adopted from Upreti, 2007a and 2006. 
 
 One of the underlying causes of conflict lay in the concentration of 
resources and power in the hands of a few elites. There was 
rampant poverty, marked by social, cultural and gender 
inequalities.  The ethnic or indigenous minorities were excluded 
from the economic, socio-cultural and development process 
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characterized by a failure of the political system in the past. (Rana 
regime, Panchayat system and the post 1990 governments), and 
continuing of bad governance, institutionalization of corruption, 
the country’s geographical exclusion and centralization even after 
1990 Further, the awareness in the people leading to a sharpened 
perception of inequality and injustice, and their power to speak out 
their frustrations – an opportunity provided by the post 1990 
government, and backed by the CPN (Maoists) campaign, all had 
contributed to it.  
 
The CPN (Maoists)’s strategic approach to capitalize the 
frustrations of the people and win their support had also helped to 
expand the insurgency. From the side of the post -1990 
governments the gravity of the cause and dynamics of the conflict 
was very much underestimated and ignored. The government 
initially took the insurgency merely as a “law and order problem” 
(Upreti, 2004a). Only later, it declared it as an act of “terrorism” 
(Upreti, 2006). Backed up by the military and other assistance from 
foreign countries, it fought against the insurgency. It never listened 
to the voice of its own people who felt similarly let down by the 
government. The government seemed to have depended on the 
analysis and advice of a few of supporting foreign countries- the 
most prominent of which were the proponents of the “war on 
terrorism” (Muni, 2003). Consequently, the government always 
took a suppressive stance towards all those it suspected to be the 
supporters of the CPN (Maoists). The turning point in the conflict 
came when king Gyanendra took over power on the 1st   of 
February, 2005. He declared a state of emergency, detained or 
arrested leaders of the political parties, members of the civil 
society, and human rights activities and intellectuals. This laid the 
ground for all the seven political parties to unite and act together 
against the king. They formed a Seven Parties’ Alliance (SPA) to 
fight for the restoration of democracy. The SPA joined hands with 
the CPN (Maoists) who were already fighting against monarchy. 
Thus sharing a common goal to some extent, the SPA and the CPN 
(Maoists) teamed up and signed two agreements 45 to return the 
                                                 
45  The 12-points agreement was signed between the SPA and the Maoistss in Delhi, 
India on 22 November 2005, and the 8-point agreement was signed on 19 March, 
2006 in Delhi).  
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power from the king back to the people. The main political agenda 
of these agreements were to end the king’s autocracy, establish a 
permanent peace and to return the country to full democracy by 
holding elections for a constituent assembly. 
 
A nation wide democratic movement started on the 6th   of April 
with a large scale participation and support of the Nepalese people 
which was confluded on the 24th of April, 2006 with the surrender 
of power by the king. The king was forced to reinstate the earlier 
dissolved parliament on the 24th of April returning political power 
to the democratic parties. A ceasefire46 was declared both from the 
government and the CPN (Maoists), followed by the signing of a 
“Comprehensive Peace Accord” on 21 November, 2006, bringing 
the armed conflict to a formal end. 
 
The Parliament on the 18th of May, 2006, declared the monarchy 
suspended. The country passed an interim constitution on January 
15, 2007. This constitution removed the King as the head of state.  
The Prime Minister is currently acting as the head of the state. The 
ever awaited constituent assembly will finally decide on the fate of 
the monarchy. 
 
Though there is a controversy of opinion about the methods used 
by the CPN (Maoists) to bring political changes, it’s impacts on 
social transformation and political change have been profound. 
Without the revolt of the CPN (Maoists), it could have taken 
decades for the people living in the rural areas to rise up for their 
rights. Some of the positive impacts of the conflict are: 
 
1. Raised awareness among a vast majority of the rural 
people, 
2. A developed sense of self-identity amongst various groups 
of people (e.g., Dalit movement, Terai movement, Janajati 
movement, etc.),  
                                                 
46 The Maoists declared 3 months ceasefire on 26 April 2006. The government 
declared ceasefire and withdrew the terrorist tag and red corner notice on the Maoists 
on 03 May 2006. Then the 25-point “Code of Conduct” was signed between the 
Maoists and the government on 26 May, 2006. 
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3. An enhanced sensitization to the conflict. 
4.  Pressure to end discrimination and effect social reform,  
5. Creation of new opportunities, 
6.  To pressurize various development sectors to be more 
accountable and transparent in their workings, 
7. Pressurize politicians and rulers to go for restructuring the 
state, 
8. Heralded a people’s resistance movement in stopping of 
production and consumption of alcohol, and to minimize 
gambling and incidences of sexual abuses in the rural 
areas, 
9. Empowered the people to raise their concerns and demand 
for their rights. 
Similarly, there were also several negative consequences of the 
armed conflict in Nepal.  The prominent among these are:  
• A high human casualty (killed more than 13300 people 
and rendered thousands other wounded), 
• Gross  violations of human rights, 
• Damage to private and public properties, 
• Shift of financial resources from social and economic 
developments to military expenditures, 
• Disruption of economic activities and slowdown of 
rural productions, 
• Economic burden to people through forced donations, 
• Withdrawal of development projects due to the threat, 
abduction of staffs, bombing  of governments’ offices 
etc.,  
• Growing psychological problems such as   stress and 
depression, increase in dependency culture, feelings of 
an  uncertain  future,  solitariness and confinement,  
• Breakdown of social safety nets and, 
• Internal Displacement 
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5.2.1 Armed Conflict and Internal Displacement in Nepal
  
Armed conflict produced different categories of IDPs in Nepal. 
They were:  
 
1. Rich and powerful local elites most of whom were 
connected with the state power at the center,,  family of 
security forces, and who were directly or indirectly 
opposed to  the ‘people’s war’  
2. Government staff and their relatives, mainly working as 
security personnel and in administration at local levels  
acting as representatives of the central government,  
3. Locally elected leaders of political parties who were 
influential  at villages, 
4. Poor, socially excluded, marginalized people who wanted 
to alter the feudal, top-down ruling system and who 
expected changes  from the ‘peoples war’,  
5. Family members and relatives of CPN (Maoists) workers 
and their leaders, 
6. People caught between two warring sides and fleeing their 
homes and general effects of war like   breakdown of 
education, closure of business, weakening of local 
economy, insecurity etc. 
Figure 5.1 Adapted: From Caritas (2006) 
 
Destinations of IDPs of Nepal 
  
Place of 
Origin
Third countries Safer   village s 
Respective 
district head- 
quarters   
Smaller  
Towns   
  
Other   
Capital city 
Other safer 
regional 
centers 
Respective 
regional 
centers 
Indian cities 
 Other safer 
district 
headquarters 
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In the above a., b. and c. categories of people were displaced by 
CPN (Maoists) whereas categories d and e. were displaced by the 
state and its security forces; and f. victims of actions from both 
sides.  
 
5.2.1.1 Trends of Displacement 
 
As in other countries affected by conflict, the trend of displacement 
in Nepal is also mainly from rural to urban areas (IDMC, 2007). In 
situations of armed conflict, people are seen to move to urban 
areas, because they are perceived to be safer and afford better 
livelihood opportunities. The general trend of displacement is 
given in the adjacent diagram.                                                            
                                               
The IDPs relocation is varied and mostly depending on the motive 
behind choosing a particular destination. People choose certain 
places based on their affordability, connectivity and their perceived 
security (economic, social and psychological). Often IDPs settle in 
those places where they have relatives or friends or places where 
people from their places of origin have settled.  
         
Case 5. 1. Reason for Choosing Kathmandu as Destination 
 
 Indramani Adhikari (name changed), age 75, from Sindhuli said 
he came to Kathmandu because his sons fled the village due to 
fear of being recruited in the CPN (Maoists) army. The main 
reason to choose Kathmandu as secure destination was because 
they had heard much about the availability of livelihood and other 
opportunities there. After living in Sindhuli for some years 
without his three sons he and his wife came to Kathmandu to live 
with his sons. One of his sons was practicing law in Kathmandu. 
Initially, the family lived in rented rooms in Satdobato of Lalitpur, 
but later they realized that they could saved money if they moved 
to the bank of Manahara River, to live with  “sukumbasis” 
(landless people) already living there. Now, they have a small 
mud house and a shop that sells sweets, soaps etc. Their youngest 
son and son- in- law are now working as laborers in Malaysia.  
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However, the capital city is not the sole destination of the IDPs. 
Sometimes, when displacement is sudden due to urgent threats, all 
the members of the family leave the village at once and come to 
the nearest urban centers. Some of them settle there while other 
members move to the capital or to some other urban areas, such as 
the district or regional headquarters. Then some members (mostly 
young men) of these families may move to India or other third 
countries, including the gulf region.  
 
Nepal is surrounded by India on three sides:  from the east, west 
and the south.  Therefore, large numbers of people from Nepal are 
entering India. Armed conflict has also pushed the youths to 
migrate to gulf countries. Observation from fieldworks in the 
Manahara 'sukumbasi" settlement area reveals that at least one 
member from each house, especially the son, has gone to work in 
the third country, mostly in Malaysia. Some of the displaced 
families have paid visit to their villages- after five to ten years 
when the CPN (Maoists) armed conflict officially ended on 22 
November, 2007. Some respondents said that they have no 
property or immediate family members to go back to in their place 
of origin . Their relatives from the place of origin pay visits to 
them, but they themselves have not gone back and neither do they 
intend to do so.  
 
5.2.1.2 State and Internal Displacement 
 
The main reason for the internal displacement was the atrocities of 
the state security forces and the CPN (Maoists). Displacement due 
to the action of the state was first reported in 1995, when the 
government launched ‘Operation Romeo”. It was carried out 
against “Sija Campaign”- a politico- ideological operation by the 
CPN (Maoists) in 1995, which took place in Rolpa and Rukum- the 
two mountainous districts in mid western Nepal. Operation Romeo 
was carried out in 11 villages of Rolpa- by mobilizing 1500 
policemen and a specially trained commando force. They brutally 
attacked the villages. More than 132 villagers were arrested 
without warrants. The age of the arrested ranged from 12 to over 
75. Nearly 6000 villagers left the villages some of them never to 
return. 
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The ratio of displacement was seen to go up after the intervention 
of the then Royal Nepalese Army (RNA)47 through operations like 
"Kilo-Sierra-II" (February 1998)and Jungle Search Operations 
(1998-99) and the imposition of the Terrorist and Destructive 
Activities (Prevention and Control) Ordinance 2001 (TADO); 
which was later enacted as the Terrorist and Destructive Activities 
(Prevention and Control) Act, 2002. This ordinance and the Act 
gave the security forces unquestioned authority to arrest, search, 
detain without warning any person and to use all necessary force 
by contravening constitutional order. Section 20 of the Act 
provided total immunity to security forces even if they grossly 
violated human rights. This Act was the main source of producing 
IDPs in Nepal.    
 
Family members and supporters of CPN (M) often had a very hard 
time as they were often tortured and threatened by state security 
forces. Similarly, acts of retribution, abduction, disappearance, 
human rights violation and abuses of authority were profusely 
practiced by the state forces who were supposed to guard against 
such practices. Nepal’s track record is poor in abiding by 
international conventions and provisions, which it has signed. Both 
the, state security forces and the CPN (M) had failed to respect 
humanitarian laws and to abide by these obligations.  
 
There are instances of whole villages like Ganeshpur and 
Ratangunj of the Nawalparasi district that got displaced from the 
attacks by vigilante groups in the name of Village Defense 
Committee, or Pratikar Samuha or Shanti ra Bikash Samiti 48 
(Peace and Development Committee) and from Rural Volunteer 
Security Group developed, trained and protected by the state 
security forces. Such groups were active in Nawalparasi, 
Kapilvastu, Rupandehi, Dailekh, Makawanpur, Dhading, Dhanusa, 
Ilam and other districts [Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC, 2006)].  
                                                 
47  The name has now been changed into Nepal Army by the restored Parliament after 
the popular people's movement of April 2006. 
48  According to Caritas (2005), The later is a sanitized name used by the 
government for channelling the unspent fund (due to conflict, no development 
works could be carried out) of Village Development Committee to back up the 
vigilante groups. 
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The then RNA trained and provided arms and weapons to these 
groups massively 49.  After the completion of training they were 
given identity cards duly signed by the army (Caritas, 2005). They 
were used against the supporters and sympathizers of the CPN (M). 
For example, the brutalities of these groups were observed in 
Ganeshpur village of Nawalparasi, where they locked 3 persons in 
a house accusing them to be Maoists and set fire to the house. 
Fearing from such brutal act, almost 400 residents left the village 
and escaped to India. 
 
According to IDMC (2006), until the July of 2005, 25,000 people 
have been displaced from their homes due to the action of these 
vigilante groups in different places protected by the state security 
forces. These Village Defense Committees pressurized the people 
to send at least one member from each family to join them. If local 
people refused to join, they forced such families to pay money, 
humiliated them, and conducted search of peoples' home at night 
and harassed their women, beat and even killed them accusing 
them as sympathizers of the Maoists (Caritas, 2005). 
 
5.2.1.3 CPN (M) and Internal Displacement 
 
Displacement caused by the CPN (M) started after the start of the 
“Peoples War” in February of 1996.  At first, it was used as a war 
strategy to create a vacuum by driving away those who either 
opposed them or directly or indirectly obstructed their expansions, 
or did not obey their directions. It was relatively a successful 
strategy to create a political vacuum to be filled in later by the 
Maoists' own cadres. Mostly, wealthy landowners and local elites 
who were accused of wrongdoings and active members of political 
parties who didn’t follow the Maoists ideology, the government 
officials, elected local representatives and the secretaries of the 
Village Development Committees and District Development 
Committees were forced to either accept the dictates of the CPN 
(M) or vacate their residence. Hence due to the fear of retribution 
                                                 
49   Local people reported to Monitoring mission of Amnesty International that, local 
people were told that if they participated in the trainings they would be recruited 
in police, army or government jobs. The training in Nawalparasi is provided in 
the Triveni barracks. 
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and extortion, many people left their villages.  Other People fled 
due to either real or perceived threats.   
 
Case 5.2: CPN (M) Specific Campaign and IDPs  
 
In 2004, the CPN (M) declared “shoes abhiyan” in Jumla 
under the slogan “tie your shoe lace and get ready to join the 
CPN (M)” under which they notified that they would be taking 
all the youths of the village to be recruited in their army. 
Hundreds of youths immediately gathered at Jumla airport – 
the only outlet, to catch the flight which operated only twice a 
week, to run away to Nepalgunj and Surkhet which were 
perceived to be safer areas. There was a great riot at Jumla 
airport because there were only few seats available and 
everyone wanted to escape. The police thrashed many of these 
youths to control the situation. Thousands of people were 
displaced from that area. 
 
The CPN (M) also used strategies of psychological pressure of 
security risks to force the youths to join their party in the Karnali 
region.  
 
Case 5.3: Pressure on Students and Displacement of Youth 
 
 In Khalanga of Jumla, the CPN (M) took the name list of all 
the students who had just joined the Jumla Multiple Campus- 
the only campus in Jumla. When inquired, a student said that 
the list was given to the CPN (M) by students of the same 
college who were already working with CPN (M). The CPN 
(M) then organized some politico-cultural programme in rural 
areas which the locals were forced to attend. In the 
programme, they announced the names from the list 
designating those names to different posts like the area 
commander, area in-charge etc. This had two implications; 
firstly, the locals started suspecting the students as CPN (M) 
which created an unwelcome environment for the students to 
continue their study and secondly, when the list was predicted 
to reach the security forces- (as it was often the case) the 
students had no other options than either escaping from the 
place to safer areas like Nepalgunj, Surkhet and beyond to 
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India or joining the CPN (M). Since the first option was 
available only to people who could afford the costs, most fell 
trapped into the second option. 
Source: Abstracted from the informal discussion with local 
people. 
 
Family members of villagers working in the state’s army or police 
often had a hard time in villages controlled by CPN (M). There are 
several incidences where the CPN (M) have asked the family 
members of the security forces for money and even forced them to 
get their sons or husbands to resign from government jobs. The 
victims who suffered from the CPN (M) formed an association to 
advocate their concerns. The association claimed that thousands of 
ex-army and ex police personnel suffered in the hands of the CPN 
(M) who forced them to leave their jobs and their villages  
 
But the activities of the CPN (M) are not solely responsible for 
such incidences. Firstly, if the state had gone towards resolving the 
problem rather than suppressing it, and had there been an efficient 
mechanism in the security forces or had the security forces been 
sensitive towards human rights and humanitarian issues, most 
people would not have been displaced.   
 
5.2.1.4 The Dilemma of Local Community and 
Displacement 
 
Most often villages were used as battlefields both by the CPN (M) 
and the state. Civilians were treated by the warring parties not as 
mere civilian but forced them to choose one or the other side.. 
They were most often taken as a threat and perceived as potential 
force of the enemy. Regrettably, neither of the warring parties 
abided by the rules of international human rights and humanitarian 
laws. They neither devised mechanisms nor were interested to 
differentiate between the combatants and the civilians. Thus, using 
civilians as means of warfare by the CPN (M) and the state drove 
the local people out of the villages. Moreover, the TADO gave 
authority to the military to suspect anyone as being a ‘terrorist’. 
Anyone not supporting them was regarded as a as supporters of the 
rebels, and was consequently a ‘terrorist’. Caught in such a 
situation, local people not only lost their basic human rights and 
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their identity as civilians but were exposed to a great danger to 
their lives. Hence, leaving their community and villages was the 
only way of survival.  
 
The people were displaced in large numbers during the armed 
conflict in Nepal also because they were exposed to money 
extortion, retribution, threat, abduction, humiliation, insecurity and 
suspicion from the warring parties. Other long term effects of the 
armed conflict were deterioration in social and economic life, 
break down of social and informal safety networks, absence of 
opportunity for livelihood to a large number of people from rural 
families impelling them to leave their homes.   
 
Case 5.4: Bitter Relation Remains for Long  
 
In a meeting at Martin Chautari, a displaced woman said that 
she together with a group of 15 women had gone as a 
delegation to meet one of the ministers of CPN (M). She was a 
member of the Nepali Congress back in the village and had 
been abducted by the CPN (M) cadres twice. Hoping that since 
he was also from the western region and a minister who has a 
responsibility to address the problems of the war-torn nation 
including IDPs he would listen to their plea. But the minister, 
who was reluctant at first to meet them, misbehaved and 
threatened the women. She said that his words and voice were 
as brutal as that she had heard from the CPN (Maoists) when 
she was abducted.  
 
This case demonstrates that there is a deep-seated bitter memory 
between the CPN (Maoists) cadres and the people sympathetic to 
other parties of other parties.  During most of the time of the armed 
conflict the Nepali Congress Party was in the government and it 
imposed the State of Emergency, mobilized military and did every 
thing it could to destroy the insurgents initially. Similarly, the CPN 
(Maoists) on its part did everything to weaken the Nepali Congress 
and evicting supporters of its parties from the villages. Weakening 
of workers and sympathizers of other parties was a common 
strategy. The bitter verbal exchange between the minister and the 
cadre of the Nepali Congress is a precise reflection of it.  
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5.2.2 The Politics of Data of Displacement  
 
The actual number of IDPs not only became a confusing and 
controversial a problem, it also became a contentious issue.  
Contradictory data was used for vested political interests. One side 
blamed the other and held it responsible for producing the IDPs.  
Hence, they started exaggerating the number of displaced people 
by other side and attempted to present that less number of people 
were displaced due to their own action. The state for a long time 
did not recognize the people displaced by the security forces as 
being IDPs and treated them as mere supporters of the CPN 
(Maoists).  
 
Further, as observed elsewhere, it became hard to find an accurate 
number of the displaced people because their counting process is 
complex and is affected by various factors such as unmonitored 
migration to India and abroad, voluntary invisibility due to the 
stigma attached to the concept of IDPs, intermixing of IDPs with 
the host community and the negligence, ignorance and biases of 
the government by not recognizing IDPs produced by the security 
forces. Hence, the authentic number of IDPs is not known. The 
figures of IDPs projected are based on the small localized research 
by various NGOs as well as those presented by the warring parties. 
One of the recent estimates of IDPs is made by the IDMC (2007) 
which says that IDPs in Nepal range from 50,000-70,000 people.  
 
Fig 5.2: Number of IDPs Staying in Different District 
Headquarters  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted 
from Caritas, 
2006 
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5. 2.3 Effects on Livelihood of IDPs  
 
Displacement everywhere is often found to have similar 
consequences- families are torn apart, communities dispersed, their 
culture suppressed, and normal support system destroyed and the 
affected population are forced to depend on others for the basics of 
survival (Korn, 1999). It denies innocent people's access to food, 
shelter and medicine and exposes them to all manners of violence. 
Displacement also contributes a lot to the process of formal and 
informal urbanization, sometimes positively and most often 
negatively. 
 
On the question of livelihood, the issues of land and property, 
political participation and the trend in  rural to urban migration and 
its consequence became a source of major global concern in 2006 
(IDMC, 2007). As in Nepal control and access to land has been a 
source of conflict in many countries. Access to housing and land is 
one of the main concerns in a debate on displacement. It has often 
been observed that when security situation improves or a peace 
treaty is signed, property disputes associated with the return of the 
displaced people are a potential source of conflict. The same is 
seen to be occurring in Nepal. The question of land and property 
dispute is directly linked with the characteristics of the current state 
(a feudal, power centric and a top-down state which does not want 
fundamental land reform, whereas the CPN (Maoists) has linked 
the issue of the land confiscated by them during their  armed 
conflict to the state’s immediate action on land reform. Hence, they 
maintain that they have not yet returned the earlier confiscated land 
fully.  The interim government has started to use pressure to return 
such land on the Maoists, which might, introduce more conflict and 
tension in future.  
 
The displaced people were unable to meet their basic livelihood 
requirements because they were dissociated from their farming 
which was their only means of livelihoods. They have faced severe 
hardship because of societal stigmas, political restrictions, limited 
economic and wage-earning potential, insufficient access to 
necessary resources, and inadequate assistance. Consequently, they 
exhibit the case of disproportionately high levels of 
malnourishment, disease affliction, physical stunting, etc.  
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According to a recent report from Dang (Samaya, 2007), the CPN 
(Maoists) have declared that they would return a maximum one 
bigha (1hectare = 1.47654 bighas) of confiscated land to only of 
those IDPs who they feel have been done injustice. Senior leader 
Krishna Bahadur Mahara of CPN (Maoists) at first said that the 
confiscated land issue is a struggle of tillers and landless people 
against their exploitative landlords to establish their rights and it 
was not hence appropriate to blame the CPN (Maoists) 50 for it. 
After becoming the Minister for Information and Communication 
he said that CPN (Maoists) would not return the land they had 
confiscated until they brought the radical land reform 51 plan in 
action which till present times has not materialized. Similarly, the 
local leader of CPN (Maoists) in Dang, Hemanta Prakash Oli alias 
Sudarshan 52 , has  said that it is unlawful to return all the 
confiscated land, Those who would want to get their land  back 
will get only one bigha of land at the maximum (Samaya, 2007) 
only after their deeds are screened well. In Dang, disputes have 
arisen between the displaced landlords now wanting to return and 
the secondary occupants, people who had been occupying the land 
after the real owners were displaced.  
 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the GoN 
and CPN (Maoists) on 21 November 2006 made specific provision 
on the IDP.  Article 5.2.1 of the CPA states, “Both parties express 
the commitment to allow without any political prejudice the people 
displaced due to the armed conflict to return back voluntarily to 
their respective ancestral or former residence, reconstruct the 
infrastructure destroyed during the conflict and rehabilitate and 
socialize the displaced people into the society”. However, this 
provision is not translated into action. If this provision is honored 
and the CPA honestly translated into action,, it could provide 
greater scope for addressing the concerns of the IDPs and helping 
to remove the  livelihood insecurities of  the IDPs. But the state so 
far seems unwilling to appropriately deal with the contested land 
issue.   
                                                 
50 See Samaya, 12 Apr, 2007 for details. 
51 See Kantipur 18 May, 2007 
52  He is the bureau Incharge of Maoists for Rapti zone 
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It has been observed in the case of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and the Philippines that once the government makes rules 
for the restitution of land and other properties to their owners,, 
political and economic elites, or people having better access to 
information manage to obtain ownership over land and property 
belonging to other less informed groups further robbing the 
vulnerable group of their property. Possibility of such a situation 
repeating in Nepal should be taken into account while making 
policy and implementation plans, as land makes the principal basis 
of livelihood for the poor people. 
 
For most of the displaced people in the poorer category, living 
conditions for them are difficult to cope with in the face of high 
unemployment rates, large debts and a high level of dependency on 
friends, relatives and community53 for assistance. Some have been 
forced to beg for food at the local hotels while taking care of their 
children. Because of the distrust among the host community, many 
faced problems in renting flats or finding jobs. Many had run up to 
large debts with their property and assets left behind all their 
savings used up, and forced to survive on loans. The displaced 
women were reported to find work in hotels and bars, working as 
semi-prostitutes. There were growing incidences of child labor. 
 
The nutritional information on Nepal (NRC, 2007) shows that 
along with countries like Burma, Colombia, and Ethiopia, the 
malnutrition rate among the IDPs is very high, sometimes above 
the critical 15% threshold set by the World Health Organization to 
define the emergency situations.  
 
Since large numbers of displaced persons are unskilled to semi 
skilled in job trainings,, they have been engaged only as laborers in 
stone quarries, sand mines, apparel factories, brick kilns or as local 
porters, street vendors, drivers, conductors, domestic laborers, 
construction workers etc. They are usually underpaid, and their 
income is not sufficient to sustain their livelihood. In Nepal 
                                                 
53 See studies on the livelihood of the displaced people in Nepal by UNHCR et al. 
2006; Rai, 2006; and Tamang `and Fedrick, 2006   
 121 
engaging children in different jobs has been a major livelihood 
strategy (Tamang and Fedrick, 2006). 
 
Social capital has played a prominent role, right from providing 
shelter, food and helping to find a job in the initial stage to 
providing moral support, recognition and enhancing participation 
in community at later stages. Community social workers and career 
advisors have also been found to be important to create a corridor 
for social integration. Language and discrimination in terms of 
ethnic lines or even the fact of being an IDP have been observed to 
be prominent barriers in integration, in Nepal as almost 
everywhere.  
 
Different studies (Upreti, 2007a; Caritas, 2005; Adhikari, 2006) 
reveal that the IDPs suffer from a feeling of depression, 
helplessness and isolation, psychologically. This is due to the 
change in their identity and retarded participation in various 
activities. They feel that from being a notable respected identity 
holder previously,, they have now become an anonymity 
 
5. 2.4 Effects on Social and Cultural Life of IDPs 
 
Displacement has affected the social and cultural life of the 
displaced people in Nepal. The shift from rural areas to urban areas 
brings with changes in different socio-cultural values. Such 
movements have helped to break down the traditional socio-
cultural barriers of occupation- assigned caste and roles. It has 
opened spaces for the flourishing of one's entrepreneurship and 
breaking down of traditional gender assigned roles. It has helped in 
the gradual eroding of caste generated disparities such as the issues 
of untouchability.  However, migration of a person from a rural 
area, where the community's relationship l is characterized by co-
operation, intimacy and mutual, support within  a  set of given 
values, in a new place which has different values, beliefs and 
traditions that is hard to adjust. The displaced people have to 
construct a congenial environment, and to integrate themselves into 
the new place at the same time. This may cause an additional strain 
to the afflicted person. Taking the decision all of a sudden to move 
from one's place of habitual residence, to where there is neither 
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protection, nor means to provide for the family, it can be the 
hardest decision of their life.  
 
5.2.5 IDPs and the Constituent Assembly Election 
 
The participation of the displaced people in the forth coming 
elections for Constitutional Assembly is a matter of major concern, 
because it is not certain whether they will get the opportunity to 
vote in this important nation-building effort. Though the voter 
registration process has been completed for most places, the 
displaced people have not been registered in the voter's list in the 
place where they are staying at present.  The rules require that they 
go back to their place of origin for voting which may be difficult to 
arrange. This discourages participation of IDPs in voting.  
 
There are also many other obstacles that impede the 
enfranchisement of displaced people 54. Nepal could and should 
learn from the experiences of international agencies like the 
Organization for Co-ordination and Security in Europe (OSCE) 
and International Organization for Migration (IOM) that have been 
monitoring and supporting elections in situations of conflict 
induced internal displacement. Provisions should be made have a 
greater voice and means of holding their government accountable 
to address their plight effectively.  
 
5.2.6 Impact of Displacement on Host Areas 
 
The phenomenon of rural to urban migration exists in all countries 
in conflict, producing IDPs involving millions of people. So, it not 
only affects the displaced people, but is also a challenge to the 
people of the host area. Mostly staying in the basement of houses 
of host families or squatting in, streets, schools or other public 
buildings in the initial periods, IDPs often end up in the fast 
growing slums which change the structure of cities besides other 
consequences like strain on infrastructures and civic facilities.   
 
                                                 
54  See Anita Ghimire (2007) “Enfranchising IDPs of Nepal” in Forced Migration 
Review No 28 in www.fmrreview.org for detail debate about the IDPs and their 
participation in election.  
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A recent study by one of the authors of this paper on the 
environmental causes of the armed conflict and the impacts of 
armed insurgency on environmental sanitation and health issues of 
IDP in the of urban areas of Kathmandu valley, demonstrates that 
most of the IDPs staying in slums are suffering from lack of food, 
health facilities, enough drinking water and sanitation, legal and 
other physical protection. They are not able to exercise their 
economic, civil and political rights in the settlement. Particularly 
elderly, children and women are suffering from lack of food and 
nutrients, medical facilities, drinking water and sanitations. IDPs 
are also facing severe harassments and problems from the 
municipality authority and local host communities (Upreti, 2007a).  
  
Studies on the effects of displacement on the urban area in Nepal 
(IDD, 2006; Rai, 2005; Upreti, 2007a; Adhikari, 2006) reveal that 
exodus to urban areas has placed pressures on the urban 
infrastructure and its capacity to deliver basic services.  It has led 
to pressure on the already inadequate supply of drinking water, 
sanitation and health services, education and transportation of the 
cities. This strain on the infrastructure and capacity of delivering 
basic services has posed a huge challenge to the local government. 
It is reported that 78% of the total population living in squatter 
settlements for the last 10 years are mainly people displaced by 
conflict (IDMC, 2006), is an evidence proving that people who 
shift to urban areas due to insurgency are prone to transforming 
into the urban poor.  
 
The arrival of the displaced people, who are mostly unskilled to 
semi-skilled agricultural laborers, to the urban area has increased a 
competition for on daily wage labor, for  resulting in the reduction 
of the amount of daily wage earning, and making livelihood that is 
already precarious, even more vulnerable.  
 
Problems of integration between the IDPs and the host community 
are also mounting (Upreti, 2007a). Since cities have started 
witnessing an increasing flow of IDPs, intolerance and prejudice 
have augmented considerably (Rai, 2005). With the increase in the 
inflow of IDPs to the in urban areas, incidences of criminal and 
anti-social activities are increasing (Upreti, 2007a). The host 
community perceives this to be the result of the IDPs.  Increased 
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competitions in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs have resulted in 
underpayment and loss of jobs. The existing labour forces see the 
economically challenged IDPs as their bread snatchers. From the 
side of IDPs the integration problem may rise while bearing the 
double brunt of adjusting to the values, beliefs and traditions of a 
new place, while at the same time making space for socializing in a 
new environment. 
 
Unsustainable use of natural resources like sand quarrying from 
riverbeds  and illegal cutting and sale of firewood by some of the 
IDPs not only bring in their train a host of  problems,  but also 
reduces the ability of sustainable  natural resources to regenerate  
for a long time (Upreti, 2004a; 2006a).  
  
5. 2.7 IDPs and Gender Issues 
 
It is an established fact that women and children who together 
make up 70% of the displaced population are the hardest hit in the 
different stages of conflict and displacement. Violence against 
women is often used as a war strategy to attack the values of a 
community or to punish or terrorize the communities and 
individuals (Aditya et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Cohen, 
2006).  
 
The present conflict in Nepal has created many single women 
among the displaced   who are living as destitute (Upreti, 2006a). 
Concerns regarding the women conflict victim are found to centre 
around two issues – protection, and provision or access to 
resources. They have been left as the sole supporters of their 
children and other dependents, and are traumatized by effects of 
losing their husbands and by feelings of insecurity and harassment 
from the government security personnel and the CPN (M) (Caritas, 
2005). However, the troubles they face are multidimensional – 
being economic, social, physical and psychological- in nature. 
 
Studies (Caritas, 2005; Zeender, 2005; Banerjee et al. 2005; 
UNIFEM, 2005) show that experience of leaving the familiar 
environment, breakdown of social safety nets, and support 
structures and accepted forms of human and family relations have 
created a chaos in the  lives of displaced women which is hard to 
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normalize. Living in an unfamiliar, crowded and cramped area 
with strangers, puts displaced women in a stressful environment. 
Reduction in limited economic opportunities and manifestation of 
frustration and tension by male members in the form of alcoholism, 
aggressiveness and violence, primarily directed towards women 
and children have caused extreme hardship to women.  
 
Displaced women fleeing their homes or living in IDP camps have 
sometimes been forced into prostitution to survive or have fallen 
prey to traffickers in Nepal (UNIFEM, 2006). However this is a 
condition not only prevalent in Nepal. Other conflict ridden 
countries like Uganda and Liberia are facing the same problem as 
many women and girls have been forced to exchange sex for food, 
money or aid even from national and international peace workers. 
UN peacekeepers were also found to be involved in abuses against 
women; running prostitution rings and other forms of exploitation 
in the Sudan and Uganda. 
 
A report by Tamang and Fedrick (2006) shows made that displaced 
girls working in carpet factories were at the highest risk of verbal 
and physical abuses. Initiatives have been set by local 
organizations monitoring violence against women and children by 
assisting in reporting of such violations.  But gender based 
violence are generally not reported during conflicts, and many 
post- conflict surveys do not include questions on sexual violence 
because they are sensitive issues. 
 
5.3 IDPs: The Responsibility Debate 
 
The issue of responsibility towards the internally displaced people 
is an ongoing debate especially regarding the issues of if and when 
international interventions should be done. Since the displaced 
people remain within the borders of their own countries, it was 
often taken for granted, under the traditional notion of sovereignty 
that the government of the country had the sole responsibility to 
look after them. But it is often found that the same government 
who under the international law and the concept of sovereignty are 
obliged to protect and provide life supporting assistance, are 
themselves the cause of displacement and human rights violation to 
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the displaced people. Even until 2006, countries 55  government 
forces were directly or indirectly involved in displacing people in 
17 countries and in 11 countries56  the IDPs received none to a   
very limited humanitarian assistance from their own governments. 
It is also for the same reason that the notion of internal 
displacement in the context of armed conflict didn’t come before 
the international agenda until the last decade of the 20th Century 
(Cohen, 2006), whereas for the refugees- who were uprooted for 
the same reasons, but fled across the border, the Office for the 
United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees was created soon 
after the Second World War in 1950. In 1951 the Refugee 
Convention was adopted. Thus, when as late as in 1988, 250,000 
Sudanese starved to death, because their government denied them 
humanitarian assistance, the international community just stood by 
and watched 
 
However, pioneers in the IDP field such as Roberta Cohen and 
Francis M. Deng have been arguing that sovereignty cannot be 
dissociated from responsibility and that a state should not be able 
to claim the prerogatives of sovereignty unless it carries out its 
internationally recognized responsibility towards its citizens 
(Cohen, 2006). It has now been recognized that when applied in 
situations of international displacement, is concept basically 
affirms that governments have the principal responsibility to 
provide life- supporting protection and other means of assistance 
for displaced populations. If they are unable to fulfill this 
responsibility, they are expected to ask for and accept international 
offers of aid. If countries refuse or deliberately obstruct this access, 
thus putting people at risk, then international interventions become 
compelling. Though strong in theory this concept is so is very 
weak in practice. India and China argue that such international 
intervention overriding sovereignty could cover for the interference   
by the powerful countries in the affairs of the weaker states. This 
may be true in some cases, but it and cannot completely be ruled 
out in a situation in which the government doesn’t carry out its 
                                                 
55  Burma, Central African Republic(CAR), Chad, Colombia, Cote d’Ivorie, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Kenya, Pakistan, Palestinian 
Territories, Philippines,  Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe   
56  Bangladesh, Burma, CAR, Chad, DRC, Indonesia, Pakistan, Palestinian 
Territories, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan   
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responsibility or evades its duty, thus putting the life of its people 
at risk, and then international intervention becomes a need.   This 
notion of interference by powerful states is prominent in South 
Asia since its countries are firmly committed to the principle of 
equal sovereignty, and most of them view internal displacement as 
a strictly domestic matter, ranking low on the national priority list.  
This may be the reason why there is no regional body in South 
Asia, even though more than two thirds of Asia’s three million 
internally displaced people are living in South Asia (IDMC, 2007).  
 
5.4 Development of a Normative Framework for IDPs 
 
The number of IDPs had swelled up dramatically due to the 
explosion of civil wars following the end of the cold war era. In 
most cases the IDPs outnumbered the refugees by two to one 
(Banerjee et al, 2005).  As a result, the phenomenon of 
displacement became very visible and a need arose to address the 
plight of the IDPs.  Roberta Cohen (2006), identified 5 main 
reasons for creating an international system to address the IDPs  
 
Firstly, there is still an enormous increase in the number of IDPs. 
When first counted in 1982, the number of the internally displaced 
was at only 1.2 million spread over 11 countries, whereas by the 
1990s, 20-25 million IDPs were found living in 40 countries. Even 
until the end of December 2006, there were under 10 million 
refugees in the world whereas there was an estimated total of 24.5 
million conflict affected IDPs in at least 52 countries (IDMC, 
2007).  
 
Secondly, the conditions in which IDPs were originated and lived, 
created an urgent need to address their plight. The highest 
mortality rate in humanitarian emergencies involved the IDPs. 
They were more often likely to be deprived of their basic needs, 
medicines and were vulnerable to assault and human rights abuses. 
 
Thirdly, conflict and displacement in one country has spilled over 
to neighboring countries, often affecting the stability and security 
of the neighboring countries and of the whole regions well. 
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Fourthly, after the end of the cold war access to the IDPs became 
easier. After the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 and subsequent human right treaties, the behavior 
of a government towards its citizen became an international 
concern. So, after 1970, systematic monitoring, reporting and   
exposure of governments involved in acts of forcible 
displacements, ethnic cleansing and other human right violations 
started regularly. In the beginning of 1991, the UN Security 
Council started to demand access to displaced people and other 
affected populations. 
 
Lastly, it was realized that peace and re-construction in war torn 
societies couldn’t take place without proper re-integration of 
displaced people.  The governments in neighboring countries were 
also less willing to accept refugees in their countries. So it was 
deemed necessary to protect, assist and reintegrate the IDPs within 
their own countries. 
 
The relief organizations trying to help the IDPs in the field 
demanded for a document that defined the IDPs and their right, 
and, consequently, after several years of hard work, the Guiding 
Principle on Internal Displacement (GPID) was drafted by Francis 
M. Deng, Roberta Cohen and a team of international legal experts 
in 1998. 
 
The GPID brings together in one document, many norms that were 
applicable to IDPs which lay before dispersed in many laws, like 
the refugee law, international human rights law and the 
humanitarian law. Though it is not a legally binding document like 
a treaty, it reflects and is consistent with the international human 
rights and humanitarian law which are legally binding.  
 
Under its guiding principle, the GPID defines an internally 
displaced person to be a  “Person or group of persons who have 
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid 
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state 
border." GPID,1998 .   
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The GPID guarantees the rights to the IDPs in all phases of 
displacement; to be protected from arbitrary displacement, 
protection and assistance during displacement and return, or 
resettlement and reintegration. The GPID has now been endorsed 
by international humanitarian, human rights and development 
organizations and their umbrella groups of non -government 
organizations in their work. Countries having internal displacement 
use it in the development of their own laws and policies, by 
translating it into local languages to create awareness and to and 
evaluate their actions in situations of internal displacement. The 
displaced people have started using it to protect and appeal for 
their rights. 
 
At present a lot of international organizations are working towards 
the facilitation of return,  in providing material and non-material 
assistance and in  working towards a local integration of the 
displaced people, providing them  counseling and legal advices etc. 
Organizations like the UNHCHR, OHCHR, ICRC, WFP, are in 
working directly or in partnership with the local NGOs or 
government organizations or sometimes with other international 
organizations57.   
 
5.5 The IDP Policy of the Government of Nepal 
 
At the domestic level, the Government of Nepal, Ministry of Peace 
and Reconstruction, has developed a national policy on the IDPs, 
entitled “National Policies on Internally Displaced Persons, 2063 
(2007)”“. It has defined the internally displaced person to be ‘a 
person who is living somewhere in the country after having been 
forced to flee or leave his home or place of habitual residence 
arising from an armed conflict or a situation of violence or due to a 
gross violation of human rights or from natural or human made 
disaster, with an aim to avoiding the effects of such situations'. The 
mission of this policy is ‘to rehabilitate the internally displaced 
persons or families with respect, and in safety and on a voluntary 
basis, with reconstruction of physical infrastructure for them, and 
by providing all preventive as well as sustainable measures in the  
re-socialization of the IDPs in order to prevent the reemergence of 
                                                 
57  See www.reliefweb.org for details 
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such situations in future. This policy has the following three 
objectives: 
 
• To adopt preventive and curative measures on a long-term 
basis and thereby minimize the problems with a view to 
addressing the problems of internal displacement. 
• To provide relief, benefits and facilities by developing 
integrated and coordinated mechanism with the  
involvement, among others, of displaced persons for the 
protection of fundamental rights and basic human rights of 
internally displaced persons, and minimization of adverse 
effects to local  communities from displaced persons. 
• To create a conducive environment for a safe, voluntary 
and dignified return of displaced persons or the 
construction and rehabilitation of social, economic 
infrastructures for their settlement in other locations. 
 
In order to achieve the objectives, the strategies proposed in the 
policy document of IDPs are: 
 
• A matter relating to internally displaced persons will be 
incorporated in the priorities of national development. 
• In order to perform necessary functions in relation to 
internal displacement, the  government  will develop an  
institutional and integrated  by coordinating and 
mobilizing the   efforts of local bodies, national and 
international non-governmental organisations, community 
organisations, donor agencies, various political parties, 
including the private sectors, 
• Institutional capacity of the governmental, non-
governmental and community organisations/institutions 
will gradually be developed. Similarly, capacity of 
internally displaced persons will be developed and thereby 
an attempt will be made to make them self-reliant. 
• Technical and financial means and resources to be required 
for providing basic services of employment, education and 
health to internally displaced persons will be collected and 
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mobilized in cooperation with donor agencies, national and 
international non-governmental organisations as well as 
private sectors. 
• The strategies for minimizing the internal displacement 
will be taken in the policies to be adopted by the 
Government of Nepal. 
• The amounts received for the benefit of internally 
displaced persons will be managed transparently to their 
benefit. 
• An environment will be created so that internally displaced 
persons could enjoy prevalent fundamental and human 
rights without any hindrances. 
• The problems of displacement will be minimized in 
conflict affected areas by undertaking the activities of 
development, construction and reconstruction and by 
providing them security and social services. 
• Formal organizations/institutions and informal groups of 
internally displaced persons will, according to their skills 
and capacities, be mobilized in relief and service delivery, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and other activities pertaining 
to the development of the country. 
• Specially targeted programmes will be launched for 
protecting the rights of such persons   as women, aged, 
children, orphans, incapacitated and the similar types of 
vulnerable groups or the persons with special risks 
amongst the displaced ones. 
• In order to raise awareness to negative effects which are 
being or will be arisen in future by internal displacement, 
activities relating to information, education and 
communication will be undertaken in a regular and 
persistent manner. 
• Displaced persons or families will voluntarily be 
encouraged to return to their places of habitual residence. 
For this purpose, an appropriate rehabilitation plan will be 
formulated and implemented. 
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• Capacities of organizations working in governmental and 
non-governmental sectors will be developed for effective 
implementation of the policies pertaining to internally 
displaced persons. 
 
However, translating these strategies into action has remained a 
major concern so far. The government of Nepal is confused in 
dealing with the issues of displaced people. One of the reasons for 
a weak response of the government on IDPs may be the situation of 
transition facing the country just emerging from violence and other 
obstacles. 
 
Further there are some operational difficulties in identifying and 
accessing the IDPs due to a higher degree of their dispersal and 
their reluctance to be identified as such due to various stigmas 
attached to the concept. There is also a high degree of coincidence 
of the IDPs with the economic migrants or with the equally 
vulnerable host population.  As already, especially when a conflict 
tends to get prolonged the dividing line between the IDPs and the 
economic migrants become blurred. Even when there is an access 
to the displaced people, the problems of response creates obstacles 
to fulfilling the needs of the IDPs. The foremost factor for creating 
the problem of response is presumed to be the lack of political will 
from the government concerned. This lack of will is sometimes an 
obvious fact, because the governments are themselves partly or 
solely the agents of displacement. In Nepal too, in the initial stage 
the government was reluctant to recognize the problem of the IDPs 
and had a biased attitude against them even later.  
 
Inadequate resources, misuse of funds and capital centered ad-hoc 
response have also impeded no little in the little assistance, 
provided to the IDPs. Failure to have a strict implementation 
design and take adequate measures to ensure effective 
implementation hinders the response. Similarly, during the time of 
conflict absence of a functional government and the government 
not having control over many of its areas also hampers response.    
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
Conflict induced displacement is becoming a new phenomenon in 
internal migration because of its specific characteristics, such as 
politicization, manipulation and biases in dealing with the issues 
and translation of policies and international provisions relating to 
them into action.  
 
Among the five categories of the IDPs presented in section 2.1 of 
this chapter, most afflicted groups are poor, socially excluded, 
marginalized people who were the victims of the state during the 
time of the conflict. Their livelihood is insecure. They are less 
accessible to the facilities provided by the state to the IDPs. They 
are completely powerless, and away from power centers and, 
consequently, helpless.    
 
Addressing the consequences of conflict induced displacement and 
the needs of the displaced people is a key factor for ensuring 
lasting peace, stability of the government, and achieve sustainable 
development. It is also a subject of an international debate as 
spelled out in the “new sovereignty” concept and the declaration 
made in the ‘Millennium Development Goals’. To provide 
protection to the displaced people is  being one of the main 
concerns of it, and the success of it is measured by indicators like 
the number of displaced people that have returned and been 
reintegrated within their community, and the support  given to the 
IDPs to enable them to return and to be reintegrated.  
 
Armed conflict between the state and the CPN (Maoists) has 
rendered many people homeless, being uprooted from their homes.  
The ongoing conflict in the Terai, if unresolved will be adding 
further to this number. The plights of the IDPs remain is a crisis of 
the untold dimension at present and may pose many problems in 
the future.  
 
The trends and agents of displacement in Nepal are quite clear to 
see, and the responsibility towards addressing the plight has not 
been taken up either by the state or the international communities. 
The persistence of the problem lies in the passiveness of these two 
important actors.  
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Livelihood insecurity of the IDPs is one of the major challenges 
facing them at present, since they have limited economic assets, 
social supports and alternate safety nets. Poor and marginalized 
sections of the IDPs are facing genuine problems of broken 
families and communities, arbitrary violence, and discrimination. 
Their future remains unpredictable. The IDPs are susceptible to 
turn to other sources for participation, recognition and 
empowerment.  
 
Similarly, tension between the host community and IDPs remain 
high unless the state takes appropriate actions.   Majorities of the 
IDPs, staying in slums and other degraded or insecure areas face all 
sorts of health hazards.. They have a very hazy and insecure future. 
. Since meeting the basic needs of everyday living is hard for them, 
they are not inclined to invest in the future, such as in preserving 
natural resources, learning new skills, and in providing education 
to their children, etc.  This will have a negative impact both on the 
environment and the society. 
 
The decade long armed conflict has created several negative 
impacts on the health and sanitation, on space and services such as 
education and, drinking water for the IDPs staying in Kathmandu 
valley. Most of the negative impacts are seen to lie in the 
governance problems, social and economic inequalities, and 
environmental injustice relating to the IDPs. Therefore, mitigating 
negative environmental impacts in the urban areas and improving 
the health and sanitation of the IDPs require a vigorous addressing 
the underlying causes of environmental degradation rooted here. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the 
Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoists) on the 21st of 
November, 2006 has opened up new avenues, for addressing the 
negative environmental impacts arising from the IDPs in Nepal..   
 
There is also an urgent need to rehabilitate58 the IDPs staying in 
slum areas and congested camps in socially, economically and 
environmentally appropriate places. However, environmental 
dimension in the IDPs mass settlements and camps that lead to 
                                                 
58 Rehabilitation is a full or at least partial restoration of degraded landscape and 
impaired ecosystem services to their stage prior to the arrival of IDPs.   
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crisis is largely ignored so far in terms of the ability of these areas 
to sustain basic ecological and environmental services.   
 
Despite the fact that the IDPs are facing lots of problems in relation 
to their livelihood, the government has not been able to address 
these problems to the extent of fulfilling  the minimum basic needs 
as defined by  the international organizations (UNHCR et. al. 
2006). These problems are related to unhygienic and congested 
living conditions,, inadequacy and lack of basic services, 
unfulfilled basic needs, under un-employment, denial of education 
to their children, psychological trauma their economic problems, 
displacement caused by  landmines implanted during the conflict, 
etc. These are the prevalent problems now that will continue to 
reverberate for many years to come in Nepal. The effect of 
disruption in education, breakdown of livelihood and social 
network, and their poor mechanism to cope with these problems is 
making the displaced population more vulnerable. This presents 
both difficulties, as it can be an opportunity to the IDPs in the host 
community. The dilemma lies in finding out and minimizing the 
difficulties and maximizing gains from the opportunities provided 
by the urban environment. 
 
There are of course, all the negative effects of being a displaced 
person forced to live in   an unknown place and to an urban or peri-
urban area- which again have their own individual drawbacks in 
comparison to the rural area (if we are to argue as such). But the 
urban habitat, which refers to a  combination of tangible and 
intangible elements that  make a given environment suitable for 
human beings to live there 59 , can also be seen to contribute 
positively to gain their  livelihood for the IDPs. Urban habitats can 
be considered to offer a wider range of opportunities such as better 
mobility, availability of expertise, and finding platforms to sharpen 
one's expertise and individual skills for making better livelihoods, 
and to get better education, health facilities and so on to them.  
 
Displaced people may also perceive in this new environment an 
opportunity to broaden their horizons or enlarge on their 
                                                 
59  as defined by NCCR-North South see http://www.north-
south.unibe.ch/content.php/page/id/72 for details 
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perspectives, which in turn may result in positive changes with 
regards to their social norms and values as well as in acquiring a 
new insight to develop their existing human capitals.   Such 
opportunities specifically for the displaced people are also 
provided freely by different organizations (GOs/ NGOs and 
INGOs) working in urban areas.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 Land Reform and Exclusion of Poor 
People 
 
Jagat Basnet 
 
6.1 Land Questions 
 
Firstly, by land reform, it is widely understood to be a process of 
confiscating someone's land and award it to other people in Nepal. 
This kind of understanding is rooted not only in the members of the 
general public, but also among the renowned leaders of all the 
political parties and members of the National Planning 
Commission (NPC). Land reform is an important factor for 
improving the economic status of a country, to establish social 
justice, and alleviate poverty. It is essential to understand that land 
reform is important not only for the landless/tenants and poor 
farmers, it is equally important for the  landlords, industrialists and 
the rich as well, for improving the rural industry, achieving 
economic growth , and for attaining peace in Nepal. 
 
Secondly, when land reform issue is raised to the political leaders, 
by the public the leaders ask back: "where is the land for 
distribution?" and "it is not possible to stretch the land". Most of 
the leaders repeated these very versions during the sit-in- protest 
held in front of, the political parties offices by the tenants and 
landless farmers from 15 - 26 May 2007. Of course, land cannot be 
distributed to all people, much less to be distributed equally to 
everyone. So land reform is meant for those people who toil the 
land; they should have rights over their land.  Those who own the 
land, but do not till it because they are involved in a non-
agricultural occupation should be given only enough as domestic 
estates. 
 
Thirdly, while talking about land reform, it is understood to be a 
problem relating to the squatters and land encroachers and not a 
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problem relating to people who have toiled the land since decades 
and who do not have any alternative occupation outside their land. 
Another thing, popular land reform does not intend to make 
farmers into landlord, it only intends to make them more 
resourceful, with greater social justice and to achieve social 
inclusion by this means. 
 
Fourthly, it is not realized that land reform does not only deal with 
the distribution of land, it also deals with the issues of effective 
land management, land administration and all land reform 
processes interrelated with the agricultural revolution. Land reform 
is the first step in purging social disparities in the society, abolish 
class discrimination, and to alleviate poverty. Thus land reform is 
essential for the establishment of democracy and for assuring the 
rights of all the citizens. 
 
The questions of land reform are directly linked to the political 
economy of Nepal. Still, those who are in power and control of 
state mechanisms are the landlords. The political parties, 
governments and the civil society were not concerned with 
economic transformation or with the land reform because of 
historical reasons of a power nexus. 
 
6.2 The Historical Process of Land Controlling 
 
In the past, the Royal family and the Rana Family had control over 
all the arable land in the state as their personal property; the rulers 
distributed these lands to their relatives and supporters in the form 
of Birta60. Jagir61, Raikar62 and the Trust land. The arable land of 
Nepal was limited to the Royal family, the Rana family, the Royal 
Commission officers, and to some high ranked government 
officers, their relatives and their priests. To give an example, 
Mathvar Singh Thapa had received 111 hectares of land in the hilly 
regions and 24,697 hectares of land in the Terai regions Birta or a 
                                                 
60  Land grant made by the state to individuals, on an inheritable and tax-exempt 
basis was abolished in 1969. 
61  Raikar lands assigned to government employees and a functionary in lieu of their 
emoluments was abolished in 1952. 
62  Lands, traditionally regarded as state-owned on which taxes are collected from 
individual landowners. 
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free gift from King Rajendra. Till 1950, around one third of the 
total land had existed in the form of Birta on which most of the 
elites and people of the non -agricultural sector had control. 
Especially during the time of Bir Shamser and Chandra Shamser, 
huge areas of land were distributed to the bourgeoisie, who 
converted most of the Birta land in their personal names. Many 
members of the Rana family gave away land to their relatives. 
According to a report published recently by the Royal Land Study 
Commission, the royal family possesses more than 50,926-8-1 
ropanis 63  or 2,546.3 hectares of land. In order to keep getting 
support and protect their regime, they gave away arable land to 
people not involved in any agriculture occupation. Thus most land 
came to be owned and controlled by the non-agricultural people. 
The system of landlordism was thus brought about. Even today, 
most of the land and political power is controlled by the few elite 
landlords. 
 
In order to protect their regime and their power, the Shah and the 
Rana family appointed the offices of the Chaudary 64  and the 
Jimdar65 in the Terai, and the Mukhiya66 and Dware67 in the hilly 
regions to collect land tax for them. All these people developed as 
a class of land collectors. They collected more tax than was fixed 
by the government from the poor farmers, got rich and came to 
control most of the arable land. When the tax in kind policy was 
changed into cash payment, they became village money-lenders 
and transferred farmers land in their names. Cultivation by 
encroaching on the forest land by the poor people formerly was 
measured in the name of the Mukhiya or the Jamindar. We can 
give example of Ashigram Village Development Committee in the 
Dadeldhura district for this. The Dalits in this village were living 
near the forest that had suitable arable land .In 1975 the land 
survey committee for land measurement came in this village and 
stayed in the Mukhiya's house. The members of the committee 
                                                 
63  Ropani is a unit of land measurement in the hill districts, 20 ropanis make one 
hectare of land. 
64  A village head appointed by the government to settle disputes in the Terai 
regions. 
65  An individual responsible for land tax collection at the village level in Terai 
region. 
66  A village head appointed by the government to settle disputes in the hill regions. 
67  A village head appointed by the government to settle disputes in the hill regions. 
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converted all the Dalit's land in the name of the Mukhiya. 
Overnight, they turned all the Dalits into tenants. The same 
Mukhiya was also elected as the chairperson of the same VDC, and 
the Dalits were made as his Haliya. Thus the Mukhiya controls the 
poor Dalits. Such examples are found to occur in each and every 
Village Development Committee of Nepal practically. Even, today, 
people who work hard to develop and till the land are being 
controlled by the Jimuwals, the Chaudharys, the Jamindars and the 
Mukhiyas, because the latter group can still influence political 
powers at different levels. 
 
Money lending is also used as a means of indirectly snatching 
away the land from the poor. From the time of the Rana regime, 
Jimbuwals and Mukhiyas started giving loans on high interest rates 
to the poor farmers, and when they were unable to pay back the 
debt they took away their land. Such a practice still prevails in 
many rural areas. Before 1950, land was in the control of the Ranas 
and the Shahas, and after 1950 it has been in the control of the 
village landlords and of the market. The slogan "Jasko Jot Usko 
Pot (Land to the tillers)" raised by the political parties has just 
remained a joke. Due to the existing power relation in land, 
political parties too could not come out of the power of the 
landlords. In the process of recent economic development, the 
state's land policy and program has slowly converted the Janajatis 
and the Dalits into small or landless farmers. So the number of 
absentee landlords has increased. After 1950, due to an increased 
urbanization, land price soared up, so that poor farmers could not 
purchase land, while only the rich people purchased more land. 
Land remains controlled either by the landlords or by the market 
and not by the state these days. Due to an increase in the price of 
land, small farmers and poor people are getting slowly displaced 
from their land. 
 
It is mostly the Dalits and the Janajatis who are being excluded 
from the land. This phenomenon is also linked to power relation 
connecting the royal families. The household staffs of the royal 
family were not dalits. As a result, dalits did not get any land as 
gift from their royal masters. Mahesh Chandra Regmi received no 
gift of land from the royal family because for writing books and 
articles regarding the inequality in Nepal's land system by 
 145 
highlighting the feudalism of Nepal. Because of this, the royal 
family did not have any liking for him anymore. In Nepal, the 
ruling class had influence on the country's economy and politics, as 
they made bonded labour of the landless people. 
 
Historically, the Haliya/Haruwa68 system evolved with the state's 
policy to distribute land to its functionaries and service providers; 
such people used to be the dependents of the royal family, army 
men, priests, and so on. Under this system majority of the people 
lost their land to the royal functionaries and were forced to provide 
free service, (the Jhara) to them. The Dalits and the marginal 
farmers were the ones who provided such services. This gradually 
changed overtime; the landlords needed permanent plough men for 
their fields instead. The Dalits employed as Haliya/Haruwa and 
Charuwa constitute the highest in number. 
 
Dalits both in the terai and the hills are a downtrodden and a 
marginalized lot today. They are denied access to land which is a 
common denominator of marginalization and pauperization in 
Nepal. 
 
The important factor to be highlighted is that Nepal's democracy 
could not be of an inclusive kind. For example, in November 1950, 
the revolutionary government declared an end to the Batiya (share 
cropping) and the Hunda (contract system of grain payment) 
system and distributed all such lands to the real cultivators in 
western Nepal. It must be held as a revolutionary step in the 
agrarian history of Nepal during the Rana period. But 
unfortunately, the democratic government formed after the tri-
partite agreement signed in New Delhi ordered the return of all 
such land to the landlords (Thapa, 2000). This showed how 
democracy could not be inclusive and was not in favour of tenant 
and landless farmers. As a result, those who were the real tillers of 
the land were being excluded from getting rights on their land 
during the time and every democratic government. Before 1951, 
7,00,000 hectares of cultivated land was Birtaland; 9,63,500 
                                                 
68  Literally, Haliya/Haruwa is a male who ploughs his master's field. Such a 
ploughman is called Haliya in the hills and Haruwa in the plain.   
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hectares as Raikar land, 40,000 hectares as Guthi 69  land  and 
1,46,330 hectares as land under Jagir, Rakam 70,  Rajya 71. This 
shows that 50% of the land was under the control of the absentee 
landlords 72   (Bhattarai, 2003). Even the democratic government 
that comes after 1990 brought a landlord-oriented land policy in 
the name of eliminating a dual ownership of land.  With this 
policy, about 4, 50,000 tenant farmers whose daily livelihood 
depended on farming were deprived of their land rights (Badal, 
1995). 
 
The table below shows that the landlords gradually deprived the 
tenant farmers from their tenancy rights and put them back in their 
subsistence status. In the recent years most landlords, even those at 
the middle level, are not involved in farming occupation, but still 
have control and ownership over the land, although they are either 
in business or in the service sectors. 
 
Table 6.1: Percentage of Tenant Farmers and Areas Covered 
by Tenant Land from 1961 to 2001 
 
Description 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Total tenant households 40.4 19.0 9.5 15.9 12.2 
Area under tenancy 25.5 15.9 6.2 8.5 8.7 
Source: Ministry of Land Reform and Management (2006) 
 
The socio-cultural institutions were shaped by the unequal 
distribution of the productive assets, the patron-client relationship 
between landlords and peasants and by the caste structure. As 
ownership of means of production was a fundamental factor to the 
politico-economic power, Nepal's rural economy was characterized 
by massive inequality in the distribution of land. This caused the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few (about 4 percent) big 
landlords. These landlords control not only the rural economy but 
also the political and social life extending from the village to the 
national level (Khadka, 1994). 
                                                 
69  An endownment of land made for religious or philanthropic purposes. 
70  Unpaid endowment of land made for religious or philanthropic purposes. 
71  Same like Rajya. 
72  Those who were not actual tillers, but had ownership of land. 
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6.3 Present Situation 
 
The women of Tilki Tol of Dhangadhi municipality told us that, 
their husbands in Mumbai wash dishes, but get scolded and beaten 
by the Indians. They do not tell much, but feel a grieved that they 
are not recognized as Kamaiyas 73 . In India they are treated as 
nothing better that a bonded labour. Every time, the development 
programme came to their door-step, it came only to benefit the 
Kamaiya and nothing to help the squatters and the landless Dalits. 
The Dalits   had been evicted more than once by the landlords and 
the government from their houses.  So, they too are displaced 
people, who do not have land.  They said they were willing to go 
away, if they were land elsewhere. The government regards them 
as encroachers, but they do not care to know about their plight. The 
Kamaiyas have got at least a shelter, but every time the Dalits were 
evicted, they became houseless and landless people. Those who 
had relations went to stayed with them, but the other have nobody 
to support them. So they settled on public land. Most of this land 
was also seized by landlords with only a limited land (few bighas) 
left to them. But the government wants to evict them even from it. 
 
The above case illustrates that, most of the Dalits are landless or 
nearly landless people. Even those who own some land cannot 
survive on the production of their farm. Often, what they own is an 
inferior quality of land. If they are deprived of land, they still have 
to depend on agricultural activities for their survival, as share 
croppers and as Haliya/Haruwas and Charuwas. 
 
Since the poor people are illiterate they cannot have any alternative 
occupation. Hence they are solely dependent on agriculture, both 
among, the Dalits and the non-dalits. Livelihood diversification 
among the Dalits and marginal farmers is very much limited. Such 
a constrained access to the occupational opportunities compels one 
to rely on the mercy of the landlords. This context weakens the 
labourers' bargaining capacity as well as their access to the open 
                                                 
73  Bonded labour mostly existed in the mid and far western regions of Nepal and 
among the Tharus. Government of Nepal abolished this system in the year 2000 
AD 
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labour market. Consequently, the landlords always get an upper 
hand in negotiations. 
 
The Haliya/Haruwas and the poor, are always in a disadvantage 
position. On top of that, the changing landownership pattern of the 
recent times indicates that the Haliya/Haruwas and the poor 
farmers may have to face even more insecure situations. The 
following table (Table 7.2) shows the changing landholding pattern 
of the cultivated land in the last 20 years. 
 
Table 6.2: Farm Size Distribution of Cultivated Landholdings 
in the Terai from 1981 to 2001. 
 
% of total 
holdings 
% of total area of 
holdings 
Average holding 
size in ha 
Category 
1981 1991 2001 1981 1991 2001 1981 1991 2001
Less than 0.5 ha 45.6 37 45.4 2.8 6.6 10.5 0.09 0.22 0.22
0,1-1 ha 13.0 21.6 22.9 6.5 12.4 17.2 0.74 0.7 0.71
1.0-3 ha 27.6 32.9 26.7 33.1 44.3 46.2 1.77 1.66 1.63
more than 3 ha. 13.8 8.5 5.0 57.6 36.7 26.1 6.15 5.31 4.9 
3-5 ha 8.0 5.7 3.5 20.6 17.3 13.9 3.81 3.76 3.73
Above 5 ha. 5.8 2.8 1.5 37.1 19.4 12.2 9.33 8.4 7.63
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.47 1.23 0.94
Source: Central Bureau of statistics, National Agriculture Sample 
Census, 1981, 1991, 2001; RP Yadav, May 2005. Land Tenure 
Situation in Nepal. 
 
Hence, the size of cultivated landholding has fragmented more 
over the years, which demands less member of agricultural 
labourers, consequently limiting the work opportunities for the 
unskilled agricultural labourers, creating thereby, a situation in 
which there is more supply than demand. The Agricultural 
Perspective Plan too did not bother to spell out any tangible 
recommendation with regard to agricultural labour contracts, 
protecting the rights of the agricultural labourers. 
 
The farmers do not have landownership right on the land they have 
been living since 1950. Seventy families of Banke were share-
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croppers but today they have been made landless. One day 
suddenly 18 hectares of land on which poor farmer had toiled for 
decades previously were ploughed by a tractor of the landlord. 
They were told later that the landowner had given the land to a 
local contractor for vegetable production. Poor farmers always 
worried about feeding and clothing their children but now they had 
to leave their shelter with all doors were closed to that family. A 
victim, Hariman Budhathoki, told us:  "in 1973 we reclaimed the 
forest land and lived in this land, but today we have become 
landless. It is sheer injustice. Please provide us justice ". This 
condition was it is the elite class who always oppressed the poor 
farmers for creating such a condition. Right now, these kinds of 
people control the political parties and the parliament. 
 
According to the land Act of 1964, the Jamindari system has been 
abolished. It is however, still in practice in many parts of the 
country. Due to a lack of commitment from the government and 
political parties, they could not put in action. 
  
Today, the possession of land by individual families has dropped 
from an average 0.96 hectares in 1981 to 0.80 hectares in 2001. 
According to the government records, there are a total of 33,64,100 
farmer families, out of which 83% have single land ownership, and 
16.62% tenants. However, the research carried out by the Asia 
Pacific Region Bureau in 2005 mentions that among the total 
number of farmers 71% work the land of others. It is also 
mentioned that out of this numbers most of them are unregistered 
tenants. 
 
Land and agriculture have played a important role in Nepal's 
social, economic and political life for centuries. Around 90 percent 
of the people in Nepal are engaged in agricultural activities. 
Agriculture contributes around 40 percent of the GDP and provides 
employment to around 80 percent of the people-the highest 
percentage among the countries of South Asia. Of the 23.1 million 
people of Nepal, the mountain and the hill regions host 7.3 percent 
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and 44.3 percent of the population, respectively, while the Terai 
land, which is considered a rice bowl of the country, hosts 48.4 
percent of the population74. The distribution of agricultural land by 
region in the mountains, hills and the Terai is 6.8, 40.4 and 52.9 
percent, respectively75. Crop production, livestock and the forest 
contributes 60, 30 and 10 percent of the total agricultural output, 
respectively. Current laws prescribe a land ceiling of 10 bighas (6.3 
ha) of land for the Terai, 50 ropanis (2.54 ha) for the hills, and 20 
ropanis (1.1 ha) for the Kathmandu valley to a family76. But this is 
not enforced in practice so far. 
 
As a result of the open market and the new financial institutions, 
most of the land has gone under the control of these institutions.  In 
case the loan is not paid, land is auctioned off and the poor become 
landless. The land system today faces some exogenous pressures as 
well. Conversion of land for non-agricultural purposes is 
happening due to expanding urbanization and industrialization. The 
introduction of exotic varieties of crops replacing the indigenous 
ones and reduction of subsidies in the agricultural sector goes 
against the interests of small farmers. 
 
6.4 Power Relation of Land Controlling 
 
During the Rana regime and the Panchayat era, there had been an 
inter-relationship between the landowners and the Mukhiya of the 
village, which is still prevalent today. The local landlord helps the 
landlord at the centre in getting him votes during the time of 
election, while the landlord at the centre offers gifts to the latter, 
such as goat, fruits, vegetables, and so on. The bigger landlord 
helps the local landlords to establish their status in the political 
parties and in the central government. There is also a vested 
relation between the central landlord and the local landlords for 
                                                 
74  See CBS/HMGN, Statisticsl Pocket Book 2002. 
75  National Sample Census of Agriculture 1992. 
76  See Ananda Mohan Bhattarai, "Environmental Management of the Himalayan 
Watershed: An Inquiry into Land Related Policies and Laws of Nepal", 16 NLR 
1&2, 2003, p. 108. 
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dominating over the poor, and arrest farmers who advocate on 
behalf of the land rights to the poor. The local and the central 
landlords can influence on the kind of land improvement policy, 
rules and programmes to adopt and implement, and how the staff is 
to be mobilized? Therefore, till today land policies and programs 
have not been working in favour of the landless people. Due to this 
class relation, the people who till the land and are affiliated with 
agriculture do not have any land of their own, while the non-
agricultural people posses’ large chunks of lands. This is so 
because they are connected with political leaders and people in 
high level offices. The central landlord and the village leader or the 
village landlords have both reaped off the farmers' grains, and the 
same grain is later given as loan to the poor farmers. The Haliya, 
Haruwa/Charuwa and Kamaiya system got created in this way and 
is still in practice in most rural areas. The situation has not altered 
due to the continuing power relation between the local and the 
central landlords. 
 
A study report by the CSRC and ILO in Siraha, Saptari and 
Dhanusha districts indicated that 58 percent of the Haliya/Haruwas 
and the poor work in the landlord's land/house just individually, 
while 42 percent of them work with their families. In the case of 
the Dalits, 37 percent of them work individually whereas 31 
percent of them work with their entire families. Most often, son or 
daughter of a Haliya or Haruwa work as a Charuwa, and the wife 
works as a housemaid. Sometimes, they have to work unpaid or at 
a low wage. One time meal is provided to them. Of the 68 percent 
Dalits, 58 percent live in their own house, and the other 10 percent 
live in the landlord's house. The poorer Janajatis also live in their 
own houses, whereas 23 percent of the non-dalits live in their own 
houses. 2 percent of them live in the landlord's house or farm. 5 
percent of the Muslims live in the landlord's house and 1 percent 
live in their own house. 
 
The structure of landlordism shows how landlords control the poor 
people of Nepal. 
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Figure 6.1: A Structure of the Landlord System of the Terai of 
Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates the organisational form of the 
Haruwa/Charuwa system including some other forms of the tenants 
and landless farmers, in particular, in a production unit at the 
household level. The landlord constantly maintains his relation 
with the state and political organisations at the local or national 
level, to secure power and authority. It is often the case that most 
of the elected representatives are themselves the landlords or the 
close kins of them. At the same time, a landlord also has links with 
the market for buying and selling of his farm products. This also 
tends to favour the market landlords because of their connection 
with the state and political powers. Likewise, they project 
themselves as social persona, or social workers, benevolent to the 
Landlord State/policies 
Market 
Social position 
Munsi (Record keeper) 
Hatway (subordinate of munsi)
Laguwa (monitor of ag. labours) 
Haruwa (plougher) 
Charuwa (person who look 
after cattle) 
Tahalu (Serves food to labour) Jan 
(Paid agriculture labour) 
Mestar (sweeper) 
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poor, regularly performing religious rituals, and giving donation to 
charity organisations, and so forth. 
 
Landholding is not a matter of individual choice but a consequence 
of the power structure characterizing a society. If we analyze the 
pattern of landholding in Nepal, it is apparent that the so called 
upper castes hold the major portion of the land in terms of race, 
gender and wealth – in short, in terms of class. The Dalits, the 
women and the poor farmers have been deprived of the access to 
land and its ownership. The social power structure and state 
mechanisms are responsible for widening the gap between the poor 
and the rich due to an unjust and inequitable distribution of natural 
resources, especially land. For example, there were less than 0.5 
million landless households in 1991, whereas this number has 
reached over 1 million in 2001 (Census 2001). According to a 
CSRC sample survey held in 11 districts, there are about 700,000 
tenants who are tilling the landlord's land, but the government is 
not serious about giving them their land rights. No one by choice 
would like to remain landless or live in a state of poverty, but 
unjust socio-political circumstances oblige them to do so. 
 
6.5 Rational of Reform in Nepal 
 
Land ownership remains the main source of wealth and social 
status, as it is also the source of economic and political power in 
Nepal. However, people who actually toil on the lands are those 
who enjoy the least rights. For example, the Haliya, Gothalas, 
Bhariyas, Kamaiyas, tenants, poor farmers and the landless Dalits 
who work the land are among the poorest in the country. In 
addition, progress in agricultural reforms is slow and proceeding at 
a less than expected rate because of the exclusion of cultivators 
from enjoying their land rights. 
 
Land Rights is also a Human Rights issue, because it is directly 
linked with a person’s right to food, shelter, and citizenship, his 
access to services and to benefit from development. But in the case 
of Nepal, most of the development agencies do not see this issue in 
this perspective. As a result, the situation of human rights is getting 
worse day by day. Most of the human rights champions have been 
looking at the problem only from  the physical violence side, but 
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not from the side of the structural violence; tenants and landless 
farmers are being evicted by the landlords or the state everyday, 
but no one care  to give much thought to  this. People do not take 
this to be a violation of the human right. 
 
The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of the 
Human Rights (article 25) have recognized the fact that having 
access to and control over livelihood resources are the human right 
of individual citizens of a country. Likewise, entitlements to 
livelihood resources as a matter of human right have further been 
emphasized by the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1976 (article 2 and 3) ,and by CEDAW. Since the 
Nepal government is a signatory to both the treaties above, it 
becomes an obligation on the government that it arranges all 
Nepali men and women to have access to and control over 
productive resources, especially to land, water and forest and for 
securing their lives. It is ironic that those who tend and work the 
land should have no control over its use. Tenants are the major 
contributors to agricultural production and the true managers of the 
land. 
 
The current land distribution pattern has led to widen the gap 
between the rich and the poor in the villages and increase class 
tension and unrest day by day. Nepal has still to suffer from 
political insurgency, because of not addressing the land rights 
issue. The same tillers/peasants and victims of the unjust land 
rights have held the guns helping the conflict to fuel. So, in the 
present context, the rationale for having land reforms and granting 
of land rights can be said to be as follows:  
 
Land Rights is a Human Right  
 
All human beings should have access to land and all other natural 
resources. Those who tend and work the land should have control 
over its use. Tenants are the major contributors to agricultural 
production and are the true managers of the land. Thus the 
tillers/tenants should be able to put claim to their land as part of a 
human right. 
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a. Land Rights is a Key Empowerment process for the Tenants 
and Landless Farmers:  
Ownership of land brings both social and economic power to the 
tillers/tenants and the landless farmers. The level of poor farmers' 
political participation depends on his owning the land. Only 
farmers with independent land rights can lend their forceful voices 
in any public decision making process. 
 
b. Land Right Ensures a Sustained Source of Secured 
Livelihood:  
Land is the primary and sustained livelihood source in the rural 
context of Nepal. Rural farmers' land and ownership rights and 
their control over the use of land can strengthen the base for an 
overall rural population's livelihood system. 
c. Land Right and Gender-Sensitive Land Reform Enhances 
Productivity:  
Even after an end to the system of landlordism, the breach of 
occupancy ceiling has hindered land productivity. A gender- 
sensitive land reform can keep all these problems in check. 
d. National Development and Agricultural Productivity: 
 Without a pro-poor land reform policy, agricultural production 
cannot be increased. Without an increased agricultural production, 
the agriculture sector cannot make significant contributions in 
augmenting the national income. Since not much attention has been 
paid to the promulgation of a pro-poor land reform, the 
contribution of the agricultural sector has been going down every 
year. 
e. Social Inclusion:  
Those who have no access to land and are deprived of their land 
rights are also robbed of their entitlement to a share in the benefits 
of development, such as , getting  loans from the banks, access to 
telephone, electricity, drinking water, and to benefits from growing 
different cash crops, like vegetables, pig raising, poultry farming, 
etc. 
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6.6 Role of Different Institutions and Organizations in 
Securing Land Rights 
 
Without making a collective effort land reform is not possible to 
achieve in Nepal. There is an important role to play by all 
stakeholders of Nepal in it. The major stakeholders of land reform 
in Nepal are the land less poor people, political parties, the state 
and the civil society. For an effective and viable land reform to 
materialize, the role of the stakeholders in it can be as follows: 
 
a. Deprived People: 
• Context analysis and identification of land rights issue. 
• Set up their own organization and formulate the action-
oriented plans for their mobilization. 
• Debate, discuss and prepare the position to take on land 
rights issues. 
• Develop leadership capacity to facilitate the land rights 
movement. 
• Pressurize the government to formulate a pro-poor land 
reform policy. 
• Formulate a draft of land reform policy, discuss it in public 
forums and submit it to the government and political 
parties for effecting necessary legislation. 
 
b. Civil Society Organizations: 
• Internalize the land rights issue as a prerequisite for a 
comprehensive development of Nepal. 
• Make the land reform and issues of social justice and 
poverty alleviation and lobby the politicians and the 
political parties to support it . 
• Organize and facilitate mass meetings in every village and 
district, and at the national level, to formulate a pro-poor 
land reform policy. 
• Produce committed local activists and create human 
resources to campaign for the land rights movement across 
the country. 
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• Carry out researches and formulate pro-poor land policies. 
Provide important feedback regarding it to government and 
political parties. 
• Ask them to include land reform issues in their respective 
programs. 
 
c. Political Parties 
• Make it a major agenda in the party manifestoes by 
identifying land reform as a pressing issue. 
• Make the land reform issue an integral part of social 
justice, livelihood security and rural development. 
• Organize the tillers and discuss the land rights issues and 
position with them. 
• Organize debates and discussions from the local to the 
national level on the subject of land rights. 
• Exert pressure to formulate a pro-poor land reform policy 
and for its speedy implementation on the state. 
• Pressurize the government to implement policies on behalf 
of the tillers. 
 
d. Government   
• Make the land reform issue an integral part of social 
justice, livelihood security and rural development. 
• Formulate a pro-poor land reform policy and programme, 
and implement it on behalf of the tenants and landless 
farmers. 
• Bring all the stakeholders involved in the process of land 
reform and get their support to put it in action. 
• Cement a partnership between the civil society and land 
less people and poor farmers for the implementation of 
land rights policy and programme. 
 
6.7 Next Road 
 
The present government and the Interim parliament should take the 
following action to ensure sustainable peace and livelihood 
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security .Inclusion of relevant sectors in political and state 
mechanisms is vital for it. Otherwise, there is no certainty of 
participation and inclusion of the deprived people in it. 
 
a. The Interim Parliament should announce a program of land 
reform to benefit the landless, poor farmers, and direct the 
government to work on this.  
b. The participation of the poor, the land-less, the Dalit, the 
agricultural labourers, the communities having insecure 
livelihoods and other deprived people of their rights in the 
process of Constitutional Assembly should be ensured. 
There should be a clear constitutional clause stating that 
those who are not dependent on land will not be allowed to 
keep land in the new constitution written in the process. 
Moreover, in view of international experiences, this right 
should be made to a legal right, so that the state can 
procure land for the purpose of its stated objectives. 
c. A high level land reform commission or academy should 
to be set up participated in by the  rights activists and 
specialists who themselves have no land of their own , to 
do homework on the kind of land reform to have in the 
country and the way to go about it. Its structure should be 
local in nature. And the management should be such that it 
is accessible to local people. 
d. The local bodies should be given rights to implement land 
reforms and land management in the proposed 
restructuring of the state. There should be a provision that 
would allow the elected representatives to carry out the 
land reform in one's region in accordance with the new law 
and within a national framework. 
 
Based on the past experiences in other countries, the next strategy 
to follow in this regard should be as follows: 
 
1. Provide land to the people deprived of land, as per the 
agricultural census, 2001, and purge the Land Act 2021 
that primarily favored the landlords’ until now. A new 
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Land Act has to be formulated with radical changes in land 
reform. 
2. Various ministries have formed different councils, 
commissions and institutions in the area of their 
jurisdiction, such as the Janajati Commission, the Human 
Rights Commission, the Women's Commission, the Dalits 
Commission etc. But, there is no Land Reform Council or 
Commission in a country where 65% of the people are 
dependent on agriculture. Under the natural resource 
management, the issues concerning land have been 
combined with the work of the agricultural and the 
cooperative committee, so that the importance of the land 
issue gets undermined along with the committee that looks 
after it . Land reform should be done keeping social 
justice, livelihood security, and economic development of 
poor farmers in mind. For this, Nepal government should 
first form a high level commission to carry out the task of a 
sincere land reform in Nepal. Such a land reform should 
have two objectives; the first is to utilize the passive 
capital and labour living in the land and agriculture sector 
for the industrialization and commercialization of the rural 
areas. Secondly, land should be distributed with the aims 
of dispensing social justice, providing livelihood security, 
and securing human rights to tenants and landless farmers 
and to make the country economically prosperous.  
3. Land ownership for those people who are not involved in 
the agriculture sector must be abolished. Land title should 
belong to the people who till the land, and to those who 
will use the products and income from land in the 
agricultural sector. Income from agriculture should not be 
allowed to go in the non-agricultural sector, which means 
that income from land should not go to support the non 
agricultural people or family. Right now, the farmers till 
the land, but non- farming land owners enjoy its products. 
Land reform means more than just a land distribution; it 
should improve a farmer’s livelihood and his social 
security, and lead to economic development and social 
justice in the country. 
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4. There should be a declaration by the parliament that no 
eviction of tenants and landless farmers shall be allowed. 
Farmers should be assured of their tenancy rights, and a 
programme of redistribution of land to those who till it 
should be launched soon. 
5. Land reform is essential for increasing people’s purchasing 
power. There should be a maximum and minimum land 
ceiling to prevent concentration and fragmentation of land. 
There should be a plan for the distribution of land under a 
revolutionary land reform. All farmers should be linked to 
an agriculture cooperative. The present practice of 
regarding land as an ancestral property should be 
eradicated. In Japan, it is cheaper to buy land than to claim 
it as an ancestral property. 
6. The major part of the budget of the country should be 
spent on the land reform, and this sector should draw up 
periodic plans. When Somalia introduced a 
commercialized or revolutionary type of land reform, 
Somalia had to face famine within one decade. All the 
traditional cattle-based agriculture got destroyed and soon 
famine hit the country. Taking lessons from it, Nepal 
should first take all the necessary measures to protect 
farmers while taking steps for a radical land reform. 
7. The arable land in a district should be brought under its 
control, and not under the central government. There 
should be a constitutional provision not to grant any 
compensation for absentee landlords but only to small and 
middle level farmers; landlords with immense amount of 
land should be deprived of such compensation. 
8. If land is distributed among the non-agricultural people, 
class or occupation it will defeat the purpose of land 
reform again. Land production will be decreased. Land 
reform should be seen through the eyes of social justice 
and livelihood security for the poor, and not just through 
the eyes of productivity.  The government and political 
leaders have tried to evade a revolutionary land reform, 
and talk instead of a scientific land reform. The class 
oppressors do not want to listen to a people's model of land 
reform. The issue is not a scientific or a modern or a 
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revolutionary land reform, it is simply providing land 
ownership rights to those farmers who actually till the land 
and give them social security as well as social justice in 
full. 
9. Justifiably, rehabilitate all land-deprived Dalits, Kamaiyas, 
Haliyas and Haruwas by providing them with fertile land 
and with the management of one family-one employment 
for everyone. 
10. Design a land ownership certificate with a PIN number on 
one family, one property basis across the country for the 
husband and wife jointly to ensure gender equity. 
11. Make legal provisions, ensuring establishment of 
communal rights of the resident lessees, who have been 
taking care of the community land (Charan, Khuriya, etc.) 
12. Provisions should be made so that a foreign international 
company is not able to own any land in Nepal and 
13. The poor always seem to be in a predicament from 
disagreement over land. A land court should be established 
to settle land disputes and land related cases without 
prejudice. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Access to Land Resource:  
Dalits and their Livelihood Insecurity 
 
Purna B. Nepali 
 
7.1 Background 
 
Land is a broad indicator of socioeconomic status in an agrarian 
society like Nepal (The World Bank, 2006). It constitutes a 
fundamental productive asset (Ellis, 2000), the principal source of 
livelihood and power, a means of pride, dignity, prestige and a 
symbol of prosperity (CBS, 2002; CSRC, 2001; ICIMOD, 2000; 
Regmi, 1999; Upreti, 2004). Endowed with these characteristics 
being, and also a fundamental economic asset, it can reduce 
vulnerability and build resilience against poverty. Land is not only 
a productive agricultural asset, it may be of potential advantage in 
a local labor market (e.g. through increased bargaining power), and 
in international labor market (e.g. as a collateral to obtain loan for 
migration). Land ownership may serve as productive and 
entrepreneurial activities (both observed and unobserved) (The 
World Bank, 2006). 
 
In Nepal, political and economic power was consolidated by the 
upper castes, interlinking it with the Hindu caste system. The 
priestly Brahmans were at the top of ritual order, with the 
Kshatriya (kings and warriors) just beneath them and in control of 
the political order; next came the Vaishya (merchants), and the 
Sudra (peasants and laborers) came at the bottom. Beneath them all 
were the occupational groups, considered as "impure", and 
untouchables, and today as Dalits 77 . In the Hills, in-migrating 
                                                 
77  The term ‘Dalit’, is understood to refer to the untouchable or Achhoot or the term 
connotes in the sense understood by the Old Legal Code of 1854, “Pani nachalne 
chhoi chhito halnu parne jat” (caste from whom water is not accepted and 
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Hindus of Caucasoid stock made up the castes of priests and 
warriors. The middle rank was made up of indigenous groups-the 
Janjatis-generally of the Mongloid racial stock. Officially 
abolished in 1963, caste based discrimination, although diluted, 
remains in practice even today. The Dalits are not only at the very 
bottom of Nepali caste hierarchy, they are also economically poor. 
Their per capita income and HDI of Dalit is at 39.6 $ (against the 
national average of 210$) and 0.239 (against the national average 
of 0.325) (NESAC, 1998).  Caste-based discriminations of over 
200 forms are in practice against Dalits, and this discrimination is 
more entrenched in the country's less developed areas, especially in 
the Mid- and Far-Western regions (DFID, 2005). 
 
7.2 Distribution of Land 
 
The land distribution in Nepal is skewed and inequitable. The 
UNDP Human Development Report 2004 (HDR, 2005) reveals 
that the bottom 47 % of landowning households own 15% of total 
agricultural land, with an average size of less than 0.5 hectare (ha), 
while the top 5% owns more than 37% of land. The report of 
WINROCK International (2005), quoting CBS data, traces 
historical changes in landholding as follows: The number of 
                                                                                                    
whose touch requires sprinkling of holy water) (Dahal et.al. 2002). The concept 
of Dalit, in general, is used to identify the vulnerable and poor groups who are put 
in the lowest rung of the status hierarchy (caste system). In most writings, the 
term is also used to identify a group of people who are “oppressed”, “suppressed” 
and “exploited”. Some tend to indicate the association of the term “Dalit” to the 
Nepali/Hindu word Daldal, meaning swamp. Those favouring these meanings see 
the Dalit as those people who are living in swamps, coming out of which is 
difficult and tedious, if not impossible. The swamp in question is a metaphor for 
the socio-cultural milieus in which Dalits are trapped throughout history 
(Bhattachan, 2005). Further, Upreti (2004) mentioned that the caste structure is 
based on Hindu Varna System which divides people into four categories 
according to their occupational activities viz., Brahmin (learned people, priest), 
Chhetri (warriors), Vaishya (trader and agriculturist), and Sudras (engaged in 
menial services). Originally, it merely meant the type of work one does but 
gradually it became hereditary. This hereditary transformation of Varna distorted 
into present complex and rigid caste system in Nepal. Although the 
untouchability and discrimination on the basis of caste was formally abolished or 
outlawed by the 1963 New National Code, Constitution of Nepal 1991, and 
Parliamentary Declaration of 2006 in the form of untouchability freed nation, it 
prevails widely in Nepalese society even now.  
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agricultural land holding in Nepal in 1961 was only 1.54 million 
households as compared to 3.364 million in Nepal i.e. a 118.5 % 
increase over the period of 40 years. Similarly the total area of 
landholdings in 1961 was 1.685 million ha compared to 2.654 
million ha. in 2001 i.e. 57.5% increase in a span of 40 years. 
Between 1991 and 2001, the number of landholdings increased by 
23 %, while the total area of landholdings increased only by 2.1%. 
In 1961, individual landholding above 3.0 ha per household 
concentrated in 8% of households who owned 53% of total 
cultivated land; in 2001 this number fell to only 2.9 % of the 
households owning land above 3.0 ha, thus accounting for 17.3% 
of the total cultivated land, which is almost one third of the total 
area under this category, as compared to 1961. 
 
The aforesaid macro data alone does not explain the state of 
landlessness in disaggregated forms in terms of class and caste. 
These statistics vary greatly depending in their sources. One-fourth 
of the total households (1,037,785 households out of 4253,220 
households) own none or less than 0.1 ha of land (CBS, 2002). 
They are considered to be agriculturally landless people. The 
UNDP Human Development Report 2004 states that there are 24.5 
% landless people and 7% semi-landless people (owing less than 
0.2 acres). Adhikari (2006) states that there are 287 thousand farm 
families who are practically landless or have less than 0.1 ha land. 
There are 2.5 million farm families whose land ownership is less 
than 1 ha. This data shows that one third of the population in Nepal 
is landless. According to Badal Commission Report, there were 
50000 people who were totally landless in the early 1990s. 
According to CSRC (2001), there are 1.02 million landless 
families. In addition, there are 0.45 million Haliya (cultivators) 
families.  
 
Among the landless and the semi landless, Dalits constitute 13.08 
% of the total population while the indigenous nationalities 
constitute about 37 % of total population. A significant proportion 
of terai Dalits such as the Chamar, Batar, Mushhar, Dushadh, and 
Dom are also landless people. Similarly, Hill Dalits such as the 
Kami, Damai, Sarki, Gaine, and the Badi are also landless people 
(Dahal, 2002), but the hill Dalits castes are also called marginal 
cultivators due to their smaller landholdings (Adhikari, 2006). 
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Bhattachan (et.al. 2003) has noted that the Dalits in the Terai are 
synonymous of landlessness. Even if the terai Dalits do own some 
land either their land is infertile or is just what is occupied by the 
huts they live in. Dahal (2002) has noted that proportion of Dalits 
having no land or some marginal land (< 0.25 ha) to the non-dalits 
is considerably higher. The same report reveals that the average 
landowning per household among the Dalits is 0.12 ha of khet 
(irrigated land) and 0.225 ha of Pakho (dry upland). They found 
that untouchables (Dalits) have the lowest ratio of land holding 
(3%) as compared to other groups like the Tagadhari and the 
Matawali. The extent of land shortage is the highest among the 
untouchables (64%), compared to the Taghadhari and the Matwali. 
 
Haliya system is a kind of semi-bonded laborer that is common in 
Nepal. The people under the Haliya systems, who are living 
miserable lives, belong to Dalit community. It is unofficially 
reported that the population of Haliya are around 300000 in Nepal, 
of whom 60000 are living in Mid- and Far-Western regions alone. 
Semi-bonded, caste-based exploitations and unfair wages are the 
common problems faced by the Haliyas (CSRC, 2004). There are 
0.45 million Haliya (cultivators) families in Nepal. About 9 
Haliyas in 10 have no citizenship certificate. 
 
Similar to the Haliya, the other most deprived groups are ex-
Kamaiya who mostly belongs to the Tharu community. Even 
though the state has abolished the ex-Kamaiya (a kind of bonded 
labourer system), the problem is far from being over. The Ex-
Kamaiyas mainly lives concentrating in five districts of the western 
terai, such as Dang, Kailali, Bardiya, Banke, and Kanchanpur. The 
problem of ex-Kamaiya is still not resolved. The government 
policy is limited to distributing 0.15 ha to each ex-Kamaiya family 
which produces food barely enough to last for 1-2 months for a 
family with 8-9 persons. Consequently, their dependency for 
survival on the landlords remains essentially unchanged.  
 
In addition, the other types of farm and household laborers include 
permanent farm workers, daily workers, periodic and semi attached 
laborers (like the Haliya, Charuwas, Gothalas, and the Kamlaris 
(young girls working as domestic help that is common among the 
Terai Tharus). From a gender perspective, men enjoy greater 
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power in terms of land ownership rights with 92% of land owned 
by the male population (UNDP HDR, 2005). Women have less 
than 10 % ownership rights on land, though they constitute more 
than 51 % of Nepal’s total population. 
According to the 2001 Census, most Dalits households (76%) own 
farm land, including rented-in land. More than 70 % of Dalits and 
non-Newar/Thakali Janajatis in the Hills reported owning some 
farmland. However, in the Tarai, only 68 % of Janajati and 63 % of 
the Dalits households own agricultural land. Moreover, nearly 79 
%of the Musahar do not own any land, and 41 %of the Muslims 
are landless. Terai Dalitss have the highest proportion (28%) of 
households that are solely dependent on rented-in land for doing 
agriculture. The Hills have very few landless households, but the 
size and quality of the land varies significantly between the caste 
and the ethnic groups. Food self-sufficiency is much lower among 
the Dalits and the Janajati groups than among the Brahmans, the 
Chhetris and the Newars (The World Bank, 2005).  
 
7.3 Why Dalits are Landless? 
 
The data above reveals that the Dalits are landless, and their 
problem is acute.  The reasons behind the landlessness of the Dalits 
are two fold: Historically, the Drabid people were defeated in war 
by the Aryan people, their skill and knowledge exploited and who 
were forced to migrate to different parts of the country and survive 
by selling their skill and knowledge to the community and nation. 
The vanquished Dalits were treated as untouchables by their Aryan 
conquerors. Now, Dalits are found living scattered everywhere. 
They have been trapped into bonded service providers to serve the 
big landowners and to live by their traditional caste based 
occupation by them. Such technology resulted in economic growth 
and capitalist development in other countries, but the Dalits’ 
traditional caste based occupation still does depend on the use of 
traditional techniques for giving them their subsistence and 
livelihood. Lacks of modernization in caste based technology of 
the Dalits and a failure to orient into the market is responsible for 
their continuing backwardness. The traditional products of Dalits 
are unable to compete with the product of the multinational 
companies, and, hence, they can provide them little more than 
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subsidiary sources of livelihoods. Dalits became dependent on land 
for their livelihoods as suppliers of agricultural tools, but with no 
land of their own (Roka, 2007)  Historical distribution of land 
vividly reveals that thousands of hectares of land were granted to 
military chiefs, royal family members, royal priests, and to other 
influential persons under Birta land-grant system. In Nepal, land 
has always been used as a powerful means to influence the politics. 
But the Dalits have failed to qualify under such elite category 
(Sharma, 2004). 
 
7.4 Livelihoods of Dalits 
 
This section describes first the livelihood strategies and outcome; 
and secondly livelihood institutions and policies for the Dalits. 
 
7.4.1 Livelihood Strategies and Livelihood Outcome 
 
The livelihood of Dalits is miserable due to their landlessness. 
Landlessness describes a person who is dependant on agriculture, 
but has got no land in his/her name or in the name of any other of 
his family member. Self-sufficiency in food is much lower among 
the Dalits than among the Brahmans, the Chhetris and the Newars 
(The World Bank, 2005). According to a survey report (TEAM 
Consult 1998), about 50% of the households surveyed had food 
deficiency. Dahal et.al.(2002), quoting Sharma et.al. (2002), has 
also noted that 21% of Dalit households produce food grains 
lasting less than 3 months, 19.6% lasting from 4-6 months, 15.4% 
lasting for 1 year, and  only 5.1% produced surplus food grains. 
Food deficiency by geographic region among the Dalits shows that 
the highest proportion of Dalits which suffers from food deficiency 
(46.6%) lives in Terai, followed by Hill Dalits (43.3%) whereas the 
Dalits living in the mountain have food deficiency (10.3%) in the 
least. Annual income of the Dalits compared to the Matwali and 
other so-called higher caste groups is one of the lowest. Likewise, 
the expenditure incurred on items such as, clothing, education and 
medicines is also found to be the lowest among Dalit groups. More 
than 54% of their populations’ practices agriculture, followed by 
service (15.7%), non-farm wage earning (14.2%), and farm wage 
earning (6.1%), and others. The main economic activity for the 
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majority of Dalits is as wage laborers. In addition to this, caste-
based traditional work such as iron smithy, leatherworks; tailoring 
etc are also important economic activities pursued by the Dalits for 
their survival. Even today many Dalits groups living in the rural 
areas of Nepal sticking to their traditional ‘Bali’ and ‘Khan’ system 
with their clients for sheer survival. 
 
Excluding the land, the other major source of livelihood for the 
Dalits is from sale of their traditional caste- based wares. 
Historically, Dalits have been practicing their traditional caste 
occupation and selling their products to their clients to make a 
living. In case of the Kami78 group, they make new agricultural 
tools and household utensils of iron, such as sickles, knives, axes, 
hoes, spades, shares (plough tips) and nails. A gold smith or Sunar 
makes gold or silver ornaments on demand from their high caste 
clients’ clients. Parkis are the basket weavers who make a variety 
of storage baskets and floor mats from bamboos.  The Chunara 
black smiths group of the Far-western Nepal make utensil of 
woods. Damai79 men and women work as tailors and make dresses 
for their clients and get paid in cash and kinds. The Sarkis80 are 
leather workers who make shoes and other products from the skin 
of the dead cattle. Badis make nice earthen pipes for smoking 
purposes. At same time, Badis are singer and dancers traditionally. 
Badi girls and women are said to practice prostitution to make their 
living. The Gaines play on their traditional instrument, Sarangi and 
sings song to their tune. Chamar are the leather workers of the 
Terai. They make shoes and dispose off the dead animals from the 
houses of their clients. The Tantis are weavers and the Doms and 
Halkhors are sweepers, who clean public streets and toilets in the 
government and individual households. Dhobis are washer men by 
                                                 
78  The term Kami was increasingly viewed as a negative term so people in this caste 
group started referring to themselves as Bishwakarma, which has some in 
contemporary parlance to be understood as referring to the historically known as 
Kami. 
79  The Damai group is also called Pariyar. Historically, its exact origins are 
unknown; it is likely that the term came from the South Indian surname Periyar. 
80   Historically, when calling to people within caste groups with respect, the term 
Mijar was used. This term then came to replace the term Sarki itself and now is 
used in contemporary parlance to refer to the group of people who had 
historically known as Sarki. 
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profession and work for cash only. Chamar women also work as 
Sudenis or midwives. Though caste-based occupation is gradually 
changing now, this is still a major source of livelihood for the 
Dalits even today. As Dalits have little land of their own and are 
among the least educated people to train them in the modernization 
of their skill is the single most important alternative for them to 
strengthen their economy in the coming days. 
 
According to Sharma et at (1994), cited in Dahal et al (2002), one 
of the main economic activities of majority of Dalits is wage 
laborers. The groups more involved in this activity are: Damai, 
Sarki, Gaine, Hudke, and Badi. Battachan et al (2002) also 
identified the main activity of the Dalits for survival is non-
agricultural activities (51%), mostly wage laborer. Dependency on 
wage labourer has a direct correlation with the land holding 
position; the landless and those holding less than 5 ropani of land 
have no better option than to work on daily wage labour and 
agriculture side by side, because only one would not be sufficient 
for survival. So, Dalits have adopted multiple resource tapping 
strategies for their survival these days. 
 
In addition to farm and household work, there are other sources of 
economy such as service, business, wage labor, remittances, etc 
open to people in Nepal. According to TEAM Consult Report 
(1998), cited in Dahal et al (2002), the mean income from service 
is found lowest among untouchables. The highest mean annual 
income group is made up of the Tagadhari (Rs. 33,130), followed 
by the Matawalis (Rs. 30,300) and the Untouchables (25,910). On 
the other hand, income from labour was found to be the highest 
among the Dalits, (72.4%), followed by Matawali (42%) and the 
Tagadhari (24.8%). In the Nepali society, the wage labor is done 
only by those who cannot make a living otherwise. 
 
7.4.2 Livelihood Institutions and Policies 
 
Services from the Dalits in their traditional skills are utilized in an 
ongoing patron-client relationship. Receiving the services of the 
Dalits craftsmen are mostly the so called high caste Hindu groups. 
The ethnic groups, and some Dalits as well. This system is known 
in different parts of Nepal by different names, such as Bali Ghare 
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Pratha in eastern Nepal or the Khalo-Pratha in western Nepal and 
the Khan system in the Terai. The services of the Dalits are paid 
mostly in kind (grains) and only sometimes in cash, depending 
upon the amount of landholding and the number of the family 
members in the client family. In addition, each craftsman also gets 
his traditional share of food, vegetable, cloth, etc on social and 
festive occasions such as marriage and other rituals in the client’s 
house. The client-craftsman relationship can be a temporary or a 
permanent one. Normally, this kind of client-craftsman relationship 
has to be renewed every year. 
 
Haliyas are bonded agricultural laborers attached to their landlords 
both from customs and because of outstanding debts that have not 
been repaid, many a time going back generations. The haliyas are 
usually made of castes like the Kami, the Sarki, and the Damai. 
They work for their landlords to be able to pay off either loan they 
took and may be somebody from their ancestors took, and no 
matter how hard they work their landlords will find one or other 
reasons to keep the haliya bonded. During the off season in 
agricultural calendar, the haliyas, who are not needed in the fields, 
migrate to other parts of country, some times even to another 
country in search of other works. However, they have to return 
when landlords want them to return. However, they have to report 
to their landlords once the agricultural season starts or whenever 
their landlords want them to return. The life of haliya is totally 
controlled by his landlords and has to work as per whip of 
landlords. Though haliyas are usually landless, yet some have land 
of their own which is often mortgaged. This is usually true of the 
hill haliyas than their Terai counterparts.  
 
Haliyas have worked as bonded agricultural labourers for the last 
hundred years and more.  They continue to do this work even today 
in order to pay off their loan. Haliyas from Darchula have served 
the longest (105 years) of the bonded state, and are still engaged as 
agricultural labourers going back four generations or more. 
However, even after putting up hundreds of years of service, their 
debts remain still outstanding. In Darchula, each household has to 
pay, on an average, 11 thousands rupees. 
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Owing to these social and economic facts, the haliyas today are 
among the most impoverished communities in the Far Western 
Development Region of Nepal with a low literacy rate, poor health 
status, and sanitary conditions, and a low no social dignity. 
 
Skewed and inequitable distribution of land has resulted in the 
formation of the various agrarian classes, enjoying different forms 
of power and agrarian social relations described by the patron-
client, super-sub ordinate, a relationship of antagonism, mutualism, 
domination, exploitation, and discrimination (Thapa, 2000).This 
mechanism is regulated or maintained through the use of  
economic, social, and coercive power (Thompson et.al.1994). 
These agrarian relations are further distorted by the existing caste 
system. For example, the Haliya people are facing an additional 
caste-based discrimination from untouchability. The peasant 
community, especially from the excluded and disadvantaged 
groups, is facing greater hardship to eke out their subsistence. 
Contrary to this, land elites or landlords are getting richer at the 
cost of the landless labor. Upreti (2004) also notes the dominant 
form of power relation in rural Nepal is still the patron-client or 
superior-subordinate relationship, illustrating it with a case of the 
Guthi81 land. For example, Koirala families of the privileged class 
have since several decades maintained a land-based patron-client 
relationship taking advantage of the various regulations, laws and 
threats to use power. The tenant farmers and poor people were 
made socially and economically to depend on them. Indeed, 
owner-tenant relationships in this case are characterized by two 
opposite tendencies: cleavage (confrontation over Guthi land 
ownership resulting in hostility, suspicions, and a deep-seated 
political division between the two groups) as well as 
interdependence placing them in a complementary role of each 
other. Further, peasants and poor people are still being exploited by 
feudal landlords and power brokers. 
 
                                                 
81  Guthi is a form of institutional land ownership of religious and charitable nature 
which has compounded the problems of land tenure and taxations. The state or 
Birta owners of the lands established religious and charitable institutions, such as 
temples, monasteries, school, hospital, orphanages, and house for the poor 
(Regmi, 1999a). 
 
 173 
Owing to the facts and figures cited above, the situation for Dalits 
is miserable and vulnerable. I agree with the conclusions of Cox 
(1994), cited in Dahal et al (2002) 47 p: 
 
"….. untouchables are caught in a vicious circle of economic 
cycle. They are unable to receive an education that would 
qualify them for a well paying professional position. This 
means that most of them end up working in their traditional 
caste occupation and/or as unskilled laborers, usually for a 
limited income. Consequently, they are unable to support their 
own children with adequate education and the whole cycle 
repeats itself." 
 
7.5 Loss of Livelihood- Livelihood Conflict 
 
Ohlsson (2000) has used and defined the term livelihood conflict to 
describe a loss of livelihood due to scarcities of arable land and 
land irrigation water. Poverty results from a loss of livelihood, 
which in turn, is often caused or exacerbated by environmental 
degradation. Though, empirically, it has been difficult to 
demonstrate the link of poverty to environment factors, in and by 
themselves, thus is strong reasons for conflict. It has been argued 
that loss of livelihood often constitutes a missing link in explaining 
the current conflict pattern, and that an exposition of it will bring 
out the correlationship between poverty and environment. 
 
The same report has also noted that while poverty may be near 
endemic in certain societies, the loss of livelihood makes a rapid 
transition from a previous stable condition of relative welfare into a 
condition of poverty or destitution. It is a rapid process of change, 
resulting in a sudden fall into poverty, which is more than endemic 
condition of poverty, this creates a potential for livelihood conflict. 
 
The common feature of livelihood conflict is that the rank and file 
of the armed militias around the world are recruited from the 
cohorts of young men who have seen a rapid devaluation of their 
expectation as a result of the loss of their family livelihood, and 
from being forced to accept a much more lowly situation in society 
than they were entitled to as dignified men (Ohlsson, 2000). Young 
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women became harder victims from the loss of their livelihoods. It 
is reflected at the rate of school drop outs and in their taking up 
subsistence agriculture again. The loss of livelihood in subsistence 
agriculture mainly undermines the social security of women, their 
dependent and ageing family members. 
 
Land scarcities denote the social effects emerging from the 
combined impacts of i) environmental degradation, shrinking of 
the imagined environmental ‘resource pie’, which is the arable land 
or an aquifer; ii) an unequal resource access that allows powerful 
segments of population to an indulge in the process of ‘ resource 
capture’, resulting in an ecological marginalization and loss of 
livelihoods for a large, but weaker sections of the population. The 
end result of this vicious circle has increased social inequalities, a 
rapid increase in the numbers of the economically marginalized 
people, passing a direct threat to their livelihoods. The conflict 
mechanisms set in motion by this process lead to relative 
deprivation and the strengthening of bonds along ethnic, linguistic, 
national or regional lines in almost all societies which do not come 
into full steam until their livelihoods are directly threatened in a 
dramatic process of change (Ibid). 
 
The case of Ruwanda proves the validity of livelihood conflicts 
approach in two ways: It constitutes the first full-blown genocide 
after the Holocaust, and Ruwanda was experiencing among other 
hardships a widespread poverty and loss of livelihood among its 
people, as a result of environmental scarcity. Environment 
scarcities became acute in the 1980s as an effect of soil 
degradation, and continuing high population pressures and 
inequitable land distribution. The resulting scarcity of arable land 
led to a high rate unemployment, leading to dissatisfaction among 
the poor peasantry, mostly in the southern region. The 
socioeconomic crisis converged with power rivalries for the 
opportunities among internal opposition groups, threatening 
legitimacy of the regimes. In a series of linked events, the author 
notes how environmental scarcities had not only influenced the 
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strategies and tactics of the political and military actors, but also 
amplified the political violence (Ibid). 
 
According to Rizal (2006), a key factor triggering peasant war in 
the 20th century was subsistence desperation, the perception of 
revolutionaries that they had nothing more to lose and nowhere 
else to go. For example in China, Mexico and Vietnam, subsistence 
crisis and struggle for land by peasant cultivators followed years of 
deprivation, marginalization and abuse of dominant political 
interests. Bourguignon and Morrison estimate that inequality in 
land distribution accounts 17% of income inequality. The case of 
South Asia reflects very well that throughout the long period of 
agricultural modernization, and development has corresponded to a 
process of income concentration. Recent research by Denninger 
and Squire based on a sample from 108 countries led to the 
conclusion that ‘an unequal income distribution is a strong 
determinant of future growth. On the contrary, unequal distribution 
of property assets, in this case land distribution, tends to reduce 
long-range growth and generate violence’. 
 
Most of youths belonging to the Dalits, Indigenous people, the 
Madheshis and people from other remote areas have joined in the 
current Maoist insurgency. It is a fact that various kinds of 
socioeconomic inequalities, discrimination and exclusion are fertile 
breeding grounds for a growing insurgency and violence in Nepal. 
Though there is no empirical evidence to suggest relationship of 
livelihood conflict to loss of livelihoods in the existing violence, 
livelihood conflicts associated with discrimination and economic 
vulnerability of people might be one of the major causes to explain 
the ongoing insurgency and political violence. The youths joining 
in the insurgency might have been motivated by a desire to revolt 
against the social structure and inter-personal relationship, and by 
their economic deprivation.  
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7.6 National and International Provisions Against Bonded 
Laborers 
 
This section describes the following national and international 
instruments that the state has to follow in relation to agricultural 
and non-agricultural laborers. 
• In July 2002, bonded labor was banned by the government 
of Nepal with the provisions that anyone violating the ban 
will be jailed up to 10 years. However, even despite this, 
the study shows that Haliyas are still working for their as 
bonded laborers for their landlords. 
• Nepal has failed to meet its international commitments. 
Having ratified the Slavery Conventions (1926) and 
Supplementary Conventions on the abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to 
Slavery (1956), Nepal has done very little to live up for the 
spirits of these conventions. The fact that Haliyas are still 
bonded by debt to their landlords proves the failures of the 
government to act effectively. 
• Although, the Labour Act, 1992, essentially addresses the 
question of labor in the organized sectors but it is silent on 
the caste-based discrimination practised in the work places. 
People from the marginalized or the 'untouchables' castes, 
especially from the rural areas, are highly discriminated 
against and excluded from local decision making 
processes. These castes are prohibited to change their 
customary occupations and their customary, traditional 
roles. Even though the State has taken initiatives in the 
New Civil Code of 1963, the Constitution of 1990, and the 
Interim Constitution of 2007, and to remove all Caste 
based discriminations and to declare Nepal as an 
Untouchability Freed Nation in the recent Parliaments' 
Declaration 2006, caste discrimination is still in practice in 
different forms and is far from being effectively 
implemented. 
• The Labor Act, 1992, has made provisions of minimal 
wage and conditions of work in the industrial sectors. But, 
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it does not include the agricultural sector, except in the 
case of some government land. 
• A Recent in 2064, Supreme Court Verdict (Paramadesh) 
states that it is illegal to keep a Haliya in Nepal. There is 
also a provision of punishment, if anyone is found to keep 
such bonded laborers as a Haliya. 
 
7.7 Provisions from Human Right Perspectives 
 
Livelihood is one of the integral components of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948.  Under this international 
instrument, all people have the fundamental rights to dignified 
livelihood and labour protections. The human rights of all persons 
to get livelihood includes the following universal, indivisible, 
interconnected and interdependent human rights. 
- The human right to work and receive wages that contribute 
to adequate standards of living. 
- The human right to a standard of living adequate for the 
well-being, health and life of a person. 
- The human right to freedom of association. 
- The human right to protection from forced labor. 
- The human right to adequate, safe working environment. 
- The human right to reasonable limitation of working hours, 
rest and leisure. 
- The human right to freedom from discrimination based on 
race, sex or status, in all aspects of work, including hiring 
and promotions. 
 
The aforesaid provisions of human rights are still denied to the 
Dalits in Nepal, and are being violated everywhere. 
 
Right to food as a human right is enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - an 
 178 
international law signed by 150 States. In 2004, Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) issued Guidelines by providing 
the Right to Food in it.   Right to food is seen as being linked to 
food production, and to overcoming its scarcity. Such an emphasis, 
however, can be held correct so far as it links production of food 
by the poor to meet their own needs. Marginalized people without 
sufficient access to land, pastures or fishing grounds lack access to 
food, because they cannot produce enough on their marginal 
resource base. The Right to Adequate Food is, therefore, not only a 
question of the availability of food. Deprived people like the Dalits 
are devoid of the means of food producing resources especially 
land, in the context of Nepal’s agrarian society. In fact, right to 
food is a matter of entitlement to land, rather than its production 
and availability. 
 
On the one hand, the Comprehensive Peace Accord 2006, in 7.5.2, 
states that “Both parties are committed to respect and guarantee the 
people’s right to food security. It also ascertains that the issues like 
food, food production, and utilization of food, its transportation 
and distribution shall not be interfered with”. This statement 
focuses only enhancement of availability of food, and this is not 
reality of out context. On the other hand, the same peace accord, in 
3.6, and 3.7, the provisions were “End all forms of feudalism and 
prepare and implement a minimum common programme of socio-
economic transformation on mutual understanding”, and “End 
feudal land ownership and formulate the policies for scientific land 
reforms”. These both statements reflect real Nepalese scenario 
which are responsible for enhancing food insecurity due to 
inequitable distribution of land, a major productive or economic 
resource. 
 
7.8 Policy Analyses 
 
Social inclusion is well reflected in the tenth five-year plan as one 
of the four pillars of Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy. However, 
attaining the goal of social inclusion will require fundamental 
shifts to have not only in the structure of governance and the 
existing access to economic opportunities, but also means a change 
in the underlying hierarchical norms, values and behaviors 
governing social interaction of the people. Old social hierarchies 
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that continue to block access to political influence and economic 
opportunities to weaker sections of the population can not be 
expected to realize the goals of the Tenth Plan. 
 
To ensure equitable development, one should analyze the nature of 
relationship between the people and the institutions, or examine the 
"rules of the games" that shape the opportunity structure for the 
deprived people in their social, political, and economic world. 
Empowerment and social inclusion of the excluded people are a 
means to bring a shift in these relationships, and develop the 
institutions necessary to ensures greater equity. There are three 
domains of change whereby the State, the civic society and the 
donor organizations can intervene on behalf of the poor and 
excluded people to give them their due rights. 
- access to livelihood assets and services; 
- ability to exercise voice, influence and gain agency; and 
- a more equitable opportunity structure with the " rules of 
games" that allow all citizens to participate on the same 
terms in the state and in the larger society as well as to 
have their access to livelihood opportunities and political 
power. 
 
"Access to assets and services" and" voice, influence and agency" 
are parts of the empowerment processes. The other domain of 
change- the "rules of the games",- is where social inclusion does, 
or does not, take place. Empowerment and social inclusion play 
complementary roles in promoting equity of agency and 
sustainable prosperity for all. Currently enacted Interim 
Constitution by the Parliament and the coalition of the eight 
parties, including Maoists also recognizes some socioeconomic 
rights to the disadvantaged community. Those provisions include 
prohibiting untouchability, right to employment and social 
security, social justice, women's rights and labor rights. These are 
acknowledged as fundamental rights. The constitution has also 
paved the way for a constitutional guarantee to these rights which 
are closely related to the Dalits' inclusion. 
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Importantly, this constitution states that an inclusive, democratic 
and a progressive restructuring of the State will be carried out by 
eliminating its present centralized and unitary structure in order to 
address the problems relating to women, Dalits, indigenous people, 
Madhesi, oppressed and minority communities, and other 
disadvantaged groups better by abolishing discrimination based on 
caste, class, language, sex, culture, religion and regional. This 
provision has also been included in the directive principle of the 
Interim Constitution to form and separate commission has been 
formed to look after it. 
 
There is a provision which clearly mentions the promotion of 
interests for the marginalized communities, the peasants and labor 
class living below the poverty line, including the economically and 
socially backward indigenous tribes, the Madhesis and the Dalits 
through reservation of quota in education, health, housing, food 
sovereignty, and employment for them. 
 
At last but not least, there is a provision for the effective 
implementation of a scientific land reform. However, crucial 
questions still arise: What does the land reform mean (how to 
conceptualize it)? How will it be implemented? Who will be 
benefited by it? etc. Most people from the high class (land lords 
and socioeconomic elites) are employed in government, parliament 
and other institutions of State governance still in large numbers.. 
All provisions of the constitutions can get interpreted and 
manipulated by these elites in favour of themselves, rather than on 
behalf of the disadvantaged community.  
 
7.9 Conclusions 
 
Historical distribution of land does not reflect a spirit of social 
justice. Only a few people owned or had controlled over land in the 
name of Birta, Jagir and other such land entitlements. On the basis 
of this principal asset, member of the upper castes became richer 
and achieved a higher socioeconomic progress in the fields of 
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education, health and politics. It also enabled them to reach key 
positions and status in the government. Thus, while looking at the 
national statistics, Dalit representation is very nominal in every 
sphere. 
 
In an agrarian society like Nepal, there is no off-farm opportunity 
to make better income. Also, there is no social security policy for 
the Dalits so that they constantly face hunger and food insecurity. 
The Dalits' livelihood is miserable and is vulnerable. Various kinds 
of informal institutions, such as the Balighare, Khalo, and Khan 
Pratha existed in the traditional agrarian system of Nepal. These 
were discriminatory and exploitive in form. This unjust situation is 
further compounded by the Hindu caste system of untouchability. 
Hence, Dalits today are marginalized people in each sphere of life, 
and their human rights are being continuously violated. This trend 
is more acute in case of the Madhesi Dalits of the Terai. Being a 
landless people, Dalits are forced into bonded labour and used as 
hands in the form of Haliyas.  In such a context, one question 
arises: How can three lakh Dalit Haliyas vote freely in the forth 
coming Constituent Assembly elections? 
 
Therefore, the state has to take some bold steps in enunciating a 
future scientific land reform program in order to bring about 
equitable seriocomic changes. Such programme will have to 
address the following points. They are as follows: i) Land reform 
programme should go beyond a mere distribution of land. It should 
also simultaneously also launch a sound agricultural system; ii) 
Hierarchical social structure and relationship based on caste, 
gender and class that is responsible for the marginalization and 
deprivation of the Dalits should be abolished; iii) There should be 
abolition of all intermediaries (informal agrarian classes 
responsible for resource and service capturing); iii)All exploitative 
and discriminatory practices like the Haliya, the Bali, the  Khali, 
and the Khan system should be abolished; iv) The socioeconomic 
security of the tillers should be ensured (not like the ex-Kamaiya); 
v) Social justice to the haves and the  haves not should be ensured 
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through tenancy reform; and, finally,  vi) A provision should be 
made for the  social security of the Dalits and all the excluded 
people. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Pluralism, Diversity and National 
Integration 
 
Kailash N. Pyakuryal 
 
8.1 Pluralism and Diversity 
 
Pluralism is a condition in which numerous distinct ethnic, racial, 
religious, or cultural groups exist in a society. It is generally 
believed that such a condition is desirable or to have, socially 
beneficial. This doctrine stipulates that reality is composed of 
many ultimate substances. Thus it is also a belief that no single 
explanatory system or it view of a reality exists. Pluralism assumes 
that disparate functional or cultural groups in a society that include 
autonomous religious groups, ethnic minorities and professional 
groups that are beneficial to the society. The concept of pluralism 
reflects social reality determined by languages, religions, ethnic 
affiliations and cultural traditions and implies control over their 
institutions by members of the constituent groups (Bentley 1971). 
Arguments in support of pluralism have continued since the time 
Romantics have reacted to the propounders of Enlightenment. 
Where Enlightenment thinkers tended to regard the world as 
governed by universal laws, Romantic critics insisted that human 
understanding of the world differs across cultures, and that these 
differences make life more meaningful (White 2005).  
 
The concept of cultural diversity also implies a societal condition 
comprising diverse ethnic, racial, and religious- groups with their 
distinctive heritage, values, languages and life- styles. The concept 
of diversity does not connote any clear- cut perspective and vision 
with regard to maintaining equality, equal rights and separate 
identity among diverse groups in a society. On the other hand, the 
concept of pluralism implies not only recognition of a condition of 
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cultural diversity but also a concrete vision and perspective of 
promoting and maintaining the separate identities of the constituent 
groups on the basis of equality and equal rights. 
 
Van Den Berge's definition (1973: 961) of pluralism that seems to 
be more applicable to Nepal's pluralism refers to "a property, or a 
set of properties, of societies, wherein several distinct social and/or 
cultural groups coexist within the boundaries of a single polity and 
share a common economic system that makes them interdependent, 
yet maintain a greater or lesser degree of autonomy and a set of 
discrete institutional structures in other spheres of social life". 
 
In democratic politics, pluralism is a guiding principle which 
permits a peaceful coexistence of different interests, convictions 
and lifestyles. Unlike totalitarianism or particularism, pluralism 
acknowledges the diversity of interests and considers it imperative 
that members of a society accommodate their differences by 
engaging in good-faith negotiations. However, some scholars have 
argued that the theory is too simplistic (Connolly 1969). In reality, 
corporatism comes to the picture. Corporatism is the idea that a 
few select interest groups are actually involved in the policy 
formulation process, with the exclusion of a myriad other interest 
groups. 
 
Pluralism is connected with the hope that this process of conflict 
and dialogue will lead to a definition and subsequent realization of 
common goods that is best for all members of a society. This 
implies that in a pluralistic framework, the common good is not 
given a priori. Instead, the scope and content of the common good 
will only be found out in and after the process of negotiation (a 
posteriori). What this means is that beliefs of any particular group 
cannot represent absolute truth. This implies that, as a general rule, 
the state operating in a truly pluralistic framework of a pluralistic 
society, must not be biased: it may not take sides with any one 
group, give undue privileges to one group and discriminate against 
the other. 
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If we look at Nepal's governance practices and how it fares with 
the above framework of pluralism and diversity, it is certainly very 
poor and unsatisfactory. Nepal is a mosaic of different cultures. 
There are 103 caste/ethnic groups in Nepal (CBS 2002). Different 
communities are settled in different parts of present day Nepal with 
their own languages, religions and cultures. They lived mainly in 
small chiefdoms and principalities that were conquered by Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, the Hindu king of Gorkha, and their territories were 
merged into the present day Nepal. Over the centuries, the State 
adopted a policy of assimilation and amalgamation and through the 
process of Sankritization and Hinduization features of pluralism 
and inherent diversities was completely ignored. Pradhan (2002) 
divides the period 1768 (the year Prithvi Narayan Shah began to 
annex  other Principalities) to present day into three epochs: a) 
hierarchy, diversity and Hindu polity (1768-1950), a period for 
exercising political control over the expanded territory and 
introducing a single hierarchical Hindu order; b) equality, 
homogeneity and Parbatiya culture (1961-1990), a period of 
assimilation into the dominant Hindu culture with the aim to 
achieve a common language and homogenous culture and; c) 
equality, pluralism and cultural dominance (1990-2001), a period 
of Nepal being constitutionally recognized as a pluralistic society. 
82 However, even after the introduction of multiparty parliamentary 
democratic system, Nepal continued as a state where political 
organization of territory was limited to select groups and classes of 
people. The fruits of democracy and development did not percolate 
to the majority of the people. Among the SAARC countries Nepal 
had the lowest HDI value (0.289) in 1975 and Sri Lanka led with 
an HDI value of 0.616. After 25 years Nepal is still at the bottom 
next to Bangladesh (Gurung 2006).   
                                                 
82  For detail, see Pradhan, Rajendra B. Ethnicity, caste and a pluralist society in 
Dixit, Kanak M. and Shastri, R. (ed.), 2002. State of Nepal, Kathmandu: Himal 
Books. 
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Neupane (2000) presents a dismal picture of representation in 
governance by various castes and ethnic groups (see table below). 
Table 8.1: Representation in Governance, 1999 
Institution 
H
ill
 
H
ig
h 
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te
 
N
ew
ar
 
M
ad
he
si
 
H
ill
 E
th
ni
c 
D
al
it 
To
ta
l 
1.Constitutional Body 14 6 3 2 - 25 
2. Council of 
Ministers 20 3 5 4 - 32 
3. Judiciary 181 32 18 4 - 235 
4. Legislature 158 20 46 36 4 265 
5.Civil Administration 190 43 9 3 - 245 
6.Political Party 
Leaders 97 18 26 25 - 166 
7.DDC Chair/Mayor 106 30 31 23 - 190 
8. Civil Society 
Leaders 41 8 4 1 - 54 
Total 808 160 142 98 4 1,212 
A. Row % 66.6 13.2 11.7 8.1 0.3 100.0 
B. As % of Total 
Population 31.6 5.6 30.9 22.2 8.7 100.0 
A-B +35 +7.6 -19.2 -14.1 -8.4 - 
Source: Gurung 2006, p. 17 (adapted from Neupane 2000, p.82). 
Reports indicate that Hill and Terai Bahun/Chhetri have the highest 
per capita income (Rs. 24,399) and Terai Dalits the lowest (Rs. 
10,887). In between are the Janajati (Rs. 15,630) (NLSS 2004).  
 
There are differences in human development among the ethnic 
groups and caste groups. Newars fare best followed by the 
Brahmins and Chhetris. The human development index (HDI) of 
these three groups is higher than the national average and dalits are 
at the lowest rank (Table 2). 
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Table 8. 2: Human Development by Caste/Ethnicity 
Human 
Development 
Indicators N
ep
al
 
B
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s 
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ill
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M
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D
al
its
 
Life 
expectancy 55.0 60.8 56.3 62.2 53 58.4 50.3 
Adult Literacy 
(%) 36.72 58.00 42.00 54.80 35.20 27.50 23.80 
Mean Years of 
Schooling, 
1996 
2.254 4.647 2.786 54.80 2.021 1.700 1.228 
Per Capita 
Income (NRs) 
1996 
7,673 9,921 7,744 11,954 6,607 6,911 4,940 
Per Capita PPP 
(US$), 1996 1,186 1,533 1,197 1,848 1,021 1,068 768 
Life 
Expectancy 
index 
0.500 0.597 0.522 0.620 0.467 0.557 0.422 
Educational 
Attainment 
Index 
0.295 0.490 0.342 0.462 0.280 0.221 0.186 
Income Index 0.179 0.237 0.181 0.289 0.152 0.160 0.110 
HDI 0.325 0.441 0.348 0.457 0.299 0.313 0.239 
Ratio to 
National HDI 100 
135.8
7 
107.3
1 140.73 92.21 96.28 73.62 
Source:Pradhan R., and Ava Shrestha, 2005 (p. 22). 
 
The Peoples' Movement –II (April 2006) abolished the direct rule 
of the king, reinstated the parliament and included the Nepal 
Communist Party (Maoists) in the interim parliament. An interim 
Constitution has been promulgated which has declared Nepal as a 
secular country. Movements are underway for a Federal Republic. 
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The struggle to win recognition for collective rights (and cultural 
identity) of various peoples, ethnic groups, regions, communities 
and classes has been the main thrust of the growing social 
movement and it has made a considerable headway. Ever more 
complex demands are put forward as possible alternatives, and 
cultures and diverse groups are increasingly organized as social 
actors who are taking their place more and more on national and 
international scene. However, no indication of progress and 
development is yet visible. Issues of pluralism and diversity have 
come to the front. Questions of identity and right to self-
determination are contemporary agenda in Nepal. 
 
Indigenous people (adibasi janajati) are clamouring for restitution 
of land where they had allegedly settled before the process of 
dispossession and subjugation. They also demand unlimited control 
over underground and surface water resources, animal and forest 
species, and places traditionally held to be sacred. Consistent with 
this claim, they oppose any form of development that is attempted 
without their participation and consent. Political autonomy and 
right to self- determination are their important demands. Similarly, 
the Madhesi movement is underway which aims at achieving 
autonomy and right of self- determination. No wonder that these 
groups have raised their voices against the state. The state never 
treated its citizens equally. The political systems have changed but 
not the social structure or the mind -set of the ruling elites. As a 
result, the country has produced unequal citizens. Lynne Bennett 
(2006) very rightly concludes in one of her recently edited book 
"Unequal Citizens" that after centuries of subjugation, and 
perceiving as the subjects of the ruler, Nepalese are beginning to 
see themselves as citizens and this change in their self-perception 
is important to achieve social inclusion and empowerment. 
 
Transformation must aim at univocally accepting diversity, failing 
which this becomes a factor leading to conflict. The overriding 
imperative is to recognise plurality as a social characteristics 
accepted by governments, institutions and actors themselves, so as 
to promote growth. It is therefore a matter of building 'pluriethnic' 
and 'pluricultural' (Iturralde, 1995) societies (and States) based on 
recognition, respect and promotion of a multiethnic and 
multicultural reality of Nepali society. 
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8.2 Ethnicity, Inter-ethnic Relations and National 
Integration 
 
There is no common agreement in defining ethnic group or 
ethnicity. However, there are some features that are more 
commonly mentioned while describing these terms. The most 
common attributes to describe an ethnic group are: a) common 
ancestral history, b) same culture, c) religion, d) race and language. 
An Ethnic group has a discrete (either one or the other) character, 
whereas ethnicity is a variable (degree or level, viz., high, 
moderate, low). 
Ethnicity is defined as a varying degree of reciprocal, common 
identification (or 'peoplehood') marked by a) symbols of shared 
heritage, including language, religion and customs; b) an 
awareness of similar historical experience; and c) a sense of in-
group loyalty or 'we feeling' associated with a shared social 
position, similar values and interests, and often, but inevitably, 
identification with a specific national origin (Pyakuryal 1982; 
Bhattachan and Pyakuryal 1996). 
 
A cursory review of the following theories related to inter-group 
relations may be useful in explaining inter-group relations in 
Nepali society. 
 
Assimilation:  
The theory of assimilation contends that a cultural consensus will 
be obtained through the absorption of minority groups into 
majority groups. The Social Darwinist doctrine relied upon the 
assertion that the dominant group's culture is superior. Much 
research has demonstrated that assimilation processes do occur in 
many societies. Yet, the assumption that minority cultures 
ultimately disappear has not been empirically validated. The 
dominant Hindu ruling group defined all rules of the game for 
mainstreaming all minority cultures. 
 
Amalgamation:  
The theory of amalgamation or the "melting pot" provides a 
slightly different though basically social Darwinist set of 
predictions. Rather than contending that the majority culture is 
superior, it points out that all cultures have good parts; all the good 
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elements of various cultures merge together and a social 
amalgamation results. Yet a few contemporary theorists would 
argue that amalgamation is a central process in a modern, socially 
pluralistic nation state. Although the Constitution of Nepal 
recognizes equal rights of all ethnic groups, in practice the state has 
always invariably promoted a Hindu value system. 
 
Bicultural Model: 
The assimilationist model of inter-group relations evaluates a 
minority group culture in terms of the dominant class culture. Thus 
the assimilationist model has resulted in a derogatory conception of 
the minority culture as cultureless, pathological, lower class, 
disorganized, and reactive. This is a normative approach. Thus 
conceptualizing a minority culture in terms of assimilation or 
acculturation leads to ignoring the bicultural dynamics of the 
minority culture. 
 
The bicultural model makes it possible to see groups as participants 
in the culture of the larger dominating society. The minority group 
experience in many respects merges with that of the" national" 
society, while in many significant respects the minority remains 
quite distinct from the experiences of the dominant group. 
However, who envisions this "larger, national" society is an 
important phenomenon to look at. 
 
Nepal being a multi-ethnic society is a good candidate for all 
manifestations inherent in any multi-ethnic societies of the world. 
In order to understand the intensification of ethnic conflicts we 
have to take into account a series of long term historical processes 
studies by authors like Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), 
Hobsbawm (1990), Mann (1993), Geertz (1963), and others. These 
studies indicate that state centralization and homogenization 
policies and state growth in general generated grievances among 
peripheral ethnic groups whose cultures and political institutions 
were threatened. Nepal's history too resembles that of others and 
thus becomes a good candidate for ethnic conflicts. 
 
To sum up, ethnicity can be viewed both as a behavioral variable 
as well as a social structural or contextual variable. Ethnicity when 
viewed as a behavioral variable denotes the degree to which there 
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is a sense of belonging to a particular group, symbols of shared 
heritage, and awareness of similar historical experience. As a 
social structural variable, ethnic groups are characteristic of most 
societies. 
 
Assimilationist theorists have viewed ethnic groups as holdovers of 
pre-modern societies. Ethnicity is thought to be an undesirable 
attitude or structural anomaly and so all minority cultures should 
hasten or be hastened to become assimilated into the main 
dominant culture. 
 
On the other hand, proponents of the bi-cultural model advocate 
the inevitability of ethnicity to some extent in any society and so 
minority cultures should also be given rights and opportunities to 
participate in the process of nation building. 
 
However, from the state point of view there is no official definition 
and recognition of 'minority groups' as such in Nepal. Concepts 
like 'backward' and 'oppressed' and 'downtrodden' are 
interchangeably used in official documents and in the  Constitution 
of Nepal to designate some special disadvantaged groups like 
Dalits, Janajatis (nationalities/ethnic groups/tribes) and indigenous 
peoples. These concepts are used in a politically neutral sense as 
they are conveyed or understood more in terms of 'economic 
backwardness' or 'social backwardness' rather than in the fullest 
sense of historical and present day discriminations against these 
groups. 
 
8.3 National Integration  
 
National integration is a progressive process of identifying 
commonalities with respect to common goods but maintaining and 
promoting the distinct ethnic identity of each group through social 
integration within the framework of current international political 
boundaries (Bhattachan and Pyakuryal, 1996). Achieving full-
fledged national integration requires shared values among all 
ethnic groups (including caste groups) where cultural aspirations of 
each group are reflected. 
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Integration is related to the issue of holding the various elements of 
society together. Two important forms are normative integration, 
which relates to the integration by commonly held values and 
functional integration, which is integration by interdependence in 
the division of labor. Integration also refers to the process by which 
different races (caste/ethnic groups) come to have closer social, 
economic and political relationships. 
 
Nepal is characterized by its multiple caste/ethnic composition, 
different languages and religions. Social groups, from the smallest 
to the largest, persist over time only when their members 
experience societies that bind them to the group and give them 
reason to belong. 
 
The problem of integrating its members with a relatively cohesive 
and functioning interactional system, then, is a basic problem of all 
social groups. 
Undoubtedly, one of the major sources of group integration is the 
socialization of its members resulting in an internalization of the 
values and norms of the group,  belief in its objectives and purpose, 
and willingness to act consistently with the group's expectation of 
behavior. 
 
The normative integration of the group then is simply the 
acceptance by its members of group norms and the degree of their 
compliance. Members of small groups that are also homogeneous 
in membership are more likely to evidence a higher degree of 
group solidarity and greater identification with the group's 
objectives, producing what is called high "morale". But, large 
groups have a greater difficulty in achieving normative integration. 
For one thing, their members are likely to be more heterogeneous. 
 
Also, there will be subgroups that emerge within the large groups, 
some of which will develop norms that are inconsistent with, if not 
contradictory to, the norm of the larger groups. 
The problem of integration of large groups becomes one of 
functional integration through the effective coordination of the 
human effort of its members, as individuals & as subgroups, so that 
their diversified and specialized activities support and supplement 
each other. Functional integration depends on a sharing of 
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normative elements. There has to be some agreement on what is 
worth doing and some relative consensus on what are reasonable 
expectations for the actions of people fulfilling their social roles. 
 
A society can be viewed as a social group that encompasses all 
other social groups that exist among a people. Such a conception of 
society does not signify any given size; societies can be large or 
small. But in the modern world the trend is to move toward large 
national societies that are politically organized and controlled by a 
nation-state, and that monopolize control over a given territory 
customarily inhabited by and identified with the people of that 
society. The Nepali society is such a politically organized society. 
But prior to the growth of the nation, societies were frequently 
smaller entities in which the cultural definition of a people and 
their territory was not organized in a nation. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
 
Nepal is still emerging as a nation state. Consequently, a great deal 
of social conflict often accompanies such nation building. 
 
Empirical evidences show that differences exist between different 
caste and ethnic groups and also between geographical regions. To 
some extent, ethnic categories correspond to the actual division of 
societal resources: the high caste Parbatiyas, along with the high 
caste Newar population, share among themselves the bulk of 
governmental political positions.  Similar inequalities are displayed 
if we take account of the literacy and educational status and 
incidence of poverty. The Dalits and a majority of the ethnic 
groups are at the bottom of the Human Development Index (Nepal 
Human Development Report, 1998). This situation, a legacy of the 
past, has not improved even after the advent of multiparty 
democracy and implementation of pro-poor and disadvantaged 
groups-focused state interventions via the Eighth Plan (1992-
1997), the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), the Tenth Plan (2002-2007) 
and other interventions.83 
 
                                                 
83  For further details see Neupane, 2000  ;Gurung, 2006; Pandey, Mishra, 
Chemjong, Pokhrel and Rawal, 2006 
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Cultural discrimination on the basis of caste, ethnicity, religion, 
language, and regionalism is equally an inherent phenomenon of 
statehood and creation of minorities in Nepal. For the last two-and-
a- half centuries, the ruling elite of Nepal - hill high caste Hindus- 
and their cultural ethos (religion, language, etc.) have been adopted 
by the state and promoted as the Nepali national culture. Ethnic 
groups, the so-called 'low caste' Dalits, Muslims, and other non-
Hindu religious groups have been critical of their continuous 
exclusion and subjugation. They have been demanding equitable 
participation and representation (including cultural) in the national 
mainstream for many decades. Similarly, the Terai people- with 
their subordinated position irrespective of their caste/ethnicity and 
religious background in a state dominated by the hill people and 
hill culture, have been strongly assertive and their movement for 
ending this discrimination is equally significant in Nepal. 
 
Nepal remained isolated from the outside world until early the 
1950's. After the overthrow of the Rana Regime, there was an 
unbalanced representation in all the aspects of nation building. 
Nepal's geo-physical location and psychosocial conditions of 
freedom fighters continuously made the leaders suspicious to each 
other. The fantasy of a particular political system as a panacea of 
all problems remained a strong force in dividing the main political 
forces in Nepal. Any expression of the feelings of deprivation of 
the rewards and privileges by any segment of the population was 
taken as detrimental to national integration and thus it was 
suppressed. The gaps came to the surface and it was possible to 
express more freely and effectively after the people's popular 
movement of 1990 that overthrew the Panchayati Regime. 
 
There is no question that inter- ethnic relations are highly 
unsatisfactory and skewed. But, the necessity of Nepal to remain 
intact is as important today as it was during Nepal's unification. 
 
To address the ethnic issue, it may be wise first to look at the issue 
from four different dimensions: 
a. Political 
b. Socio-economic 
c. Human rights 
d. Academic 
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The issue is political because the movement seeks for greater 
autonomy and power sharing. This is socio-economic as it is 
concerned about the preservation and promotion of cultural 
heritage as well as economic upliftment. It is also human rights 
related because not all groups exercise equitable privileges and 
rewards though constitutionally, equal rights have been guaranteed 
to all Nepalese irrespective of their affiliation to any particular 
ethnic group. The issue is academic because there is a worldwide 
debate on who make the indigenous people: whether it is the 
history of settlement, i.e., who settled first, or experience of a 
similar history of exploitation and subjugation, or violation of 
human rights or the racial origin or the language and the culture or 
the likes? 
 
Nepali scholars, politicians and the human rights activists have 
quite often trespassed their boundaries (disciplinary ethics) that 
have further complicated the understanding of the issues of 
social/national integration. 
 
The key to attaining national integration is respecting and 
recognizing pluralism and diversity and empowering various 
groups of people on equal footings. Nepal is a country where none 
of the ethnic/caste groups is in majority. To bring various groups at 
equal footing is a need of the day while in the near past the 
dominant group has had a resolute posture of 'we shall overcome 
by the vote if possible and violence if necessary'. Social 
transformation calls for a thorough reform in legislation now than 
ever before. The time has come to acknowledge that it is necessary 
to work out, with involvement of all social actors – big or small, 
powerful or powerless, dominant or the dominated- a new body of 
laws consonant with that long–standing cultural and ethnic 
diversity, that latent and much-abused diversity which represents 
the deep roots of real Nepal. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Moving Ahead: From Transition to 
Transformation 
 
Bishnu Raj Upreti 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
Nepal is in the fragile transition from war to peace. The nation 
experienced the armed conflict and insecurity for nearly eleven 
years with casualty of more than thirteen thousand people and 
damage of infrastructures worth billions of rupees. However, after 
reaching the 12-point understanding between the Seven Party 
Alliance (SPA) and Communist Party of Nepal Maoists (CPN-M), 
the people’s movement of April 2006 became successful. The 
April movement paved the path to end the armed conflict. Signing 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the CPN (M) and 
the government of Nepal ultimately brought the CPN (M) into 
mainstream politics. The promulgation of the Interim Constitution, 
formation of Interim Legislative Parliament and Interim 
Government, and invitation to the Untied Nations Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN), and completion of the verification process of the 
'peoples liberation army' (PLA) are some of the fundamental 
building blocks for the lasting peace and transformation of the 
Nepali state.  
 
After the signing of the CPA, Nepal as a feudal, centralised, 
unitary and exclusionary monarchist nation for centuries with 
widespread discriminations based on sex, caste, ethnicity and 
religion is moving towards a federal inclusive republic nation. This 
can be achieved only when citizens of this country engage in 
democratic practices, realise protection of human rights, social 
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justice and harmony; entertain economic development and 
experience political stability.  
 
This chapter briefly discusses the important elements of 
‘management of transition’ and components of ‘transformation’ of 
the old state into a new nation.  
 
9.2 Managing Transition  
 
It is crucially important to smoothly manage transition to achieve 
stability and democracy, and materialise transformation. Managing 
transition requires appropriate dealing with the following important 
and complementary elements:  
• Smooth execution of the power sharing arrangements,  
• Constant monitoring of peace process,  
• Sincere implementation of understandings and agreements,  
• Ensuring transitional Justice and rule of law, 
• Guarantee transitional security,  
• Free and fair conduct of elections, 
• Facilitating, disarming, demobilizing and reintegration 
process, 
• Starting of security sector restructuring, 
• Implementation of reconciliation, rehabilitation, recovery 
and reconstruction, 
• Managing and/or addressing of public expectation and 
frustration, 
• Obtaining international support.     
 
9.2.1 Execution of the Power Sharing Arrangements  
 
Power sharing arrangement is fundamentally important to make 
transition successful. During the transition period, the interim 
arrangements are made between the previously warring parties. 
Hence, coalition culture is crucial in making power sharing 
arrangement functional.  In Nepal, enough provisions of power 
sharing are outlined in the CPA and Interim Constitution. 
Accordingly, SPA, including CPN (M) leaders, are in important 
power structures (e.g., interim government, interim legislature 
parliament, diplomacy, etc.), but the coalition culture is totally 
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lacking. They perceive that the power exercised by them is their 
reward for their past activities, with no responsibility to smoothly 
manage the transition and achieving political stability, democracy 
and peace. The action and behaviour of the actors in the current 
power sharing arrangement are creating enormous operational 
problems and make transition shaky and fragile. Those who are out 
of the power sharing arrangements are being disgruntled and 
gradually organising to oppose the decisions and actions of SPA-
Maoists. It is important to include as many groups of actors as 
possible in the transition process to ensure success, but this aspect 
is missing. The expertise, knowledge, skills and competencies of 
independent, intellectuals, academics, professionals, specialists and 
analysts who are not members of any political parties are not being 
utilised in managing transition and transformation of the state. This 
is an organic group with tremendous capacity for opinion building 
and influence international communities with access to 
information. It is needed that the SPA-Maoists should utilise their 
capacity, skill and knowledge.          
 
9.2.2 Constant Monitoring of Peace Process  
  
It has been observed that more than 40 percent of the provisions in 
the peace agreements collapsed within 4 years of signing them. 
This is mainly because of a lack of proper monitoring and sincerity 
in the implementation of the agreed provisions. Hence, an effective 
monitoring of the peace process is crucially important to make it 
successful and to transform the state from transition to stability, 
peace and democracy. The monitoring mechanism should be an 
independent, powerful and impartial watchdog and make sure that 
the parties signing the agreements follow the provisions of the 
agreement honestly and sincerely. 
 
In the case of Nepal, monitoring of peace process is extremely 
weak. The government and SPA-Maoists did not internalise the 
indispensability of the monitoring mechanisms. In the past, the 
ceasefire monitoring team had resigned mainly because of non-
cooperation from the government. Later the chairperson proposed 
for the monitoring of peace process also refused to take on the 
responsibility because of the bitter experiences of non-cooperation 
by the state and political parties in the past. Making the transition 
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successful requires strong monitoring mechanisms endowed with 
full mandate, resources and authority.    
9.2.3 Sincere Implementation of Understandings and 
Agreements  
 
The success or failure of any peace agreement during transition 
largely depends upon the sincere implementation of the provisions 
outlined in the agreements and understanding. Usually, there is a 
tendency of violating the agreement during the transition and 
blaming the other side for it.  
  
SPA and CPN (M) had signed numerous agreements and 
understanding. Some of them are: a)12-point understanding, b) 8-
point understanding, c) 25- point code of conduct, d) CPA, e) 5-
point letter to UN, f) an Interim Constitution, g)agreement on 
management of arms and armies, h) and a 23-point agreement. 
However, critical examination of the situation of their 
implementation reveals that most of them are either partly 
implemented or not implemented at all. Most of the provisions 
implemented are related to power sharing (getting in power and 
position) and most of the provisions not implemented are related to 
the direct concerns of the Nepalese people.     
  
9.2.4 Ensuring Transitional Justice and Rule of Law 
 
Transitional justice is one of the fundamental elements in securing 
justice to conflict victims. According to the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, “transitional justice refers to a range of 
approaches that society undertakes to reckon with legacies of 
widespread or systematic human rights abuses as they move from a 
period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights”. 
Truth seeking, prosecution, reparation and reconciliation are some 
of the major focus of transitional justice (Upreti, 2007b).  
 
According to the Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity (2004), transitional justice refers to a field of activity 
and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past 
human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social 
trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more 
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democratic, just, or a peaceful future 84 . Therefore, transitional 
justice should be understood in a narrow sense of ‘justice during 
transition’. The notion of transitional justice not only includes the 
concept of legal justice according to the international legal 
principles but also wider areas of reparations programs and truth-
seeking mechanisms, political transformation (in this paper 
transition from conflict to a state of peace and stability). It is a long 
and complicated process. 
 
Transitional justice is a powerful concept to understand the 
dynamics and the process relating to the emergence of a society 
from an armed conflict. While examining the translation of the 
concept of transitional justice into practice in a war-ridden conflict 
like Nepal, it falls into legal, political, moral and operational 
dilemmas and practical complications. In the case of Nepal, it is 
highly contested and resisted. The tension between dealing with the 
past and moving forward to the future is a prevalent phenomenon, 
and ultimately, ‘political compromise and negotiation’ determines 
the course of action in a transitional justice. The bill on Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission prepared and brought forth for 
discussion by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in August 
–September 2007 is an example of this character. 
 
Role of law in realising the rule of law in transition is crucial but 
frequently questioned, once the contribution of legal actors and 
institutions in transition from war to peace is far below the public 
expectations of the people and as it operates on the framework of a 
legal engineering of the society. In the situation of a country like 
Nepal which having itself transited from war to peace, the role of 
law is crucial but severely weak. Nepal’s transitional justice 
depends upon to how far it respects international law, providing 
legal obligations to  prevent human rights abuses, investigating 
past crimes, identifying and punishing human rights abusers, 
imposing sanctions against persons responsible for violence, 
facilitating reparations to victims, accepting international human 
rights and humanitarian provisions to prevent human rights abuses, 
and promoting reconciliation and reintegration. Thus, ensuring 
                                                 
84 See The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2004), vol. 3, pp. 
1045-1047 for detail. 
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transitional justice in Nepal depends upon the readiness of the 
government of Nepal to respect international human rights and 
humanitarian provisions. Hence, the success of the transition 
period depends upon honest and sincere implementation of the rule 
of law and transitional justice.   
 
9.2.5 Guaranteeing Transitional Security  
 
Success or failure of political transition depends upon the 
guaranteeing of security. The vested interest groups benefiting 
from a weak security situation or those, who do not want a 
progressive change and transformation for Nepal, create insecurity, 
weaken transition and pose various other challenges. Massive 
proliferation of small arms in Nepal is one of the numerous 
examples of this intention (Upreti and Nepali, 2006). Hence, 
containing of or controlling these groups becomes absolutely 
essential. The Police and the armed police force alone cannot 
achieve transitional security if political forces and citizens of the 
country do not proactively engage in establishing such a security.  
 
It is urgently needed to fill-up the severe political vacuum that has 
existed at the village level. Starting and strengthening joint 
political activities by all political parties across the country, 
engaging citizens in a political process, adopting integrated and 
non-conventional security approach (going beyond mere reliance 
on security forces for realising transitional security), coordinated 
action and administration with the Indian security forces in the 
border areas and dialogue with the Indian politicians are some of 
the measures to be taken immediately to bring improvement in the 
transitional security.           
 
9.2.6 Free and Fair Conduction of Elections 
 
Election is one of the fundamental components of the successful 
management of a political transition and a foundation stone for the 
stability and democracy of a state. Elections provide a fresh 
mandate for the State’s laws and regulations, and a new legitimacy 
for the transformation of the old state, by institutionalizing the 
achievements made during the time of transition.  However, 
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ensuring a free and fair election and higher participation of the 
eligible voters are its preconditions. The highly expected but 
frequently postponed constituent assembly election has a 
tremendous opportunity to institutionalise the achievements made 
so far and open new avenues for the restructuring of the state .But, 
at the same time; it has severe risks of being a failure and a source 
of ethnic and territorial conflict. Hence, political parties and 
decision makers have to accept certain constitutional principles and 
democratic ideals to minimise such risks and maximise the 
potential of the elected constituent assembly. However, most 
regrettably, political parties have used it very tactically for their 
narrow vested political interests. The constituent assembly election 
is perceived by political leaders as being only a periodic election to 
form the government.      
 
9.2.7 Facilitating Disarming, Demobilizing and 
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
 
Disarming is a process by which it involves handing over of the 
arms used by individual combatants to the authorities responsible 
for the safe storage, redistribution or even to destruction of those 
arms (Gleichmann et al., 2004). Demobilization is an act either of 
disbanding arms unit, or reducing the number of combatants or an 
interim stage that precedes reassembling of the entire armed forces 
(ibid:15). Reintegration is a social and economic process by which 
ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian 
forms of work and income (ibid: 15).  
Regarding the DDR of the Maoists PLA, clause 11.1.3 relating to 
‘Registration of the Maoists Army Combatants at Cantonment 
Sites’ of the agreement states: “Only those Maoists army 
combatants who have been properly registered at cantonment sites 
will be eligible for possible integration into the security forces 
fulfilling the standard norms. Any discharged personnel will be 
ineligible for possible integration. Those who are eligible for 
integration into the security forces will be determined by a special 
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committee as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Accord85. This 
integration process will be determined in subsequent agreement 
with the parties. Upon registration Maoists army combatants, if 
found to be born after 25 May 1988, will be honourably and 
automatically discharged… The Interim Council of Ministers will 
form a special committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate 
the Maoists army combatants”. This section provides the important 
basis for DDR in Nepal.  
In the courses of the verification process UNMIN came up with 
two categories of PLA. The first category signified qualified PLA, 
and the second category disqualified PLA. The disqualified PLA in 
the UNMIN verification process should be reintegrated into the 
society which would require especial knowledge, skills, 
procedures, resources and mechanism. Similarly, the qualified 
PLA, as per the provision of CPA, has to integrate into state 
security forces or adjust in any other appropriate structures. This is 
one of the main tasks to achieve for restoring durable peace in the 
country.   
   
The role of DDR is fundamentally important for sustaining peace 
and providing security to all the communities across the country, as 
inclusion of qualified PLA combatants into national security forces 
(police and the army) and the reintegration of ex-combatants into 
society is crucial. It is therefore not possible to transform the 
machinery of conflict into one that supports a sustainable peace 
and development without having the appropriate DDR. Security 
sector reform (Ball, 2002; Kumar and Sharma, 2005; OECD, 2004; 
Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005) and relationships between citizens 
and security forces are crucial in the promotion of greater security 
sector governance. This is a prerequisite for any successful DDR 
programme (Aditya et al., 2006).  
 
                                                 
85 Section 4.4 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement states, “The interim cabinet 
shall form a special committee to carry out monitoring, integration and rehabilitation of 
the Maoists combatants”. 
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9.2.8 Starting Security Sector Restructuring 
 
Transformation of security sector is not much debated in Nepal. 
The definition of security sector is globally contested and a 
unanimous view of it is difficult to find. OECD defines security 
sector as those state institutions which have a formal mandate to 
ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of 
violence and coercion (OECD, 2004; cited in Kumar and Sharma, 
2005). Security Sector reform is a common concept globally used 
in the post-conflict literatures. SSR is a process of transforming the 
organizations having legitimate authority to use or order the use of 
force, such as the police, the army, the paramilitary, the local 
security units, the intelligence and other legally defined 
arrangements (Greene, 2003). Changing roles, responsibilities and 
actions of security actors inconsistent with democratic norms, 
values and principles of good governance in a changing context are 
some of the basic elements of SSR (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005).  
 
Fundamental principles of SSR relate to civilian control and 
parliamentary oversight of the nation’s security related agencies, 
right sizing and modernization and professionalisation of security 
forces, respect for the rule of law, facilitating transition from war 
to peace, etc (Upreti, 2006; OECD, 2004; DFID, 2002). SSR is a 
concept of total reform in the shortcomings and weaknesses of the 
security sector, of having a new vision and neutrality that demands 
honest commitments and impartiality from both the civilian 
government and the security professionals. Giving appropriate 
trainings (both in terms of military and in human rights, capacity 
building and acquiring technical competence), taking  security 
issues into the mainstream of  development policies and 
programmes, striking a delicate balance between confidentiality 
and transparency, maintaining strong co-ordination and operational 
mechanisms, forging new relationships between the military and 
the civilians, building an enhanced public awareness, strengthening 
the constitutional and legal frameworks, periodic reviews of 
security sector and strengthening of independent oversight 
mechanisms (e.g., public complaint bodies like the human right 
commission, the auditor-general, the legislative and the judicial 
bodies, etc.) are some of the important elements of the SSR 
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(Baldwin, 1997; Ball, 2002, Aditya et al., 2006; DFID, 2002; Ebo, 
2003). 
Transformation of security sector in general and military in 
specific is related not only to security aspects but also to social, 
political, economic, international and developmental 86  issues. 
Security sector reform or any ideas of restructuring or 
transformation has to address policy issues and, legislative and 
international relations; redesign structural and oversight issues 
keeping within standard democratic principles and values (DFID, 
2002). The classical security approach mainly focuses on the legal 
monopoly of the state over the use of the security instruments and 
security forces for safeguarding its citizens and preserving national 
security, specifically arising from external threats. Further, the 
conventional notion of the military force is to prepare for, prevent 
and engage in war (Walt, 1991) in which the army, the 
paramilitary, the police force, the intelligence and the secret 
services are mobilized. This conventional state centric approach of 
security operation is narrow-based and ignores modern notion of 
security that operates in a holistic framework of human rights, 
livelihood security, environmental security, energy security-in 
other words, a broader human security concerned with peoples’ 
rights for a dignified life (Upreti, 2006 and 2004; Baldwin, 1997). 
Hence, democratic governance is a central element of security 
sector restructuring (Kumar and Sharma, 2005; Upreti, 2007a; 
Aditya et al, 2006). This work is seriously lacking in the case of 
Nepal.    
 
Taking suggestions from the concerned committees of the interim 
parliament both the CPA and the Interim Constitution have 
outlined the responsibility to the interim cabinet to prepare and 
implement a detailed action plan for the democratization of the 
Nepali Army. In addition to this, there should be a provision for a 
technical committee composed of PLA leaders, Nepal Army 
officers, and defense experts to assist the parliamentary committee 
and the interim government in this task. This committee has to 
work out all the necessary details and overcome technical 
                                                 
86  The relationship between security sector and development has been extensively 
discussed by the report of the Club of Rome in early 1970s [Brandt Commission 
(1980) and Olaf Palme Commission (1982)].  
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complications in transforming Nepal army and integrating the 
PLA. This committee needs to work until the complete 
transformation of security sector going, beyond the time of the 
interim government.    
The SSR is accomplished with the realization of the following 
steps:  
 
Step 1:  Analyze the security sector  
• Prioritize the core needs and challenges 
• Identify the weaknesses and constraints  
• Explore the opportunities and potentials 
Step 2:  Formulate a new policy, and establish an institutional and 
legislative framework based on the identified 
opportunities and potentials, 
Step 3: Translate the policy, institutional arrangement, and 
legislative framework into action  
 
These steps have to be accomplished keeping within the following 
basic principles: 
• People of Nepal  as the ultimate source of power   
• Accountability, 
• Transparency, 
• Representation,  
• Rule of law and human rights,   
• Social justice and good governance principles, 
• International provisions and standards.    
 
The SSR has to be accomplished in the following phases:  
 
A. Before the constituent assembly election:  
• Sincere commitment at the political level  
• Debate and discussion,   
• Analyzing of security sector, 
• Exploring of opportunities and challenges by the 
‘Technical Committee’.  
 
B. After the constituent assembly election (during the period of 
constitution-making) 
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• Incorporation of fundamental principles for the operation 
of  security sector (discussed in section 4.4 above ) in the 
new constitutional provisions,  
• Providing a conceptual framework for the creation of a 
modern, professional and a democratically operating 
security apparatus.  
 
C. After the new constitution by the elected government is 
promulgated   
• Preparation of a comprehensive security sector 
transformation package, 
• Execution of security sector in accordance with the new 
constitutional provision, by restructuring the following 
organizations: 
o The National Security Council 
o MoD 
o Nepal army,  
o Nepal police  
o Intelligence  
o Other security apparatuses.  
 
9.2.8 Implementation of Plans for the Reconciliation, 
Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Recovery and 
Reconstruction 
 
Reconciliation is a process of developing a shared vision of a 
society that is interdependent and fair in acknowledging and in 
dealing with the past, and in building positive relationships, 
through a significant cultural, attitudinal, social, economic and 
political change87 (Hamber & Kelly, 2004).  
 
Reconciliation is a process that involves searching for justice, 
healing, forgiveness, and finding new bases of cooperation and 
coexistence as well as understanding the needs, fears and 
aspirations of the past antagonists. Whereas reintegration is a 
process in which acceptance of ex-combatants, IDPs and conflict 
                                                 
87 See Brandon Hamber & Gráinne Kelly (2004) entitled ‘Working Definition of 
Reconciliation’ Paper published by Democratic Dialogue, Belfast, September 2004  
for detail. 
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victims within the community becomes possible. Thus 
reconciliation is a process of examining the past and addressing the 
legacy of the past violence and rebuilding the broken relationships 
(Bloomfield et al., 2003). 
 
Reconciliation and reintegration means dealing with the victims, 
including the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and ex-
combatants or former soldiers from both sides. According to the 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, the  General Assembly 
Resolution 40/34, 29-11-1985, ‘victims are persons, who 
individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic losses and 
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or 
omissions that do not yet constitute violation of national criminal 
laws but go against  internationally recognized norms relating to 
human rights’. 
 
Reintegration is a complex psychological (a process involving 
psychological accommodation of people reintegrated from their 
present combatant lifestyle to a normal civilian life), social, 
political and economic process of mainstreaming demobilized 
soldiers or ex-combatants and their families, and other conflict 
victims as active members within their own their communities or 
new communities, and becoming active producers in the civilian 
life (Upreti, 2007a). However, this paper mainly deals with the 
social and political reintegration only.  
 
Social reintegration for the purpose of this paper is defined as 
being a process of acceptance of former soldiers and their 
dependents, IDPs, and their conflict victims by the local 
communities. Political reintegration for the purpose of this paper is 
defined as being a process by which demobilized soldiers and other 
conflict affected individuals and communities participate in the 
structures and processes of political organizations in their 
communities and societies. Economic integration is related to 
providing employment opportunities and marketable skills. It is 
dealt with however, in a separate paper.  
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Archbishop Emeritus of South Africa ,Desmond Tutu ,said, 
‘examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding 
it, and above all transcending it together, is the best way to 
guarantee that it does not and cannot happen again” (foreword in 
Bloomfield et .al., 2003). Reconciliation and reintegration reorient 
people from the adversarial and antagonistic relations in the time of 
conflict to more mutually respected and cooperative relations. 
Essentially, reconciliation helps to develop healing-relations 
between the victim and the offender that is needed for attaining 
durable peace and democracy. Establishing democratic processes 
and structures is fundamental to addressing post-conflict 
challenges. However, democracy cannot travel for if it does not 
build locally. Similarly, democracy cannot function in injustice and 
in a legacy of violence in any post-conflict situation. Therefore, 
reconciliation is an integral part of developing and strengthening 
the broader democratic process. The major concern for the post-
conflict societies is to ensure that the people engaged in violence 
will not resume their violent acts (Upreti, 2006). 
 
Rehabilitation means a process of settling the conflict victims by 
providing them physical and psychological means in a new setting. 
Recovery is a process of bringing conflict victims to a normal 
situation that requires giving social, psychological and financial 
supports. Both the rehabilitation and recovery programmes are 
long-drawn process that requires special attention.  
 
In a strict sense, reconstruction is a process that seeks rehabilitation 
and recovery mainly of physical infrastructures. However, in a 
broader sense, reconstruction also involves social, political, 
spiritual, physical and financial abilities of conflict victims to 
resume accomplish their normal life.  
  
9.2.11 Managing and/or Addressing Public Expectation 
and Frustration 
 
One of the major characteristics of transition is higher expectation 
of people and a situation of turning this soon into deep frustration 
for them. When there is a political change or when civil war ends, 
people who have suffered for a long time wish to get rid of all the 
problems and difficulties they faced in the past. They expect to see 
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their voices heard, their opinions respected and their demands 
fulfilled.  People feel frustrated with the leadership or even with 
the change if the new leaders fail to address their concern or fail to 
constructively engage with them. Once the trust with political 
leadership is eroded, it is extremely difficult for leaders to manage 
the transition. Therefore, it is essential for the political leaders and 
decision-makers to deal with the expectation of the people and 
address their frustration in time. One of the established methods of 
addressing such expectations and people’s frustration is to engage 
with them, discuss the potentials and limitations with them openly, 
and make them part of the decision making process. Nepalese 
politicians never applied this principle in the past and therefore 
they have to face   serious difficulties with the Madheshi people, 
the Janajatis, women, and the minorities.      
 
9.2.12 Obtaining International Support    
 
On one side, international support in terms of financial resources as 
well as moral and symbolic aspects is crucially important to 
successfully manage transition. On the other, it is equally tricky for 
political leaders to act on the political pressures from the 
international forces. Hence, finding a balance between support and 
interference is crucially important. It is not uncommon for the 
international community (particularly the big powers) to directly 
engage in the internal affairs of the countries facing a civil war, 
armed conflict, or such political crisis. But maintaining good 
relations and keeping foreign powers away from for internal 
interference is the task of the political leaders. In the case of Nepal, 
political leaders are found excessively relying upon the external 
political power. When politicians engage in obtaining small 
personal benefits (such as scholarships for their children, 
international visits or receiving other gifts and benefits) from 
international power centers, their credibility in the eyes of the 
people gets reduced.      
 
9.3 Transition to Transformation  
 
New Nepal is possible only when the existing obstructions 
(political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological) are 
dismantled and commitments made with a new vision.  It is 
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virtually impossible to transform the feudalistic, centralised, 
unitary, monarchist and exclusionary country into a modern, equity 
oriented, federal Nepal without transforming the perspective, 
thinking, action and behaviour of people of Nepal (Baechler el. al., 
2008) first. Realising the goals of new Nepal requires bringing 
transformation in the following areas:  
    
9.3.1 Actor Transformation 
 
One of the main conditions for realizing new Nepal is to have 
change in the political leadership. Nepal is facing a shortage of 
visionary and charismatic leaders. There are thousands of potential 
young leaders in this country but they are sidelined and prevented 
from rising by the outdated politicians of authoritarian orientation, 
and behaviour.  New and a more visionary leadership is absolutely 
essential to have in every political party. However, transferring 
authority and responsibility from the old to the young and energetic 
leaders needs time to happen. Change of attitude in the old leaders 
is also equally important and that could come about gradually 
through exerting internal (within the party) and external (from 
society) pressures.  
 Changes are also required in the organisational structures 
procedure and mode of representation of the political parties.  
 
Similar changes are required in bureaucracy. The existing 
bureaucracy is nurtured, trained and oriented to act to control 
people's behaviour, instead of being a facilitator of change and 
serving the people, a tendency to administer them. The change in 
bureaucratic orientation is a precondition; therefore the same 
principle applies to state security forces and the judiciary. The 
Civil society, the business community, party members and citizens 
have also to change their  orientation in thinking and in their 
perspective and behaviour by acknowledge the principles of equity 
and by assuming  accountability and responsibility for  their action. 
Shifting the blame on others and engaging in opportunistic actions 
are the common characteristics of all sections of society in Nepal 
today                                                                                   .                   
 
Altering the existing elite structures from the centre to the outlying 
regions social structures at all levels based on equality is crucially 
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essential to have to realise new Nepal. This can happen only with a 
change in the perspective, mindset, heart, and will of the elites. 
 
9.3.2 Rule Transformation 
 
Changing action and behaviours also requires a change in the rules 
of the game. Most of the existing laws, rules and regulations are 
the controlling arms of the exclusionary state and serving narrow, 
vested interests of the political, economic and bureaucratic elites 
mainly. Therefore, transformation of the constitution, of laws, 
regulations and procedures are preconditions for bringing about 
new Nepal. These changes have to be made through legitimate 
procedures and election is the chief basis for doing that.  
 
9.3.3 Issue Transformation 
 
Nepali society is transforming from a state of civil war to 
achieving durable peace. Hence, all issues and agenda of the war-
time should be changed for strengthening peace and democracy. 
While in transition, country is running from the interim 
arrangements (e.g., interim parliament, interim government, 
interim constitution, etc.) to reach a more durable and stable 
arrangement (e.g., elected parliament, permanent constitution made 
by the people, an elected government, etc.). Only the elected 
people have a mandate to govern and rule the country in 
accordance with the governing principles. The role of the 
government should only be that of facilitators, and not of a 
controller and all nominated posts should be replaced by elected or 
competitively selected members.  
 
9.3.4 Structure Transformation 
 
Transformation is also required in the existing structure of 
relationships and power distribution. The centrally controlled 
power and resource pattern, by excluding the local people and the, 
people form the geographically remote areas, is debilitating. 
Hence, there is a strong need to have a federal governing system 
allowing, state structures that are ensuring people's rights and 
responsibilities. Change in the existing asymmetric power relation 
 218 
and resource distribution through the promotion of localised 
structures is necessary to have for realizing new Nepal.  
 
9.3.5 Context Transformation  
 
Transformation of exclusionary and controlling patterns of 
governance into those of a  participatory and facilitating nature a 
republican system to replace the monarchy , elimination of abusive 
state characters (violation of human rights, impunity, 
criminalisation of politics, institutionalised corruption, favoritism 
and nepotism, etc.) and  to have in their place a more transparent, 
accountable and deliberative state governing system, and to end all 
exclusionary, discriminatory and gender insensitive actions and 
promote inclusive, non-discriminatory and gender-sensitive 
practices, are essential for the realisation of new Nepal.  
 
9.3.5 Value Transformation  
 
Perception, orientation and behaviour of a person are guided by his 
values. Hence, behaviour is influenced by the values of the actors 
involved in conflict. When violence is internalised as a means of 
social change and political transformation, violent action in the 
political process is a more likely outcome. But if the value of the 
political actors is oriented more toward a non-violent means, co-
existence and respect for other people is more likely. Therefore, it 
is extremely important to focus on changing or transforming the 
values of the major actors engaged in political transition.   
 
9.4 Conclusions 
 
While examining the management of the current transition in 
Nepal, some of the fundamental components listed above are 
missing or ignored from the beginning. Multiple political interests, 
opaque dealings and power-hungry action and behaviour on the 
part of the key political actors have shaped the course of the entire 
peace process. One of the main weaknesses to witness is the lack 
of honest implementation of the written or unwritten agreements 
by the political parties.  
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The management of the whole transition process is non-
transparent, elite-centric, and consequently, exclusionary in nature. 
Neither the political parties nor the government seriously worked 
to ensure the above mentioned elements during transition 
management (section 10.2). They failed to sincerely implement the 
agreements and understandings made in the past. The members of 
the High Level Committee (composed of senior-most leaders of the 
SPA) and the government ministers were reluctant to commit to 
abide by the agreements reached in different times and to address 
the issues and concerns raised during the 2006 April popular 
movement and thereafter. They were being more reactive than 
proactive in dealing with the concerns of the people (e.g., if some 
groups exerted pressure through strikes, agitation and use of force, 
they yielded to their demands, but were reluctant to implement 
them later). Political leaders in the decision making positions were 
evading the issues of restructuring the army, to end the state of  
impunity, take action against the proven human rights violators and 
implement the  various components of the transition management 
(section 10.2) and transformation (section 10.3). The political 
leaders and the main political parties are excessively guided by 
their narrow, vested, personal and party interests, rather than 
guided by broader national interests. The repetitive postponement 
of the constituent assembly election is a vivid example of it.  
 
The mind-set of the key political actors and their unwillingness to 
go in for an inclusive state is a major challenge for the successful 
transition management of the unitary top-down exclusionary state 
and its transformation into a federal inclusive and democratic 
nation. The leaders have not yet been able to visualize the need for 
effecting a fundamental transformation in Nepal’s feudal system, 
and for giving equal rights to the people of all sections of the 
society. They saw themselves as the only people responsible to 
manage the nation, and viewed all other people demanding their 
rights (e.g., Madheshis, Janajatis, the minorities, women, the 
disabled groups, etc.) as problem creators. The powerful leaders of 
the major political parties and the GoN acted in the manner of 
being the owners of the state, with an authority to give or not tp 
give power to other people as their sole right.   
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Managing the people’s expectation, bringing the international 
power centers to support the cause of the peace process, and 
holding the constituent assembly elections successful are some of 
the challenges facing Nepal’s transition today.  
Nepal’s transition can be successful only when Nepali politicians 
can keep aside their vested and narrow political interests and 
collectively work for achieving broader national interests. Different 
groups with their various demands at present wait until the 
accomplishment of the constituent assembly elections and the 
formation of an elected government. It is crucially important to 
review the past achievements and the past problems, focusing on 
the process, mechanisms, outcomes, and the spirit of various 
agreements (by avoiding to engage in blames and counter blames), 
and coming forward with commitments to order new  institutional 
arrangements and appropriate processes and procedures that can 
ensure a smooth transition from a state of war to of the conditions 
of peace, by holding the  constituent assembly election ,and by 
honestly addressing the grievances of the Nepalese people.  
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